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Abstract
Building on existing analysis of chronic poverty, social protection and remote rural areas 
(particularly mountainous areas), this thesis examines the synergies between the three 
issues in order to assess the suitability of social protection strategies to address chronic 
poverty in these harsh environments. The social protection measure of workfare is found 
to be a natural fit with both chronic poverty and remote rural areas. Primary data from a 
workfare program in the remote Kamali region of Nepal was gathered and is used to 
examine what social protection can do for the chronically poor and how it is able to 
achieve these results. The program is shown to be able to provide income, assets and 
insurance to the chronically poor through a variety of means. Eight key elements of 
workfare programs enhance the ability of the programs to provide the benefits that 
address the particular needs of the chronically poor in remote rural areas.
In choosing appropriate interventions to address the immediate and longer-term needs of 
the chronically poor who suffer under a number of constraints (not just a lack of income), 
the choice is not between welfare mechanisms, which smooth the income of the 
transitorily poor, and growth-oriented development interventions. Social protection 
strategies are much more than simple welfare mechanisms; they do act as a safety net to 
stop the chronically poor falling further into poverty but they also act as a ladder to 
facilitate the escape from poverty. They can support and enhance growth and should be 
viewed as an investment, not simply a cost. Workfare is so well suited to addressing 
chronic poverty in the case study area that in extremely remote environments it goes 
beyond being a strategy that could be used to being one that should be used. It offers 
active pathways out of chronic poverty and even in performing its safety net function, 
provides a security of income that has the potential to act as a livelihood promotion
measure.
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C H A P T E R  1
Introduction
Chronic poverty, defined as the experience of severe deprivation for an extended period 
or for the entirety of a person’s life, has received increased attention recently. There is 
increasing recognition in certain developing countries that, despite achieving reductions 
in poverty due to people participating in growing economies, there are parts of 
populations that are unable to effectively participate in a country’s growth and who are 
remaining extremely poor. To examine the phenomenon of chronic poverty, the Chronic 
Poverty Research Centre was established in 2000 as an independent research centre in the 
United Kingdom. One of the fields of analysis the Centre has identified as requiring 
particular attention is remote rural areas. A focus on these areas is required because there 
is a danger that they will be left even further behind as their countries develop. Other 
poverty stricken people in developing countries are often excluded from development 
processes for a variety of reasons but, in remote rural areas, market failure is severe; there 
is often no access to functioning markets or to basic services which are provided as 
standard in more integrated areas.
Ravallion and Jalan (1997) have termed areas where poverty seems to be determined by 
the physical environment “spatial poverty traps”. The remote rural area of the Kamali 
Zone, where the case study for this thesis is situated, clearly displays the characteristics 
of such a trap. The surrounding Hindu Kush-Himalaya is a mountainous region 
encompassing 150 million people who live in eight countries; Nepal, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, India, China (Tibet and Qinghai), Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. While 
there are many obvious differences between the peoples of the region, the characteristics 
of the constraints that keep them in a situation of chronic poverty are generally the same 
even though the people may be constrained by the particular characteristic to a greater or
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lesser extent. Thus, the findings of the case study may be applicable to a large part of the 
immediate region and potentially elsewhere in comparable environments.
There is evidence to suggest that people in remote rural areas are often in a situation that 
has been described by de Haan and Lipton (1998) as a “logjam of disadvantage”. This 
refers to a state of having so many layers of constraints and disadvantages that reinforce 
each other that it is almost impossible to escape from poverty. The logjam works at the 
level of the individual, the household, the group and the region. This thesis aims to better 
understand the logjam and to consider ways in which it could be dismantled. This will be 
done by concentrating on new research at the level of the region, looking at chronic 
poverty in relation to remote rural areas. The spatial dimension of poverty will be shown 
to be the most difficult log to shift and the one deemed by most chronically poor as their 
key constraint. It will be argued that social protection strategies - that is, strategies aimed 
at reducing chronic conditions and acute risk - are essential to provide the chronically 
poor with the necessary resources for them to begin the dismantling process themselves.
Within the literature, chronic poverty is generally viewed as being due to a lack of assets 
and transitional (or periodic) poverty due to a lack of access to income smoothing 
strategies. The latter is seen to be best addressed by some type of safety net mechanism 
and the former requires more active income generating development strategies. Chronic 
poverty is characterised by a lack of assets but it is also characterised by an extreme 
vulnerability which can be best addressed, as a first step, by social protection strategies. 
Vulnerability, defined as the inability to cope in adverse conditions, is most often 
associated with transitional poverty as this inability to cope is what causes the slide into 
poverty. However, the concept of vulnerability should also be central to the 
understanding of chronic poverty as people in chronic poverty experience the inability to 
cope on a regular basis. The ability of social protection to address this vulnerability can 
then provide pathways out of chronic poverty by, for example, increasing risk-taking 
behaviour that can serve to increase production. While social protection in some 
circumstances will still be able to be viewed as a safety net, it can also importantly be 
viewed as a ladder, and thus focusing on ex ante measures, which provide greater security
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to populations and reduce the use of safety nets, is a rational strategy to pursue for the 
chronically poor.
Social protection for the chronically poor in this thesis will be examined in the context of 
recent research that has been undertaken at the level of the region that supports the belief 
that a macro view of the causes of poverty in remote rural areas should be taken. This 
research suggests that poverty in remote rural areas results primarily from the constraints 
of being in an unfavourable geographic location rather than because of individual 
household endowments. Inequality is low but there is an inability to leave poverty 
because, even if a household is able to increase its resources, human or material, it is still 
constrained by the surrounding environment. The extent to which other development 
strategies can function effectively until this geographic constraint is addressed is in 
doubt. Thus, in the absence of infrastructure or asset provision from any other sources, an 
effective social protection strategy in remote rural areas must have some focus on 
reducing the isolation of the population.
In light of the analysis of social protection as an appropriate strategy to address chronic 
poverty, combined with the analysis of the view that whatever the situation of the 
household the condition of chronic poverty will remain because of physical location 
constraints, the thesis will examine how social protection can improve the situation of 
extremely vulnerable households within the overriding constraint of the physical 
environment. In doing so, the thesis will examine whether regional targeting of social 
protection measures is appropriate and how any social protection measures can 
complement or displace existing informal arrangements. The overarching research 
question is: can social protection be an appropriate mechanism to address the 
particular needs of the chronically poor in remote rural areas? In answering this 
question the thesis’s key arguments are: 1) that social protection measures are 
essential in remote rural areas in order to enable people to effectively address 
chronic poverty and 2) that such programs can fit well with both the characteristics 
of remote rural areas and the needs of the chronically poor. While it is recognised 
that other state and private interventions will be required to address poverty, without
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social protection policies the chronically poor will be less able to adequately express their 
capabilities and take advantage of opportunities to exit poverty.
In summary, the objectives of this research are to:
1) establish that remote rural areas are often characterised by spatial concentrations of 
chronically poor whose pathways out of poverty are constrained and ascertain the 
main contributory factors to the chronic poverty;
2) examine the assertion that, no matter what the household resources, the primary cause 
of poverty in remote rural areas is the physical environment;
3) establish that social protection is key to addressing the vulnerabilities of the 
chronically poor in remote rural areas;
4) investigate appropriate social protection strategies given the new information about 
the dynamics of chronic poverty in remote rural areas and form a hypothesis about 
what particular social protection mechanism suits the characteristics of the 
chronically poor in remote rural areas; and,
5) test the hypothesis in the Kamali Zone of the remote and mountainous Mid Western 
Nepal.
Research into chronic poverty in remote rural areas is essential if any real steps towards 
its eradication are to be made. Unless appropriate measures are taken, millions of people 
may be stranded in chronic poverty in these remote areas, unable to participate in their 
countries’ growth. This research does not aim to provide all of the answers to the very 
difficult issues being faced by the chronically poor in remote rural areas but instead seeks 
to focus on a certain type of intervention, social protection, and demonstrate its 
complementarity with this type of poverty in these types of environments.
The thesis is divided into six chapters:
Chapter 2 examines the current literature on chronic poverty, social protection and 
remote rural areas and begins to draw some linkages between the three.
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Chapter 3 looks at various social protection mechanisms and argues that for the 
chronically poor in remote rural areas, workfare programs are a suitable mechanism 
to address the particular type of poverty in the particular environment.
Chapter 4 provides background to the case study set in the Kamali Zone in Mid 
Western Nepal in terms of the development situation across Nepal and in its remote 
rural mountainous areas in particular. It provides further background on the specific 
geographical location and the characteristics of the population of the Kamali Zone 
and details the workfare program on which the case study will focus.
Chapter 5 forms the case study where the hypotheses drawn in Chapter 3 are tested in 
the case study area and focuses on the extent to which spatial concentrations of 
chronic poverty exist as well as what the workfare program is able to do for the 
chronically poor in remote areas and how it is able to do it.
Based on the findings of Chapter 5, Chapter 6 concludes with an assessment of social 
protection’s ability to address chronic poverty in remote rural areas.
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C H A P T E R  2
Overview of Current Arguments, Key Concepts and Definitions
Bringing together research on such complex issues as chronic poverty, social protection 
and remote rural areas requires that, as a first step, each area is examined, current 
thinking outlined and areas of contention highlighted. This will allow a greater 
understanding of how these areas have the potential to complement each other and what 
the limitations may be in seeking to link them. The thesis will then be able to build on 
this work to extend some of the existing analysis surrounding the extent to which social 
protection strategies could potentially be used to effectively address chronic poverty in 
remote rural areas.
2.1 Chronic Poverty
2.1.1 Types of Poverty -  Do they Matter?
The differentiation between types of poverty, in terms of the duration the poverty is 
experienced, is only a relatively recent development. In most of the poverty literature of 
the 1990s poverty is largely viewed as a static concept with the poor being a group of 
around 1.2 billion (Devereux, 2001). There are some benefits in viewing poverty in this 
manner. Having such a large group of people who are seen to be sharing the same 
misfortune can focus the public’s attention on the issue and spur donors to act to alleviate 
poverty. Viewing the poor as a homogenous group also has the benefit to donors of 
simplifying potential interventions and simplifying goals.
While the static concept of poverty is still prevalent, there is an increasing body of 
literature that recognises the dynamic nature of poverty. Some people may move in and 
out of poverty across their entire life course whereas others remain firmly below the 
poverty line. Being able to differentiate between those who are consistently below the
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poverty line and those who occasionally fall below it has been found to have important 
ramifications for how poverty should be addressed.
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) may serve to capture the public’s attention 
but they have been criticised by Hulme and Shepherd (2003) as falling into the trap of 
viewing the poor as a single group with a common problem of having a low income. The 
key MDG is to halve the number of people living on less than $1 a day. This monetary 
focus may be good in terms of mobilising donors but it does little in terms of providing a 
way to address the problem. Poverty is a multidimensional issue. Income is important, 
but the poor, especially those who have been poor for a long period of time, often have 
many obstacles in their way in any attempt to escape poverty. Seeing their prime 
problem as low monetary income does little to guide effective policy. Hulme and 
Shepherd (2003) argue that not ail poor people should be viewed as those who have not 
been effectively integrated into the market as is often assumed. While market forces do 
have the potential to lift many poor people out of poverty, many will miss out. Some of 
the poor experience so many other constraints that they are often unable to take 
advantages of opportunities the market can bring. By not differentiating between the 
different types of poverty people experience, the MDGs make the mistake of focusing 
only on those who can easily be lifted out of poverty.
Despite the MDGs, it is becoming increasingly accepted within the development 
community that poverty is often not simply a phenomenon relating to a lack of income. 
The multidimensional nature of poverty is being recognised, and the income level, while 
important, is being seen for certain groups as just one of the characteristics of poverty 
that needs to be addressed to ensure an escape from poverty.
The question that then arises is: how do policy makers differentiate between those whose 
main problem is a lack of income and those who are kept in a situation of poverty by a 
variety o f constraints? The accepted practice has been to divide those in poverty into two 
groups: the transitorily poor and the chronically poor. The transitorily poor fall into 
poverty at different points across their life courses. It is believed that most poor people
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fall into this group (Barrientos and Shepherd, 2003). The chronically poor in contrast 
remain poor for extended periods of time and are commonly victims of intergenerational 
poverty (Bird et al, 2001). They are also likely to produce offspring who will remain in 
poverty. The chance of escaping poverty is tied to how long a person has experienced 
poverty (Yaqub, 2002). Duration is thus the key determinant of chronic poverty.
However, there is still some contention over the length of time in poverty which relates to 
long-term persistent poverty. In a study of developed countries, Yaqub (ibid) found that 
the probability of poverty increases conditionally on past years’ poverty and that after 
four years of poverty most remained in poverty. Such data does not exist for developing 
countries, so it is yet to be determined what length of time in poverty will likely extend to 
a lifetime of poverty (Barrientos and Shepherd, 2003).
While most countries do not distinguish in their poverty alleviation strategies between 
chronic and transitory poverty, Barrientos and Shepherd (2003) highlight that there is a 
fundamental political bias away from addressing chronic poverty. The distinction 
between chronic poverty and transitory poverty needs to be clearly made so that policy 
makers are not under the misapprehension that their strategies affect all types of poverty 
equally. The bias arises because generally more people are affected by transitory 
poverty, and it is a more widespread phenomenon across different parts of society (ibid, 
2003). Further, because transitory poverty normally involves temporary income 
shortfalls, it is easier and faster to address than chronic poverty which can involve a long 
period of unpicking various social and economic constraints. Governments thus obtain 
more political mileage from strategies which address transitory poverty.
The drivers of transitory poverty and chronic poverty are very different, and hence the 
policy responses also need to be very different. Appropriate policy responses will be 
covered in greater detail later in this thesis, and there is some contention over how the 
two types of poverty should be handled, but typically income smoothing strategies are 
suggested for transitory poverty and strategies to increase assets and returns to labour and 
capital are suggested for chronic poverty (McCulloch and Baulch, 1999). It is thus 
important to ensure that targeting of particular groups is not based on data from one point
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in time. Making policy decisions based on income or consumption in a single time 
period risks including the transitorily poor who are having temporarily bad fortunes and 
excluding the chronically poor who are having temporarily good fortunes (ibid).
2.1.2 Who are the Chronically Poor?
The multidimensional nature of chronic poverty renders it difficult to measure. Monetary 
measures do not capture all of the dynamics of poor people’s lives. Further, panel data is 
most often based on the household unit, but it has been recognised that severe inequities 
can exist within households resulting in the chronically poor living within non-poor, or 
transitorily poor, households. These problems of measurement remain, especially in 
areas where data is scarce. The main measurement approaches must thus be seen as best 
estimates.
There are three key measurement approaches: 1) the spells approach; 2) the components 
approach; and, 3) the use of proxies. Under the spells approach, the chronically poor are 
identified by the number and length of periods they experience below the poverty line.
For example, a household would be considered chronically poor if, over a period of ten 
years, its income was below the poverty line each year. The components approach 
distinguishes the permanent component of a households income or consumption from the 
transitory components. A household is considered chronically poor if this permanent 
component remains below the poverty line (McKay and Lawson, 2003). Under the 
components approach, chronic poverty is measured by average income below the poverty 
line over a specific period. Using the same example as above, a household would be 
considered chronically poor if its average income over the ten year period was below the 
poverty line regardless of the situation in individual years.
McCulloch and Baulch (2003), in their analysis of poverty in rural Pakistan, used the 
components approach. They deemed a household to be chronically poor if its mean 
income was below the poverty line and to be transitorily poor if its mean income was 
above the poverty line but its annual income fell below the poverty line at least once 
during the period being analysed. This method of calculation thus means that chronically
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poor households may not always be poor; that is, they could have some years above the 
poverty line but the other years would be sufficiently extreme to pull their overall average 
income below the poverty line or, alternatively, one extremely good year could 
potentially push a household average income above the poverty line. Yaqub (2002) 
contends that this method of calculation is a more accurate way to calculate transitory 
poverty and that the spells approach generally overestimates those in transitory poverty 
by up to 25 percent.
The recognition of the complexity of chronic poverty, and the misleading nature of 
income and consumption figures, has led to a greater focus on proxies for chronic 
poverty. To make static data more dynamic, certain indicators are being used which 
assist in capturing the nature of chronic poverty. In cases where indicators can be 
identified which have implications for duration, such as illiteracy or stunting, such 
proxies can be used to complement the income or consumption analysis of chronic 
poverty. The use of proxies has the benefit of being able to look over longer term time 
periods without short term fluctuations affecting the results (McKay and Lawson, 2003).
While the chronically poor may not necessarily be the poorest at any point in time, they 
are often severely poor (which is normally defined as living off under US $1 to US $2 a 
day). An analysis of the severity of poverty sometimes accompanies the duration 
analysis. In Mehta and Shah’s (2003) investigation of chronic poverty in India, in 
addition to the analysis on duration and the multidimensional nature of chronic poverty, 
they focus on the severity of poverty to provide some further depth to the chronic poverty 
analysis. The severely poor have incomes at 75 percent of the poverty line or less, are 
unable to withstand shocks and are suffering from hunger, being unable to access two 
“square meals” a day (ibid). Knowing how severely poor the chronically poor are can 
assist in formulating methods to address their problems. The importance of developing a 
greater understanding of the characteristics of the chronically poor is further elaborated 
below.
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2.1.3 What are the Key Characteristics o f Chronic Poverty?
The determination of the characteristics of the chronically poor versus the transitorily 
poor has been the subject of much analysis (McCulloch and Calandrino, 2003; Jalan and 
Ravallion, 1998; McCulloch and Baulch, 1999). Results have been reasonably similar 
but there have been some differences in the findings. Chronic poverty and transitory 
poverty have been broadly differentiated in the past by looking at the level of assets; the 
chronically poor are generally very asset poor. Recent analysis has looked more closely at 
other characteristics of the chronically poor and has found the following:
1) Demographic Characteristics such as household size are more important to 
chronically poor households than transitorily poor households (Jalan and 
Ravallion, 1998). The household composition is also important, but it is unclear 
from the research the extent to which the dependency ratio is a determinant of 
chronic poverty. While household size is important, some analysis shows the 
dependency ratio to be a key characteristic of chronic poverty. McCulloch and 
Baulch (1999) assert that the chronically poor have a statistically higher 
dependency ratio than the never poor, whereas the transitorily poor do not. This 
finding is thus seen by the authors to be significant for targeting purposes for 
policy makers; the dependency ratio could be used as a proxy for chronic poverty. 
Bhide and Mehta’s (2003) study of chronic poverty in India also found the 
number of dependent children to be a determining factor of severe poverty. Other 
analysis, however, shows that the dependency ratio is not significantly associated 
with being chronically poor (McCulloch and Calandrino, 2003). Further, 
generalisations such as “single parent households are more likely to be part of the 
long term poor” (McKay and Lawson, 2003; 431) can mask the complexity of the 
characteristics of chronic poverty. For example, in a study of chronic poverty in 
rural Sichuan it was found that female-headed households were less likely to be 
chronically poor, perhaps because of remittances (McCulloch and Calandrino, 
2003). What was found to be a more important factor was the reason behind the 
household having a single female head. Widowed females heading households 
were more likely to be chronically poor. Data tables are unlikely to provide such 
detailed information.
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2) Human capital characteristics have been found to be an important determining 
factor of chronic poverty. Having low formal and informal education levels has 
been identified as having an association with chronic poverty (McKay and 
Lawson, 2003) but there remains some contention over the extent to which 
education is an appropriate strategy to lift people from chronic poverty. The role 
of education, and its importance as an initial condition required to exit chronic 
poverty, will be covered in more depth later in this section.
3) Livelihood characteristics - that is, how a person earns a living - can be linked to 
chronic poverty. In a study of chronic poverty in Bangladesh, the non-poor 
workforce and those rising out of poverty were shown to have significantly 
moved to the non-farm sectors. In the 12 year study, the percentage of non-poor in 
the non-farm sector had increased from 36 to 61 percent, and those rising from 
poverty had increased their non-farm activities from 38 to 56 percent (Sen, 2003). 
The proportion of the chronically poor engaged in non-farm activities had only 
moved from 23 to 38 percent (ibid). Caution must be taken when generalising, as 
even though most of the literature would suggest that an agricultural worker in a 
marginal area with no access to off-farm employment or any social protection 
measures would be vulnerable to chronic poverty, this may not always be the 
case. Research in Peru, for example, has found that chronic poverty is associated 
with household heads employed outside the household (McKay and Lawson, 
2003). Other complicating factors can be the layers of exclusions a worker 
experiences. The occupational status may not be associated with chronic poverty 
for men, but for women there may be a strong association. Female agricultural 
workers in India, for example, are normally paid one half or two thirds that of the 
male workers (Mehta and Shah, 2002). Therefore, while a person’s occupational 
status can be a key characteristic of chronic poverty it must be viewed carefully to 
determine its impact on keeping them poor.
4) Mobility characteristics are not often mentioned in the general literature 
reviewing chronic poverty but recent research on migration shows that often those 
who do not migrate are the ones most likely to be chronically poor (Kothari, 
2002). The less poor have the ability to shift to different locations to maximise
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their earning opportunities (Hossain et al,2003). Even if this is a “struggle to stay 
put” as Rogaly (2003) terms it, those who can take advantage of being able to 
leave home to undertake what may be arduous manual work are generally not 
chronically poor. Indeed, Kothari (2002) states that it is often only the less poor 
who have the necessary capitals - that is, the human, social and economic capitals 
- to take advantage of this strategy. McDowell and de Haan (1997) support this 
analysis through their finding that landless migrants generally migrate less.
Kothari (2002; 4) notes that the most chronically poor are those who stay in an 
area where others have left as “it is a condition of their poverty, through the 
peculiarities of their exclusion, which prohibits migration as an option”.
5) Geographical location characteristics are increasing in importance as more is 
being leamt about the chronically poor. It is being increasingly accepted that 
geographic location can be the primary determinant of chronic poverty (Ravalhon 
and Wodon, 1997; McCulloch and Calandrino, 2003). This characteristic of 
chronic poverty is one of the prime areas of focus for this thesis and will be 
examined in greater detail later in this chapter.
2.1.4 Why Fall, Why Stay, Why Rise?
While it is useful to have an understanding of the characteristics of the chronically poor, 
it is necessary to go beyond this analysis to look for the processes at work. The 
transitorily poor are characterised by their dynamism - they move into and out of poverty. 
The chronically poor, although defined by their duration in poverty, are not a static 
group. The processes which have led them to chronic poverty, which keep them in 
chronic poverty, and which prevent or allow exit from this state, are extremely important 
areas of analysis.
Hulme’s (2003a) analysis of life histories as a method of understanding poverty dynamics 
points to two very clear processes. The first is related to the slide into poverty and how 
strategies to prevent the slide, such as the use of economic and social capitals, can fail. 
The second related to how, once the slide has occurred, the subjects of the analysis 
became trapped and were unable to improve their social and economic circumstances
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{ibid). Hulme and Shepherd (2003) add a further dynamic, the escape from chronic 
poverty. Analysing how the chronically poor are able to lift themselves to a less poor 
status is key to any understanding of appropriate strategies to combat chronic poverty.
In a study of rural Pakistan, Baulch and McCulloch (2002) find that the correlates of 
poverty status and entry and exit into poverty can differ. The correlates of poverty status 
were the dependency ratio and the geographic location, whereas the correlates of entry 
and exit related to education and livestock ownership. The policy recommendation was 
thus that the focus should be on decreasing the entry points and increasing the exit points 
rather than focusing on the correlates of poverty status.
Very different factors can be involved in entry to and exit from chronic poverty. The 
descent into poverty is generally characterised by income shocks arising particularly from 
natural disasters and ill health, whereas the ascent from poverty is characterised by the 
ability to overcome structural obstacles and to pursue multiple strategies at the one time 
(Sen, 2003). Households that have been able to exit chronic poverty have been found to 
be faster accumulators of financial, physical and human assets and were better 
diversifiers, especially into non-agricultural activities {ibid). However, even when these 
obstacles can be overcome, Yaqub (2002) notes that there is a “distance” problem; that is, 
many of those who are able to escape poverty do not rise far. In a South African study, 
the income of 41 percent of those who exited poverty remained within 1.25 times the 
poverty line {ibid).
2.1.5 Importance o f Initial Conditions in Exiting Chronic Poverty 
Having a good understanding of how people fall into chronic poverty, why they stay 
there and how they leave is helpful in developing policy to lift people out of chronic 
poverty. What deserves more attention are the constraints preventing people from 
accessing the appropriate strategies to exit chronic poverty. In Sen’s (2003) analysis of 
the strategies for exiting poverty, he emphasised the importance of initial conditions in 
being able to successfully access these strategies. The initial conditions of the chronically 
poor are typically such that their ability to combine appropriate strategies to successfully
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exit poverty is diminished. The probability of successfully avoiding or exiting chronic 
poverty has been shown by Sen to be very closely tied to initial asset position. There is 
some contention in the literature as to the relative importance of other initial conditions 
that assist in successfully avoiding or successfully exiting chronic poverty. The 
importance of education, literacy in particular, is especially contentious.
In a study of chronic poverty in rural Uganda, the ability of a household to move out of 
poverty was shown to be influenced by its initial asset base, its health status and its 
access to electricity and infrastructure (Bird and Shinyekwa, 2003). When looking for 
appropriate policy approaches to assist in exiting poverty, the study emphasised that 
improving infrastructure such as road access was less important than improving 
household characteristics such as the number of literate household members and the 
quality of the land holdings. De Haan and Dubey, (2003 ) support the focus on the quality 
of assets by noting in their study of chronic poverty in India that part of the scheduled 
tribes’ disadvantages stem from not having less land but having more marginal land.
In examining the effectiveness of economic growth on poverty in India, Datt and 
Ravallion (2002) emphasise the importance of initial conditions such as education, health 
and landlessness for the effectiveness of non-agricultural growth in decreasing poverty. 
Particular emphasis is placed on literacy. Low educational attainment has reduced the 
capacity of people to participate in the opportunities that come with growth. A key 
finding of their study is that economic reform must go hand in hand with human resource 
development to be able to have any real achievement in poverty reduction (ibid).
While not providing a direct link to existing chronic poverty, education was shown to be 
important in McCulloch and Calandrino’s (2003) study of chronic poverty in rural 
Sichuan both in terms of the household head and other members of the household. Poor 
education greatly increased the chance of being chronically poor. Jalan and Ravallion 
(1998) supported this notion in their study of chronic poverty in rural China and further 
noted that household education levels had little effect on transitory poverty. Living in an
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area with better attainments in health and education reduced chronic poverty, but not 
transitory poverty (ibid).
Education has many meanings, and some studies have sought to differentiate the level of 
education and the effect on chronic poverty. Levels from basic literacy to secondary 
schooling have been shown to be the important level in a number of these studies 
(McKay and Lawson, 2003). In the Bangladeshi study, Sen (2003) showed that the initial 
endowments of human capital were extremely important. The never poor had average 
years of schooling levels three times higher than that of the chronically poor. As well as 
characterising the poor, he found that households rising out of chronic poverty had 
increasing average years of schooling. While this would seem to lend weight to an 
argument that schooling levels positively impact escape from chronic poverty, further 
analysis would be required to determine the extent to which this is just an effect of 
changes in other characteristics or whether the rise can be attributed to schooling; that is, 
whether it is a cause or an effect of exiting poverty.
Not everyone, however, agrees that education is always so closely linked with chronic 
poverty. In an analysis of who escapes and who remains in poverty, Grootart, Kanbur and 
Oh (1997) show that while education is a very important part of escaping poverty in 
urban areas, it plays a much smaller role in rural areas. The initial conditions that 
favoured exit in this African study were households with fewer members, household 
heads younger than 45, well equipped farms and access to non-farm sources of income 
(ibid). Education was not requisite to exit. Literacy has also been shown to potentially 
negatively affect poverty. While Bhide and Mehta (2003) found that in India literacy 
generally is a factor which contributes to the ability to escape from poverty, in examining 
whether literacy levels affected scheduled caste and scheduled tribes more or less so than 
other households, they found that there was an adverse differential impact on scheduled 
tribes. A potential explanation was that literacy reduced the willingness to continue the 
traditional way of life but, due to the isolation of the scheduled tribes, income earning 
opportunities using the literacy skill were rare (ibid).
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Summarising this section, it is clear that there remain some benefits to presenting the 
poor as a homogenous group as has historically been the practice but, as we accumulate 
more knowledge about the chronically poor whose constraints to exiting poverty extend 
well beyond a lack of income, it is impossible to ignore the benefits of disaggregating 
different types of poverty. Only by recognising these different constraints can 
appropriate strategies be designed to prevent people from falling into poverty and 
remaining there, as well as assisting people to exit poverty. It is within this context that 
the next section will examine social protection as a potential strategy for the chronically 
poor.
2.2 Social Protection
2.2.1 What is Social Protection?
Social protection has been an evolving term. Throughout the 1990s it predominantly 
referred to safety nets, a means to stop the vulnerable from slipping into poverty. The 
World Bank, in their 1990 World Development Report, highlighted the importance of 
safety nets as a means to help people through short term shocks (World Bank, 1990). The 
recommended use of safety nets was broadened by the World Bank during the 1990s to 
include those in chronic poverty, not just those who were at risk of falling into poverty. 
But it was still seen by some to have very strong welfare connotations and to reduce the 
poor to “passive recipients of handouts” and it “made very little contribution to broader 
development goals or to sustainable poverty reduction” (Devereux, 2002a; 661). As a 
result of this criticism a greater emphasis was put on the proactive nature of social 
protection. It is being increasingly seen as not just a means to catch people when they are 
falling, but also as a “rope”, a “ladder” or a “trampoline” to help people exit poverty 
(Conway and Norton, 2002).
This new understanding of social protection - that is, as a way out of poverty - carries 
with it a number of new meanings. It is no longer just trying to address the symptoms of
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poverty, but also the causes, insofar as the causes of poverty are related to the many risks 
that the poor face and their vulnerability to the effects of this risk (World Bank, 2001). 
Because of this focus on risk, social protection is increasingly seen to be forward looking 
and an investment in poverty reduction rather than a cost {ibid). Social protection also 
acknowledges the many different kind of risks that can affect a household and thus 
acknowledges the multidimensional nature of poverty (Barrientos and Shepherd, 2003).
Definitions of social protection vary between different donor agencies and reflect the 
perspective of the particular agency. The World Bank defines social protection as:
“public interventions to (i) assist individuals, households, and communities better manage 
risk, and (ii) provide support to the critically poor” (Holzmann and Jorgensen, 2000).
The emphasis here is on income protection and agency which is in line with the World 
Bank's other strategies (Barrientos and Shepherd, 2003). The International Labour 
Organistion (ILO) defines social protection as “entitlements to benefits that society 
provides to individuals and households -  through public and collective measures -  to 
protect low or declining living standards arising out of a number of basic risks and needs” 
(van Ginneken, 2000). The emphasis here is on basic rights. The definition most 
commonly used in the academic literature is from Conway, De Haan et al (2000) who 
define social protection as consisting of “public actions taken in response to levels of 
vulnerability, risk, and deprivation which are deemed socially unacceptable within a 
given polity or society”.
Perhaps the clearest definition that encompasses all of the above is that given by 
Farrington et al (2003; 1) which is “efforts to reduce the effects of chronic conditions 
(e.g. old age) or acute risk (e.g. drought or economic shocks) on vulnerable groups” . The 
key question then is who are these “vulnerable groups”? To answer this it is necessary to 
look at the concept of vulnerability in greater depth, as it is a term that can have very 
different meanings within the literature.
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2.2.2 Conceptualising Vulnerability
Vulnerability has been viewed in a variety of different ways in the chronic poverty 
literature. Martin Prowse (2003) analysed the Chronic Poverty Research Centre’s 
working papers and found that there were benefits to the study of chronic poverty in 
disaggregating the concept of vulnerability. The most common usage of the word 
vulnerability within the literature was in the sense of “vulnerability to poverty”. Prowse 
highlights that the problem with such an understanding is that it is only focused on the 
transitorily poor and not the chronically poor who are already in poverty. Another 
understanding was vulnerability to the effects of poverty. Rather than focusing on the 
likelihood of falling below the poverty line, this conceptualisation focused on the 
outcomes of poverty such as lower nutrition, education etc. Others saw vulnerability as a 
cause of poverty in the sense of vulnerability to shocks. It was also viewed as just one 
dimension of the many dimensions of poverty.
Prowse (ibid) does not dismiss any of the conceptualisations of poverty, but he does point 
to their limitations and sees benefits in viewing vulnerability as a cause, symptom and 
constituent part of chronic poverty. The most important link to be made in any discussion 
of vulnerability is that between vulnerability and risk. Hulme and Shepherd (2003) make 
this link by suggesting that vulnerability should be seen as the risk that a household will 
be unable to cope in the face of adverse conditions. Such a conceptualisation allows for 
the fact that all of the vulnerable are not chronically poor, but all of the chronically poor 
are vulnerable.
Arguments have been made that greater attention needs to be paid to vulnerability 
because a hazard is just a hazard until it intersects with a vulnerable population; it then 
becomes a disaster (Prowse, 2003). The hazard could be a natural event such as a heavy 
monsoon or an economic event such as the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Ninety-nine 
percent of all natural hazard disaster related deaths occur in the developing world (ibid).
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Diagram 1 -  Vulnerability and Disasters
Hazard
Vulnerable population of 
the developing world
Disaster No disaster
Developed world 
population
Source: Author
That so few people die from natural disasters in the developed world leads to the view 
that it is the vulnerability of the population rather than the hazards that require attention 
(Chambers, 1989). Devereux (2002a) supports the two dimensional view of vulnerability, 
the first being the exposure to risk (i.e. likelihood that a shock will affect an individual), 
and the second, the susceptibility to that exposure (i.e. the ability to cope). In the case of 
the chronically poor, the ability to cope is impeded by layers of constraints, such as their 
sex, caste or ethnicity, that have kept them in poverty for such a long duration. One extra 
layer o f constraint could make the difference between coping and not coping.
With such renewed focus on the importance of vulnerability, it is unsurprising that the 
idea of measuring it arises in the literature. However, the problem with measuring 
vulnerability is that it is in a sense a measure of those things which are not there; an 
absence of “voice”, social protection, basic needs and coping options (Prowse, 2003).
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Because vulnerability is a cause, symptom and constituent part of chronic poverty, it 
further complicates measurement. McCulloch and Calandrino (2003) attempt to measure 
vulnerability, and while the analysis does complement the work they also undertook on 
the determinants of chronic poverty, their definition of vulnerability was very narrow: the 
probability of a household being below the poverty line in any given year (ibid). They 
were also looking backwards, and measuring how households reacted to changing 
conditions rather than trying to determine who are the vulnerable before any shocks push 
them into poverty.
While the measurement of vulnerability is difficult, a proxy used by some is asset balance 
(ODI, 2003; Moser 1998). This focus on assets is due to the emphasis put on the capacity 
to cope with shocks. Economic, social and physical endowments can determine how well 
a household can withstand a shock. Such assets can be measured before any such shocks 
occur. As will be discussed below, having an ex ante focus, such as this view of assets, 
rather than ex post, is important when looking for ways to most effectively protect 
vulnerable populations.
2.2.3 Types o f Social Protection
Social protection is very broad in scope. It covers interventions as diverse as giving 
handouts of food to strengthening market links between rural and urban areas. While 
social protection can take many forms, all social protection activities can be distinguished 
as being either a promotional measure, a preventative measure or a protective measure 
(Guhan, 1994). Some social protection interventions may fall into more than one of these 
categories.
This conceptualisation of social protection moves from the macro to the micro 
environment. Promotional measures, for example, focus on ways to improve real incomes 
and capabilities and often focus on the economic environment and ways to reduce 
constraints to productive economic activity (Kabeer, 2002). Prevention methods are the 
ex ante approaches that focus on direct poverty alleviation strategies designed to make 
people less vulnerable and avert deprivation. Ex ante measures to reduce risk have
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received renewed attention of late as they effectively reduce the need to cope and 
decrease the need for ex post safety net measures (Devereux, 2001). When the 
promotional and preventative social protection strategies fail or, more commonly, do not 
exist, protective measures are required. These are the typical safety nets which are 
necessary to stop people falling into extreme poverty which they may not be able to 
escape, or if already living in extreme or chronic poverty, some level of safety net can 
guarantee basic survival.
There are some clear cross overs between the different types of social protection. For 
example, just the existence of protective safety nets can act to change the risk taking 
behaviour of people in chronic poverty. Not living in constant fear of a calamity and 
preparing for such events allow other objectives to be pursued (Unni and Rani, 2003). It 
could also be argued that even if pursuing these other objectives is unsuccessful, creating 
an environment where people are no longer living in constant fear is a goal in itself.
Safety nets thus have a clear role in promoting livelihoods as well as the role they are 
commonly ascribed as just being purely protective measures. The promotional role is 
often undervalued and has the potential to increase the focus on protective measures as a 
way to address chronic poverty (Devereux, 2002a). This link between security and risk 
taking will be examined in greater detail below.
2.2.4 Risk Minimisation as a Precondition for Security and Growth 
Risk and vulnerability are key drivers of the descent into poverty but the literature has 
been unclear on the extent to which risk and vulnerability keep people in a state of 
chronic poverty (Barrientos and Shepherd, 2003). Much of the recent literature on 
chronic poverty makes at least some mention of risk and its effects on productivity.
Hulme and Shepherd (2003) suggest that the poor’s main concern is not that their level of 
capabilities, income or consumption are low, but rather that they will experience a 
decline in their existing levels. The key argument is that in endeavouring to decrease 
exposure to adverse events in bad times the resulting effect can lead to lowering average 
returns in good times (Conway and Norton, 2002). The poor cannot afford a major 
setback so, in the absence of sufficient social protection measures, they do not have the
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luxury of taking risks in good times which, if not successful, could damage their ability to 
cope in bad times. This entrepreneurial constraint is a possible explanation for the 
duration of chronic poverty.
Wood (2003; 455) extends this analysis by suggesting that “the determining condition for 
poor people is uncertainty” and that security is so valued by the poor that they will not 
always make rational choices. The continued need to survive in the present often causes 
the poor to discount the future, which can sometimes lead to a patron-client relationship 
which serves this security need but also limits access to exit routes from poverty. Any 
type of strategic preparation for the future is continuously postponed for survival and 
security in the present {ibid).
Access to formal risk minimisation measures to deal with this overwhelming need for 
some level of security are generally absent for the poor. In Hulme’s (2003a) analysis of 
the decline into poverty o f a mother and son in Bangladesh, he demonstrates how the 
need to sell all of the family’s assets to pay for medical costs was one of the main drivers 
of the descent into poverty. Health insurance could have prevented such a decline, but 
such formal mechanisms are rare for people in developing countries working in the 
informal sector. Credit access is similarly rare for poor people, even though recent studies 
suggest that households that rise out of poverty generally have higher access to credit 
(Sen 2003). The absence of private insurance and credit markets from poor rural areas of 
developing countries would suggest that it is commercially not viable and it is a service 
that the government would have to take up, but recent analysis suggests that the need is 
so great for the poor that cost is not a major barrier to uptake, and therefore tremendous 
potential exists for the commercial provision of such services (Devereux, 2001).
While much of the chronic poverty literature focuses on risk and vulnerability and the 
behavioural effects of being part of a vulnerable group, there has been some focus lately 
on the contention that risk averse behaviour comes not from being vulnerable but from a 
resignation to continued deprivation. The argument is that continued deprivation can 
generate its own behavioural patterns which entrench poverty (Barrientos and Shepherd,
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2003). Thus while chronic poverty can in part be understood in terms of risk and 
response, it may not take account of some of the structural factors which characterise 
chronic poverty. Too much focus on agency may not give a comprehensive 
understanding of chronic poverty {ibid). Aliber (2001) supports this view in highlighting 
the psychological dimension of poverty. Being resigned to being poor is seen as an 
important correlate to chronic poverty. It manifests itself in discouragement and risk 
aversion due to the belief that the poverty will endure no matter what action is taken 
{ibid). Moser (1998) also acknowledges that people’s ability to recover from shocks is 
influenced by the psychological effects of deprivation and exclusion. While in a sense, 
this line of analysis is reminiscent of the literature on the “culture of poverty” of the 
1960s (Lewis, 1961), it is relevant in this context because it could give some guidance on 
the effects of duration on the likelihood of escape from poverty and the potential 
reduction in agency of the chronically poor. It may also provide a realistic insight into the 
potential productivity increases delivered by reducing risk through social protection 
measures.
2.2.5 Compatibility Between Growth and Social Protection
Social protection has entered the mainstream development agenda and the debate has 
largely moved from whether or not social protection measures should be undertaken to 
what type of measures are the most appropriate. However, social protection has not been 
embraced with the same enthusiasm by all parties, and there remain some doubts about 
whether pursuing such policies at the expense of others, such as direct economic growth 
promotion, is the most effective way to decrease poverty. Arguing for a greater focus on 
export led growth in Africa, Fafchamps et al (2001) argue that development assistance 
has been unsuccessful largely due to a focus on social protection alongside growth 
promotion. Dollar and Kray (2000) also argue that the poor’s share of income is not 
significantly affected by social spending. A further key criticism is that the leakages to 
non-target groups, and the adverse incentive effects on labour and savings, result in a 
serious trade-off against efficiency and growth (Ravallion, 2003). But perhaps the most 
common criticism of social protection strategies is that the poor are so numerous and 
governments’ resources are so limited that no meaningful impact can be made {ibid).
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Further research is required into the link between social protection and poverty reduction, 
but there is an emerging body of literature that supports the view that the benefits of 
social protection extend far beyond improvements in equity and do not necessarily 
involve any trade-off with economic growth (Ravallion, 2003). One of the key 
misconceptions is that the poor are a homogenous group who would be treated in the 
same manner in any social protection intervention and which would render effective 
interventions unaffordable. As has been argued earlier in this thesis, the poor are far from 
a homogenous group.
A typical starting point for the analysis of social protection measures is the cost of the 
interventions. The cost aspect is emphasised by its detractors with little focus on the 
potential economic benefits social protection measures can bring (Holzmann and 
Jorgensen, 2000). However, in trying to address the causes of risk and vulnerability, 
social protection measures are very much investments in developing the capacity of the 
poor to reduce the need to cope (Barientos and Shepherd, 2003).
The key economic argument which supports social protection measures is: “that effective 
social protection arrangements put in place by the state can help the poor to escape 
poverty traps and participate in the economy, promote growth and ensure that when a 
major crisis hits, households do not fall as far, and can ‘bounce back faster’ (Conway and 
Norton, 2002; 534). Some sort of minimum income security is necessary for 
development. In examining the extent to which safety nets can reduce chronic poverty, 
Devereux (2002a) supports this view by arguing that there are many safety net programs 
targeted at the working poor and therefore directly impacting labour productivity. He also 
highlights the income and employment multipliers generated by income transfers to poor 
households.
One of the main arguments against social protection measures is the perceived trade-off 
between growth and income transfers. However, Ravallion (2003) proposes three 
arguments against there being a trade-off between increasing growth and decreasing
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inequality: 1) people require appropriate nutrition to be productive; 2) the failure of credit 
markets means that many of the poor are unable to invest in physical and human capital 
and hence unable to exploit economic opportunities; and, 3) market failures create a link 
between spatial inequalities and growth, and therefore policies which compensate for 
these failures can stimulate growth. Transfers which were previously considered straight 
welfare measures can thus be analysed in terms of their potential economic impact. This 
can turn typical development arguments on their head, such as the long held belief that 
increasing growth decreases poverty. While this remains generally true, it also holds that 
decreasing poverty, through social protection measures, can increase growth. In 
supporting this view, Devereux (2002a) points to the cross-country finding that 
increasing GDP by one percent increases calorie intake by 538 kcal/day. Looking at the 
issue in reverse, if dietary energy supply is increased to 2,770 kcal/day, GDP per capita 
would increase by 1.23 percent per annum. Devereux (ibid; 663) concludes that: “feeding 
the poor is not just good social policy, it is also a sound economic investment”.
Diagram 2 -  Poverty and Growth -  Changing Views
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Even if growth is viewed as the main way to assist people to exit poverty, growth in itself 
does not reduce the need for social protection. In most developing countries, the majority 
of the chronically poor remain in the informal sector and thus lack access to normal 
formal sector benefits which come with growth (Unni and Rani, 2003).
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Sometimes social protection measures are supported for the pure welfare reason of 
decreasing inequality. The growth benefits are not examined and the measure supported 
purely for equity’s sake (Ravallion, 2003). As described above, there is a growing view 
that pursuing equity also can have strong economic growth implications. In a recent study 
Ravallion (ibid) found that the growth rate of mean household income will be lower the 
higher the initial inequality. This is supported by Jha (2000) in a study of poverty and 
inequality in India, who found that the rise in inequality diminished the poverty-reducing 
effects of economic growth.
2.2.6 Traditional Safety Net Displacement
While investing in social protection measures may be positive for economic growth, if 
people are coping why should the government invest resources which could be used 
elsewhere? The key issue is that while people may be coping, they may not be coping 
adequately; coping strategies may be utilising scarce household resources that are 
difficult or impossible to replace. Coping strategies differ enormously, and in the face of 
adverse situations people’s coping strategies may in fact mark a failure to cope. The 
poor’s coping strategies can be evaluated not only by their effectiveness but also by the 
cost and reversibility of each action (Devereux 2001). A survival strategy, such as selling 
an entire herd of animals that represented a household’s sole livelihood, cannot be seen as 
an acceptable coping strategy. Traditional coping strategies which render people 
chronically poor, or keep people in chronic poverty, are not effective.
People have been living with risk and vulnerability for centuries and have not been 
passive in the face of shocks. Traditional safety nets, normally in the form of social 
capital - that is, a reliance on community support - still exist today and there is a lively 
debate about the extent to which functioning traditional social protection measures should 
be built on or replaced. There is a particular concern about “crowding out” mechanisms 
that are working well and leaving beneficiaries of new schemes in the same position as 
they were before, or, if the new transfer scheme is not sustainable, the traditional 
protection may have been broken down to a point that people are left worse off than
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before (Devereux, 2002b). If most of the transfers were coming from the rich in the 
community to the poor, then crowding out would be more of an issue, but the reality is 
that most traditional systems involve poor-to-poor transfers, and so are not robust in the 
face of shocks (Devereux, 2001).
The poor-to-poor transfers offer very limited assistance for a very limited amount of time 
(Prowse 2003) and, in the case of shocks that affect whole communities, they offer 
negligible assistance. Evidence in South Asia and Africa points to poor communities 
facing a period of heightened vulnerability due to traditional rich to poor transfers 
disappearing as a result of the rise in the market economy (Devereux, 2002b). The 
undermining of these traditional practices has occurred before efficient markets and 
services were in place, which could potentially offer the poor other sources of protection 
(ibid).
Traditional mechanisms should not be completely disregarded. Conway and Norton 
(2002) suggest that informal social protection schemes need to be fully understood by 
governments and state sponsored schemes built around them. They do, however, 
emphasise that even if state schemes crowd out traditional schemes this can result in a 
“crowding in” of other benefits, for example, in South Africa, with the introduction of a 
state pension scheme, funds which were previously sent to elderly parents were diverted 
to investments in children’s education (ibid).
2.2.7 Targeting -  Who Should Access Benefits?
During the nineties, in developing countries where some level of social protection 
existed, there was a move away from universal benefits towards targeting. Untargeted 
methods, such as price subsidies, were being disproportionately captured by the non-poor 
(Devereux, 2002b). In India, for example, more than 50 percent of the benefits of 
centrally sponsored schemes have been captured by those other than the intended 
beneficiaries (Farrington et al, 2003). Targeting was seen as a way to counter this 
problem. By targeting resources only to those who are in need, the maximum public 
resources could be transferred to the poor (Devereux, 2002b). However, targeting comes
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with its own difficulties -  it has been found that elaborate targeting gives too much 
discretion to local officials and the schemes are therefore too open to manipulation 
(Farrington et al, 2003). There are also the initial screening costs.
In examining a way around the unintended consequences of targeting, Farrington et al 
(2003) suggest that rather than design cutting edge transfer programs that then have 
troubles in the delivery, the focus should rather be on effective delivery systems. Once a 
delivery system is identified which is resistant to benefits going to those other than the 
intended, the transfer program can be designed around the delivery system. The example 
of an effective delivery system provided by Farrington et al is a post office transfer 
scheme in India where small regular payments are provided to the elderly. The emphasis 
is on cash payments which can be small and regular and which are controlled by some 
degree of automation so only the intended beneficiaries access the funds. Farrington et al 
argue against in-kind transfers as the cost considerably exceeds the value of the product 
transferred.
Devereux (2002b; 3) agrees that administrative costs, such as identifying the eligible 
beneficiaries, associated with targeting can be high and “may offset the savings from 
universal benefits and undermine the fiscal sustainability of the programme”. He also 
emphasises that a key political problem with targeting is the loss of political support of 
those who have been excluded from the target group. Two other weaknesses with 
targeting that receive less attention are: i) the risk that interventions will become patchy; 
that is, some areas will be covered while neighbouring, but slightly less poor, areas may 
miss out; and, ii) perhaps the most important for the purposes of this thesis, is that 
because poverty is a dynamic concept, people can be considered eligible for social 
protection in one period but not in another. Because assessments of need are generally 
not as dynamic as the poverty the schemes are trying to deal with, people who should be 
included can miss out.
In designing targeted schemes, most policy makers' key concern is to minimise inclusion 
errors, but as Devereux (2002b) points out, poverty is a dynamic concept, so the concern
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should rather be on minimising exclusion errors. He suggests that because of the potential 
serious consequences of excluding people who should be included, exclusion errors 
should be weighted three times higher than inclusion errors {ibid). Examining the 
potential for error in social protection schemes has supported the arguments of both those 
who argue for greater targeting and those who argue for more universal provision of 
benefits.
The self-targeting mechanism differentiates itself from other targeting strategies in a 
number of ways. It does not have the same administrative or political costs because 
people self-identify, and there is little risk that the ineligible will access the benefits 
because of the stigma attached. It is in a sense a mixture between a targeted transfer and a 
universal benefit; that is, it can theoretically be accessed by anyone, but only the targeted 
group access the benefits. Common examples of self-targeting mechanisms are those 
which require the recipient to queue to receive the benefit, the subsidisation of inferior 
goods that only the poor would want to buy and workfare (public works) programs. The 
key benefit of self-targeting mechanisms as a targeting methodology is that they get 
around the informational constraint often present in developing countries; that is, the 
government’s ability to identify the target group (Ravallion, 2003).
One of the more famous workfare programs is the Maharashtra Employment Generation 
Scheme (MEGS), which has been running for over 30 years (Gaiha, 2003). It is funded 
largely from the taxes of the urban populations and has played an important role in the 
stabilisation of the incomes of the poor in the state as it provides work to anyone who 
wants it. The key factor which allows MEGS to work is its ability to keep the wage rate 
low to ensure that only the working poor use the scheme (Ravallion 2003). It also does 
not have the political problems of other social protection measures, as the wealthy urban 
populations who effectively fund the Scheme see it as a reasonable price to pay for 
containing rural to urban migration (Norton etal , 2001).
A limitation, which is common across all self-targeting mechanisms, is that the 
requirement for self-identification comes at a cost. Those who use these schemes must be
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willing to be stigmatised as the poor and hence, while the administrative cost may be low, 
the social cost can be high (Kabeer, 2002). Some may not be willing to pay the high 
social cost that self-targeting schemes require. Higher caste Indians, for example, have 
felt culturally constrained and not able to participate in workfare programs (Norton et al, 
2001). A key risk with self-targeting schemes is that being marginalised from the rest of 
society due to poverty status is often one of the dimensions of a poor person’s poverty 
which limits exit routes (Devereux, 2002b). Stigmatisation as a poor person through self- 
identification for social protection measures may serve to reinforce that status and limit 
the poor’s ability to escape poverty.
2.2.8 Social Protection as a Right and the Role o f the State
In developing countries, the ethos that underpins most social protection strategies is one 
of charity rather than of entitlement and a desire to guarantee basic human rights 
(Devereux 2002b). However, there is a strong link between social protection and the 
human rights framework (Norton et al, 2002). For example, the right to security of 
livelihoods is recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (ibid). While a 
fundamental problem of developing countries is the lack of resources to uphold this right, 
it does not diminish the value of having rights at the centre of the rationale for social 
protection measures, and it can guide future social protection goals. It can also establish a 
framework in which governments can create an environment for people to effectively use 
their own efforts and resources to increase the security of their livelihoods.
An oft-cited example of the benefits of viewing social protection as a right is the 
Maharashtra Employment Generation Scheme. The right to employment is entrenched in 
the state’s law. This is of key importance to its beneficiaries, as it is not a welfare 
mechanism but the legal right of every citizen of the state (Kabeer 2002). The rights 
aspect of this scheme creates a key difference with some other self-selecting social 
protection mechanisms. The right to employment significantly lowers the stigmatisation 
associated with the Scheme, and hence participation in the Scheme poses less of a risk 
than other self-selecting mechanisms that it will reinforce other dimensions of poverty 
which can entrench a person’s poverty status. The Scheme is further strengthened by the
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accompanying rights to childcare for women and the guarantee of work within eight 
miles of home (ibid). A recognition of rights can thus be helpful for both encouraging 
participation of target groups in a scheme, as well as in achieving the poverty-alleviating 
goals of the scheme.
Viewing social protection as a right serves to highlight the essential role of the 
government. Even when markets are functioning well, livelihood security is not 
guaranteed. People are excluded from poverty exit routes for a variety of reasons, not 
only because of market exclusion, and often only the direct intervention of the state can 
serve to rectify the situation. Most people in developing countries remain in the informal 
economy, out of reach of formal social protection structures (Unni and Rani, 2003). The 
obligations of the state to uphold basic rights to livelihoods and security are of course 
constrained by the administrative and fiscal position of the government, "but within those 
constraints action can be taken. Perhaps one of the major barriers to the provision of 
social protection is the desire by governments to undertake “development” interventions 
first and worry about social protection later (Norton et al, 2002). In Malawi in 1998, the 
World Bank and other donors proposed a large investment in social protection measures; 
$28 million over 20 years. The Government of Malawi was sceptical about the proposal, 
arguing if donors could afford so much it should be spent on “developmental programs” 
instead (Devereux, 2002b). Such government attitudes are also supported by donors 
whose interventions almost always focus on activities which have clear exit strategies. 
Social protection interventions by their nature do not have such strategies, and so are 
typically less attractive to donors (Norton et al, 2002).
The general lack of focus on social protection measures by developing country 
governments and donors is highlighted by the limited or non-existent role of social 
protection in most Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) (Devereux, 2002a). In 
2000, in a PRSP meeting with donors, Malawi’s Deputy Finance Minister suggested that 
the PRSP should not focus on the poor because they cannot get any poorer; the focus 
should instead be on productive growth (ibid). The need for both governments and donors 
to take a long-term view and recognise the key importance of some type of social
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protection guarantee is something which is slowly developing with the increasing 
evidence of its importance in the development process. A recent ADB-funded social 
protection study in Nepal clearly highlights the link between social protection and growth 
(ADB, 2004) and has led to the ADB embracing wider studies and plans for large scale 
social protection activities. However, while there are some positive developments, it may 
be some time before social protection can shake the welfare connotation.
2.2.9 Importance o f Social Protection in Dealing with Chronic Poverty 
The common response of governments and donor organisations to shy away from social 
protection policies based on the cost and the enormity o f the problem could in some way 
be addressed by a greater emphasis on the different types of poverty. Seeing the poor as 
equally poor makes social protection strategies too daunting (Ravallion, 2003). 
Distinguishing between different types of poverty that require different types of 
responses could assist in remedying this problem, but it also comes with some associated 
risks. Due to the focus on risk and vulnerability within social protection literature it is 
unsurprising that there is a tendency to link social protection to transitory poverty. There 
are many more transitorily poor than chronically poor, so such an understanding is also 
more politically appealing. Breaking down poverty into different groups thus carries the 
risk that social protection anti-poverty policy could be drawn away from the chronically 
poor (Barrientos and Shepherd, 2003)
There is increasing evidence that chronic poverty can be effectively addressed by social 
protection. Barrientos and Shepherd (ibid; 17) have conducted a preliminary investigation 
into the relevance of social protection strategies for the chronically poor, and while they 
acknowledge that further research is required, they conclude that “social protection has 
an important role to play in the reduction of chronic poverty” . This is due to the ability of 
social protection to interrupt chronic poverty as well as its ability to positively affect 
some of the factors which keep people in chronic poverty. A subsequent study of social 
protection and chronic poverty undertaken by Barrientos, Hulme and Shepherd (2004;
21) confirms these findings. In investigating developed countries with different levels of 
social spending, they found “a negative relationship between long term spending on
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social protection and the incidence of chronic or persistent poverty”. They state that if 
strategies to address chronic poverty should be putting security first, as suggested by the 
Chronic Poverty Research Centre (2004), social protection strategies should take centre 
stage {ibid).
The ability to manage risk is essential to prevent the vulnerable from falling into poverty, 
and social protection has a clear role to play in this dynamic process. However, as 
described earlier in the section on risk, those already in poverty also require risk 
management assistance to allow them to pursue livelihood strategies which could provide 
an exit route from poverty (Wood, 2003). While risk is an important element of chronic 
poverty, and does explain to some extent the duration o f chronic poverty, it is important 
to remember that social protection goes beyond just managing risk. Social protection is 
not just a safety net, but also a ladder. It can assist in addressing many of the dimensions 
of poverty which serve to keep people in a state of chronic poverty. Barrientos and 
Shepherd (2003) point to idiosyncratic, structural and agency factors that keep people in a 
state of chronic poverty and outline various social protection policies combined with 
other social and economic policies which could serve to address the transmission and 
maintenance aspects of chronic poverty. While social protection cannot act as a cure-all 
for the phenomena of chronic poverty, it has the potential to be an integral part of the 
multiple strategies that could be used.
In summary, as the meanings of social protection have expanded over recent years, so has 
its relevance in being able to address different types of vulnerability without necessarily 
any growth trade-off. Indeed, its ability to manage risk is being increasingly seen as a 
precondition for growth. The different methods of social protection have different 
advantages and disadvantages and thus policy makers must carefully assess the many 
social protection options available to them in order to maximise impact. Further research 
is required surrounding the appropriateness of social protection to address chronic 
poverty and, for the purposes of this thesis, such analysis is complicated by the additional
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complexities of remote rural areas. It is on these complexities that the next section of this 
chapter will focus.
2.3 Remote Rural Areas
2.3.1 Why Focus on Remote Rural Areas ?
There are many ways in which remote rural areas differ to non-remote areas. A body of 
recent literature has suggested that these some of these differences not only foster poverty 
but also keep people in a state of chronic poverty (Bird et al, 2002). The exact numbers 
of chronically poor are not known, but there is a growing recognition that the chronically 
poor are spatially concentrated in remote rural areas (ibid). While not all chronically 
poor, 76 percent of the poor in India and 89 percent of the poor in Bangladesh live in 
remote areas (Kabeer, 2002). This geographical grouping of the poor is a key reason for 
investigating chronic poverty in remote rural areas. Another reason for this focus is that 
not only do the poor seem to fall into chronic poverty in remote rural areas, but there 
appear to be stronger barriers to exit than in more integrated areas. Even if the national 
economy is performing well, because of the multiple constraints on poor people in remote 
rural areas, “trickle out” may take several decades to impact on the majority of the people 
living in these areas (Farrington and Gill, 2002).
As discussed above, many of the chronically poor live in remote rural areas, and they are 
likely to remain chronically poor for decades even if they are part of the faster growing 
national economies; however, a question that could still reasonably be asked is: how 
important is the physical environment? Are we looking at a spatial concentration of 
people who have characteristics that foster chronic poverty? If this is the case, then 
methods to deal with chronic poverty in non-remote areas would be relevant to those in 
remote areas and, despite the high concentrations in remote areas and the difficulties of 
exit from remote areas, there would be little reason to examine chronic poverty any 
differently than in better integrated areas. Research by Ravallion and Wodon (1997) in 
remote rural areas of Bangladesh sought to investigate the extent to which the physical
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geography matters; whether there were truly poor areas or just concentrations of poor 
people in these areas. Their findings supported the view that geographic differences in 
living standards cannot be attributable to non-geographic factors. Households in better- 
integrated areas with exactly the same characteristics as households in remote areas were 
found to have higher standards of living. There were large spatial difference in the returns 
to household characteristics. Ravallion and Woden’s results support the contention that 
where people live is important in explaining their poverty and that poor areas are not just 
poor because households with characteristics that foster poverty are spatially 
concentrated. The conclusion was that targeting poor areas is a sensible strategy even if 
there are no obvious impediments to mobility.
As described earlier in this chapter, the chronically poor have many constraints on exiting 
poverty. The spatial element is just another constraint, but as the research above found, it 
could be one of the most important constraints, so particular attention needs to be paid to 
remote rural areas and how their specific characteristics compound the difficulties faced 
by the inhabitants of remote rural areas. Both IFAD (2001) and the World Bank (2000) 
recognise the importance of geographical disadvantages. Terms such as “logjams of 
disadvantage” (de Haan and Lipton, 1998) and “spatial poverty traps” (Goodhand, 2001;
11) are common when trying to convey the particular difficulties faced by the chronically 
poor in remote rural areas. Household characteristics may or may not be such that the 
household could be in chronic poverty wherever it was located, but when combined with 
the low geographic capital of a remote rural area (e.g. the natural, physical, political, 
social and human capital of an area), then chronic poverty is highly likely (ibid). The rest 
of this section will focus on the mechanisms which exacerbate chronic poverty in remote 
rural areas, how the challenges of mountainous areas differ significantly from the plains, 
how risk and risk management contribute in these areas and the arguments for and against 
different policy options.
2.3.2 What Active Mechanisms Make Chronic Poverty Worse in Remote Rural Areas? 
Most of the conditions that exacerbate chronic poverty in remote rural areas are not 
unique to these areas. Pockets of chronic poverty can exist in well-off, well-integrated
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areas, and people within these pockets of poverty can suffer to the same extent as those in 
remote rural areas. The key difference is that in remote rural areas, whole populations are 
generally experiencing these conditions. This environment of chronic poverty creates yet 
another barrier to exit, as income generating opportunities resulting from the income and 
consumption of neighbouring households are lower, especially in times of crisis. While 
many of the conditions suffered by chronically poor households in different areas are 
similar, there are some conditions that are specific to, or are experienced to a greater 
extent in, remote rural areas such as market failure, state failure, social exclusion, 
intergenerational poverty transmission, migration and conflict. These conditions are 
discussed below.
Market and State Failure
The failure of the market and the state tends to be more severe in remote rural areas. 
Access to markets is limited, input prices are high and economic services, such as credit 
and insurance, are expensive and less accessible than in more integrated areas.
Extraction of resources is common without any accompanying pro-poor growth. Distance 
and inaccessibility is a key issue for remote rural areas; for example, in Tanzania it has 
been found that living within 100 metres of a gravel road with a bus service increases 
incomes by approximately one third over the rural average (Bird et al, 2002). While 
distance and accessibility are important, they are not the only factors driving market 
failure. Because market operations are driven by incentive systems which are not easily 
manipulated, even if access was improved through the development of infrastructure this 
would not guarantee a swift inclusion into the market system. There may be a greater 
access to non-farm employment if there are some nearby towns, but population density, 
low average incomes, governance weakness and low human capital could still serve to 
dissuade market enterprises from entering remote rural areas (ibid).
The failure of the state in remote rural areas can be explained in part by the standard 
difficulties of access. Making a significant difference to the accessibility of remote rural 
areas is expensive and potentially out of reach of some developing country governments. 
Compounding this difficulty is the marginality of the population. Their lack of voice
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means that government inaction generally does not negatively impact on the government 
at the polls. In rural areas of Bangladesh, it has been found that in areas where the 
government has invested in infrastructure, incomes and the health of the poor have been 
positively affected; however, the electoral mileage of the area impacts on government’s 
expenditure. Typically, sparsely populated remote rural areas offer less mileage (Bird et 
al, 2002).
There is an emerging view in the literature that remote rural areas have a right to state 
sponsored assistance to compensate for the structural disadvantages of living in such a 
location (Papola, 2002; Parvez and Rasmussen 2002). Pointing to the example of the 
central alpine regions of Europe which have prospered under significant state protection 
and subsidies, Parvez and Rasmussen (2002) argue that the sustainability of livelihoods 
of mountain communities is contingent on long-term public support even in the presence 
of dynamic highland-lowland interactions because of the inherent inequities which do not 
favour mountain communities. They further argue that in remote rural mountain areas in 
developing countries, the situation is more precarious for these populations so the action 
of the state is much more urgent and justified. The state needs to compensate for the 
market failures (ibid).
There is evidence in India that state-led development strategies are having significant 
results in remote rural areas (Bird et al, 2002). Integrated rural development policies 
went out of fashion in the 1990s, but given the greater understanding of the dynamics of 
remote rural areas and the severe market failures in these areas, there is greater attention 
being paid, as in India, to how the state can assist in overcoming these failures.
Social Exclusion and Human Capital
Other key areas of failures in remote rural areas are social failure, in the form of social 
exclusion, and the poor development of human capital. Social exclusion refers to the 
breakdown between the individual and society and effectively being an outsider in terms 
of rights that determine normal citizenship (ibid). The socially excluded generally have 
limited access to all forms of capital such as assets, contacts in wealthier areas,
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opportunities and information (Kothari, 2002). These exclusionary measures are 
reinforcing, and it is likely that if one dimension of exclusion is broken down others will 
act to hold the person, household or community down (Bird et al, 2002). Social exclusion 
exists in less remote areas also, but remoteness means that changes occur more slowly, 
which gives the historic holders of power time to adapt to their new circumstances and 
hold on to power through these changes. These local elites tend to control the exploitation 
of resources and political processes {ibid).
The lack of development of human capital in remote rural areas is a clear dimension of 
the population’s social exclusion, but it is worth exploring the problem of exclusion from 
education, skills development and health services given the importance of capable human 
capital to be able to take advantage of any opportunities which arise from the breakdown 
of other aspects of exclusion. The provision of government health and education services 
is generally lower than in non-remote areas. Where the private sector enters the market to 
provide services that are not being provided by the state, the cost is generally prohibitive 
for the chronically poor. This low level of human capital decreases entrepreneurship and 
can impact on investment in remote rural areas because o f a lack of capable staff (Bird et 
al, 2002). As discussed earlier in this chapter, Datt and Ravallion (2002) support the 
importance of education as an initial condition which, if absent, can explain why 
opportunities presented by economic growth are not exploited. In rural Bangladesh it has 
been shown that the average years of schooling were three times higher for the never 
poor than for chronically poor households (Sen, 2003). However, there is general 
agreement that, although human capital improvement in remote rural areas is a required 
part of development, it may not in itself lead to a reduction in poverty because of the 
limited opportunities for its use in economically productive activities (Papola, 2002).
The poorest do tend to be the most illiterate, but the extent to which literacy would 
improve living standards is firmly embedded within other exclusionary processes (Shah, 
2002) .
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Intergenerational Transmission
The intergenerational transmission aspect of low levels of human capital is an important 
partial explanation for the duration of chronic poverty (Bird et al, 2002). Food security in 
remote rural areas is often erratic, leading to under-nutrition which damages the physical 
and mental development of children. A lack of access to family planning services can 
result in high fertility rates in remote rural areas, and high dependency ratios are also 
compounded by out migration. The lack of health services can lead to a higher rate of 
disability in remote rural areas because disability in developing countries stems primarily 
from preventable impairments. Human capital dynamics within a household in remote 
rural areas thus have a greater chance of reinforcing poverty in increasing the chance that 
new members to the household will be unable to escape the chronically poor situation 
into which they were bom.
Migration
Both migration and the absence of migration can aggravate the chronic poverty situation 
of populations in remote rural areas. Much of the migration out of remote rural areas is 
driven by push factors, particularly the lack of productive employment opportunities. It 
is estimated that 40 percent of males migrate from the remote rural areas of the Hindu- 
Kush Himalaya (Papola, 2002). Construction work is the main productive activity 
available to surplus labour from Indian rural areas, and a significant proportion of 
migrant workers from remote areas of India end up as construction workers, among 
whom the incidence of poverty is high (Shah, 2002). As land in rural areas is 
increasingly subdivided with growing populations, more labourers are being pushed to 
undertake this low paid construction work, which may not offer an effective path out of 
chronic poverty (ibid). It usually results in an increase in female headed households 
being left in the villages, and the labour shortages during the busy agricultural times of 
the year can constrain agricultural productivity and can lead to an increase in poverty 
(Papola, 2002).
While migration does not currently solve the problems of poverty in remote rural areas, it 
can serve to provide benefits such as remittances in some cases. However, the
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opportunity to migrate is not open to all; there are many hidden constraints. Cultural and 
linguistic differences can be a barrier to migration, as can physical geography. Moving 
also involves a level of risk, especially if social networks at the destination are weak 
(Ravallion and Woden, 1997). The cost of moving, while often small, in the absence of 
credit and insurance markets for the poor, can be prohibitative. Remoteness can also 
prevent information of potential productive opportunities being accessed. Thus, while 
there are generally no official government policies that restrict movement from remote 
rural areas, in practice movement is often far from free (ibid).
Kothari (2003b; 645) has found that migration as a livelihood strategy for poor 
households is no different to other livelihood strategies in terms of being “facilitated or 
constrained by relations within and between the institutions of the household, 
community, state and market”. As mentioned earlier in the description of the 
characteristics of chronic poverty, many of those in chronic poverty are the ones who 
have stayed in an environment that others have left; migration not being a realistic option 
(Kothari, 2002). In a study of remote rural areas of Northeastern Bangladesh, the less 
poor shifted from place to place in order to minimise their risk and make the most of 
opportunities on the land. The poorest, however, could not move, and so stayed in an 
environment where they risked losing the little they had (Hossain et al, 2003).
While the discussion above clearly illustrates that migration is not available to all, there is 
a certain connotation that it is a desired activity. It is important to consider that migration, 
in itself, may not be desired by all, and in many cases migration may just represent part 
of the “struggle to stay put” (Rogaly 2003; 1). People often seasonally migrate because 
they cannot afford to stay where they are without the extra income, but would not 
undertake this seasonal work in other locations if there was access to employment in their 
region. Thus, in summary, there is no one model which can serve to explain an 
individual’s decision to migrate or to stay put. It is a complex response to available 
opportunities and migration must be understood as both a cause and a consequence of 
chronic poverty (Kothari, 2002).
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Conflict
An underexplored aspect of chronic poverty and remote rural areas is that of violent 
conflict. There is some suggestion in the literature that remote rural areas could be 
potentially more prone to conflict than more integrated areas (Bird et al, 2001).
Goodhand (2001) hypothesises that spatial poverty traps are more likely to experience 
political instability and violent conflict. He also contends that the distinction between 
chronic and transitory poverty is a useful one in the analysis of conflict, and while it is 
known that chronic conflict is likely to produce chronic poverty, Goodhand surmises that 
it could be the transitorily poor who are more likely to be the trigger for violent conflict 
than the chronically poor. This is due, in part, to the fact that the chronically poor in 
remote rural areas are less likely to be involved in organisations that can be mobilised for 
violent conflict. The extent to which this is the case requires further investigation.
A good example of grievances surrounding the depth of deprivation and the absence of 
effective state services within remote rural areas escalating into full-blown conflict is the 
recent situation in Nepal. The following chapter will provide more details on the 
particular conflict dynamics, but in brief, the insurgency was able to spread throughout 
the country so quickly in part due to the lack of any meaningful resistance by the 
government for the first five years of the conflict (Mercy Corps, 2003). This can be 
attributed to both the terrain and the perceived lack of political voice of the people who 
inhabit the remote rural areas of Nepal.
This section so far has briefly analysed some of the different poverty dynamics which 
exist in remote areas compared to more integrated areas. The analysis is taken one step 
further below with the examination of some of the key differences between mountainous 
and non-mountainous remote rural areas.
2.3.3 Are Mountainous Areas Different from Other Remote Rural Areas?
Remote rural areas, whether in the plains or the mountains, have some important 
common features, such as exclusion from markets, lack of political voice, poor access to
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services such as health and education and high chronic poverty but there are some 
important differences. As this thesis will focus on the Kamali Zone in Nepal, and hence 
on people living in remote rural mountainous areas, it is important to examine the 
specific characteristics of mountainous areas which are relevant to chronic poverty in 
these areas.
Jodha (1990,1992) identifies five characteristics that differentiate mountainous areas 
from the plains. Three of the characteristics are seen as disadvantages and two are seen as 
potential opportunities. The disadvantages are:
■ Inaccessibility -  the difficulties associated with the remoteness of mountainous 
areas is compounded by the rugged terrain and high altitude. Market access is 
made more difficult, and transportation costs are higher. Being so isolated, 
people have little access to non-farm employment, so while the work life of 
many is characteristed by long hours of physically demanding work, especially 
among women, there exists the paradoxical situation of idle labour, especially 
among men (Papola, 2002). It is estimated that in mountain areas 63 percent of 
men’s and 34 percent of women’s days are unused (ibid). The isolation imposed 
by this inaccessibility leads to a greater reliance by households on other 
households in the region. As mentioned previously, such poor-to-poor linkages 
offer only weak social protection. The isolation also effectively prevents them 
from taking advantage of any development gains of the economy, as they are 
effectively removed from the market (ICIMOD, 2000). Inaccessibility can also 
sometimes skew indicators, for example, indicators which reflect access to 
schooling can be misleading because a five kilometre walk to school in the 
mountains can be much “longer”, and potentially prohibitive for a child, than it 
would be in non-mountainous areas (Papola, 2002). Finally, a new aspect of 
poverty in mountainous areas, as access to media has become more widespread 
and thus one aspect of inaccessibility is being overcome, is the greater sense of 
relative poverty; households’ isolation from the wider economy has been made 
more conspicuous to them (ibid).
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■ Fragility -  the physical geography of mountainous areas renders them fragile. 
Even with relatively little disturbance, mountainous areas are very vulnerable to 
degradation. These areas thus offer few options in terms of agricultural 
intensification (ICIMOD, 2000).
■ Marginality -  marginality is closely linked to inaccessibility and fragility. Living 
in an area which is barely able to sustain livelihoods, and where it is difficult to 
upgrade resources, reduces the relevance of many standard poverty alleviation 
activities. The high incidence of natural hazards when living in a marginal 
environment has the consequence that even if people are able to escape poverty, 
their vulnerability is such that a fall back into poverty may not be far away 
(Papola, 2002). People are not only living on the margins in a physical sense, but 
also in a political one. Mountain people commonly have little political voice and 
are excluded from national socioeconomic and political processes (ibid).
The two characteristics which are seen to be advantages of mountainous areas are:
■ Diversity -  this term is also referred to as “internal heterogeneity” and means the 
high degree of variability, including biological, physical and temporal 
differences, within a small area (ICIMOD, 2000). Diversity is seen as an 
advantage, as it offers opportunities for higher productivity without damaging the 
resource base. The key to successful harnessing of this diversity is to not be 
involved in narrow specialisations but to engage with the system as a whole 
(ibid). Recent research in remote but non-mountainous areas of Zimbabwe has 
shown that the poorest have significantly less diversified livelihood activities 
than the non-poor and that diversification can provide an exit route from poverty 
(Bird et al, 2002). The greater diversity found in mountainous areas in contrast 
to the plains represents an advantage that can be exploited.
■ Niche -  mountainous areas have obvious disadvantages in terms of productivity 
increasing options. The potential of diversity does offer a glimmer of hope for 
productivity gains, but there are other possibilities that can be grouped under the 
characteristic of “niche”. Mountain areas offer a unique environment which gives 
them a particular niche; a comparative advantage over non-mountainous areas.
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Such advantages could include hydropower and irrigation potential, timber and 
tourism and medicinal plants (ICIMOD, 2000).
While there are some advantages that can be harnessed within mountainous areas, 
exploiting these advantages requires a clear understanding of the limitations of the 
environment and the characteristics of mountainous areas. To date, development 
interventions have generally not operated with this understanding, and interventions that 
have been transplanted from the plains have often failed. There has been an overemphasis 
on intensification, integration and extraction {ibid).
As described earlier in this thesis, recent studies have confirmed that it is not just a high 
concentration of poor people in one area that causes chronic poverty in remote rural areas 
but, rather, the characteristics of the geographical environment. Recent research on a 
mountainous area in remote rural Sichuan takes this analysis a step further and confirms 
that even among remote areas, it is the mountainous areas which record the highest 
degree of chronic poverty (McCulloch and Calandrino, 2003). Assets and education were 
shown to be important factors in determining chronic poverty, but the greatest 
determinant was geographical location. Households in mountainous areas were eight 
times more likely to be chronically poor than those in flat areas {ibid). Papola (2002; 7) 
agrees that poverty in the mountains is more area-specific than household-specific; that 
is, it results primarily from “the severity of the constraints of an unfavourable 
geographical situation and only secondarily by the resource endowments of individual 
households”.
2.3.4 How Do Risk and Risk Management Mechanisms Contribute to Chronic Poverty in 
Remote Rural Areas?
Geographical location, especially access to flat land for the chronically poor, often has 
the largest influence on the vulnerability of a population (McCulloch and Calanadrino, 
2003). Remote rural areas generally have greater vulnerability to natural disasters, both in 
terms of the marginality of the land and the propensity and the willingness of the 
government to provide appropriate disaster assistance (Bird et al, 2002). As well as the
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actual risks of the physical environment, living in remote rural areas carries with it the 
risks of market failure and the underprovision of goods and services (such and credit and 
insurance), which could serve to decrease vulnerability. Again, as discussed earlier, not 
having access to typical income smoothing vehicles can lead to coping strategies which 
are risk averse and hence do not maximise productivity, further entrenching chronic 
poverty. Whole areas behaving in such a manner leads to weak consumption and thus a 
reduction in the opportunities for neighbouring households to climb out of poverty (ibid).
One of the key risk management mechanisms that is mentioned in the literature in 
relation to remote areas, especially mountain areas, is social capital (Morris, 1998). In 
the absence of other coping mechanisms, the strong bond between households living in 
marginal areas can serve to strengthen their ability to withstand the harsh conditions they 
often have to endure. In addition to being able to assist in the face of disasters, social 
capital can be mobilised to build and maintain collective assets such as roads, to enable 
people to take advantage of economies of scale in the export of mountain products and 
can also assist them in developing strong community-based organisations that can 
contribute to longer term development (Parvez and Rasmussen, 2002). This concept, 
however, is coming under increased scrutiny with a recognition of the limitation of 
relationships between poor households and that social capital can actually serve to keep 
people poor (Hulme, 2003a). The chronically poor often have strong links with each 
other, but relationships with the wealthier and more powerful parts of the community are 
often weak, and they are therefore “more likely to experience exclusion or adverse 
incorporation rather than positive power relations and mutually supportive networks” 
(Bird et al 2002; 28). Thus while it is recognised that, in some circumstances, social 
capital can serve to strengthen the position of the poor in remote rural areas, its ability to 
function as an adequate social protection measure is doubtful.
2.3.5 Arguments For and Against Area Specific Development Policies?
The concentration of chronically poor people in an area - which by its nature reduces the 
escape routes from poverty - offers an opportunity for targeted interventions in mountain
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areas. However, not everyone agrees that mountainous areas should be treated differently 
based on their specific characteristics.
While Parvez and Rasmussen (2002) argue that some state support is required to 
compensate for the structural disadvantages of mountainous areas, they argue that too 
great a focus is placed on mountain specificities and not enough on integration with the 
national economy as a method for alleviating poverty. If mountain specificities 
condemned mountainous areas to poverty, they argue, then mountainous areas in all 
developed countries would also be poor. They thus contend that a more appropriate 
development strategy is the sustainable livelihoods approach, which focuses more on 
opportunities than constraints. The failed large scale World Bank Integrated Rural 
Development Projects (IRDPs) of the 1970s and 1980s have also not helped the cause of 
area development activities. They were criticised as being unsustainable because of the 
artificial conditions for service delivery that they created and the reliance on donor inputs 
(Farrington et al, 2002; Bird et al, 2002).
Despite the above criticisms, there is a substantial body of literature that supports at least 
some aspect of geographical targeting in development activities. It has been argued that 
area development makes more sense than a household-based approach because it is the 
constraints of the area, not the household, which constitute the main sources of poverty in 
mountain areas (Papola, 2002). The results of McCulloch and Callandrino’s (2003) 
research in rural Sichuan - that chronically poor households are concentrated in hilly or 
mountainous areas - led them to recommend that geographical targeting was key in any 
anti-poverty policy.
Because of the impediments to migration from remote rural areas, and the constraints on 
policy makers effectively targeting household characteristics, poor area policies have the 
potential to make effective use of limited development budgets (Ravallion and Woden, 
1997). Even when there are no impediments to migration, Ravallion and Woden’s (ibid) 
research supports targeting poor areas; however, they also highlight that further research 
is required into the cost effectiveness of area-based policies versus non-geographic
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policies. Area development activities should not be dismissed because of the failure of 
some IRDPs. As mentioned earlier, state led development in remote rural regions of India 
is beginning to show positive results (Bird etal, 2002).
In terms of the appropriateness of social protection as an area development policy, 
Farrington and Gill (2002) argue that the severe fiscal and implementation constraints 
may limit them to those who cannot engage in productive activity. They suggest that 
growth oriented strategies, which incorporate a measure of social protection, would be a 
more viable alternative. Bird et al (2002) theorise that the impact of extending social 
protection coverage to remote rural areas is likely to be greater than extending coverage 
elsewhere. There is little specific discussion in the literature on the appropriateness of 
social protection targeted towards remote rural areas - this is one of the key areas that this 
thesis will explore.
To summarise, different studies have highlighted the spatial element of chronic poverty 
as an important explanatory factor of chronic poverty. Certain mechanisms work together 
to make chronic poverty worse in remote rural areas, especially in mountainous regions, 
and questions remain about the appropriateness of different policy responses that address 
these particular problems. The following section discusses the next steps this thesis will 
take in building on the existing literature to further the analysis of chronic poverty in 
remote rural areas and the relevance of social protection in addressing some key 
constraints faced by the chronically poor.
2.4 Summary of Key Areas of Relevance from the Literature
The existing literature on chronic poverty, social protection and remote rural areas has 
provided a good starting point to analyse the complementarities between these three 
areas. There are many unanswered questions within the literature, and many issues 
remain contentious. This thesis will not seek to answer all of the questions raised in the
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literature but will use it as a base on which to examine some of the key linkages between 
chronic poverty, social protection and remote rural areas.
Even when there is a clear knowledge of those who are transitorily poor and those who 
are chronically poor, the literature points to some very different dynamics in terms of 
what causes people to fall into poverty, rise out of poverty and stay in poverty which 
could have large policy impacts. It will be beyond the scope of this thesis to undertake 
detailed quantitative analysis to determine the correlates of this phenomenon but, to the 
extent possible, social protection will be examined in terms of its role in decreasing entry 
into chronic poverty and increasing exit routes.
The concept of risk aversion among vulnerable communities in remote rural areas as a 
cause of chronic poverty, and social protection as a potential solution, will be closely 
investigated given the assertions in the literature that it could provide at least a partial 
explanation of the duration of chronic poverty. The durational aspect of chronic poverty 
will also be discussed in examining the extent to which duration in itself could act as an 
inhibitor to the exit from poverty.
The chronically poor’s existing coping strategies in the face of shocks will be studied to 
ascertain whether they provide adequate protection or whether they are more surv ival 
strategies which further entrench poverty and which therefore cannot be seen as 
appropriate strategies. The requirement of some level of income security so that coping 
in difficult times constitutes more than just survival will be examined. The literature 
highlighted the fact that traditional coping strategies were often inadequate, especially in 
remote rural areas, due to the poor-poor relationships that can potentially cope with a 
shock which affects just one household, but not if it affects an entire community. The 
extent to which this is the case in the Kamali Zone will be investigated. Assuming social 
protection is found to be a valid strategy, questions regarding the most appropriate type 
of social protection measures (promotional, protective or preventative) and the method of 
delivery (universal or targeted) will be examined, especially in light of the literature on 
mountain specificities.
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While it is expected that social protection strategies will be found to be appropriate in 
some form, the extent to which social protection is able to go beyond the safety net and 
become a ladder to assist the chronically poor in overcoming their constraints is 
contentious. The literature highlighted that the chronically poor are generally kept in that 
state by many complex factors, so it remains unclear whether the ladder created by social 
protection will be strong enough to lift them out of poverty or high enough to allow them 
to escape to a level much above the poverty line. Due to the particular constraints in 
remote mountainous areas, the focus of this research is very much on the extent to which 
decreasing poverty through social protection can strengthen livelihoods, which reinforces 
the move out of poverty rather than the standard focus on growth and its ability to reduce 
poverty. Given the case study is located in Nepal, attention will be paid to social 
protection and conflict. The opportunities and limitations of using social protection 
measures to address simmering tensions in remote rural areas, especially among the 
chronically poor, and thus its potential to address a root cause of violent conflict will be 
discussed.
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C H A P T E R  3
Addressing Chronic Poverty in Remote Rural Areas through Workfare
Programs
The fundamental issue that this thesis is seeking to examine is the extent to which social 
protection can be used successfully to address chronic poverty in remote rural areas. As 
the previous chapter demonstrated, the chronically poor and remote rural areas, 
particularly mountainous areas, have some very specific characteristics that have the 
potential to complicate development interventions. This thesis argues that while not all 
social protection mechanisms will be effective, social protection does have the capacity 
to operate well in such environments and provide meaningful assistance to populations 
who are frequently neglected. In light of the literature on remote rural areas and chronic 
poverty outlined in the previous chapter, this argument is extended to include the 
argument that a comprehensive development strategy must introduce some level of 
effective social protection. This growing recognition of the importance of social 
protection is reflected in the Chronic Poverty Research Centre’s assertion that an assault 
on chronic poverty should put security first (Chronic Poverty Research Centre, 2004).
As discussed previously, for social protection strategies to take a more prominent role, 
there is a need to change development thinking around the issue; that is, social protection 
needs to be seen as an investment, not a cost, and an appropriate strategy for governments 
and donors to undertake. It must fight through its association with “welfare” in the typical 
sense and be seen as a strategy with rational, achievable development goals that are 
supportive, if not essential, for other typical development goals to be achieved, such as 
economic growth.
This chapter will briefly review some of the major social protection mechanisms 
currently utilised in developing countries and comment on their suitability for aiding
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chronically poor populations in remote rural areas. It will be argued that the most 
appropriate mechanism for such populations in such areas is the workfare program. 
Workfare is not the only way to address chronic poverty in remote rural areas; it has 
limitations and these limitations will be discussed, but it will be argued that is a key 
strategy in any attempt to address the issue.
3.1 Social Protection Mechanisms
3.1.1 Advantages/Disadvantages o f  Various Social Protection Mechanisms
The previous chapter outlined the particular characteristics of remote rural areas and the 
chronically poor and established that social protection has the potential to make a positive 
impact. Given the particular needs of these populations, the question that then arises is: 
which social protection mechanism is the most appropriate? Strategies that work well in 
integrated areas - that is, non-remote areas - or amongst the transitorily poor may be 
inappropriate.
Micro finance
A very popular social protection strategy in the developing world is microfinance. Small 
loans for productive puiposes have the potential to provide security to households and lift 
them out of poverty. Loans can be provided to those who would not normally have access 
to formal financial service markets, especially vulnerable women. The provision of credit 
to those normally excluded from these services can play a very important social 
protection function. However, studies in Bangladesh on impacts of micro finance 
programs have shown that while impacts are often positive on the poor, the severely poor 
generally do not benefit to the same extent as other poor (CGAP, 1996). Loans are not 
available to all and there are inevitably those who miss out (Kabeer, 2002). In 
Bangladeshi villages where microfinance programs have been in place for more than 
three years, only 40 percent of the poor participate (Khandker, 1998). Even when 
relatively easily accessed, the chronically poor often have constraints that extend well 
beyond a lack of income which inhibit their ability to participate in microfinance
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programs (such as a lack of numeracy skills). These constraints can prevent them from 
becoming self-employed entrepreneurs (CGAP, 1997). In his critical review of 
micro finance programs, Khandker (1998; 17) notes that landless people and those with 
poor mathematical abilities do not participate and that “the poorest of the poor and the 
most illiterate of the illiterate do not participate. For them wage employment is necessary 
for poverty reduction”.
The nature of remote rural areas, their isolation from markets, further compounds the 
problems and limits the potential income that can be generated from small loans to the 
chronically poor. A recent Asian Development Bank study in Nepal recognised the value 
of micro finance as a social protection measure but recommended its use only in urban 
areas at the moment due to the limited marketing opportunities that exist in remote rural 
areas (ADB, 2004).
Cash Transfers
In a world in which there was perfect information, cash transfers (and to a lesser extent, 
food transfers) could be an effective social protection mechanism. Cash transfers could 
be provided to build up the assets of the chronically poor and protect both the chronically 
poor and transitorily poor from income declines which would otherwise lead to 
irreversible coping strategies. Having this safety net could also lead to less risk averse 
behaviour, and the resulting risk taking could lead to higher income earning 
opportunities. The transfers could be made even more effective by making them 
conditional on the recipients undertaking activities which could assist in addressing 
aspects of their poverty, such as attending literacy classes.
The difficulty with these direct transfers is that information in the developing world, and 
especially in remote rural areas of developing countries, is far from perfect. To maximise 
effectiveness, significant administrative resources must be put into targeting. There is a 
risk of excluding eligible recipients and including ineligible ones. Even if poor 
households could be identified without large administration costs, there would be a risk 
of disincentive effects, for example, people lowering their income below a certain
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threshold to be able to qualify for assistance. Such problems can be overcome by linking 
the targeting to household characteristics that are hard to manipulate (Coady, 2004) but, 
again, this represents an enormous data gathering exercise that may be outside the 
capacity of developing countries. A recent ADB study in the Pacific (ADB, 2007) 
concluded that due to the difficulty of generating and maintaining accurate data for 
targeting, it would be more efficient for transfers to be to all. There is also the problem of 
wasteful consumption if there are no conditions placed on the cash transfer.
Food Subsidies
The use of universal food subsidies is intended to overcome the difficulties of targeting 
but remain effective by only subsidising those products that are not generally purchased 
by those on higher incomes. They work in a similar way to cash transfers in terms of 
providing assistance to cash constrained households who need to purchase food. The 
nutritional effects can serve to improve labour productivity and, hence, future income 
(Coady, 2004) which supports the view of social protection being an investment not a 
cost. There is some flexibility through this social protection measure for governments to 
cope with specific shocks, whether natural or economic, by increasing the subsidies, 
although this comes with associated economic distortions. Perhaps the defining 
difference between this mechanism and cash transfers is its self-selecting nature. 
Resources do not need to be put into targeting strategies.
The effectiveness of subsidy programs suffers due to unintended beneficiaries accessing 
resources. For example, universal food subsidies form a key part of India’s poverty 
reduction strategy through the Public Distribution Scheme. In states where it has been 
well administered it has generated benefits but, in general, it has been criticised for not 
effectively reaching its intended beneficiaries. Urban areas are better served than remote 
rural areas because of superior storage and delivery infrastructure (Farrington et al, 
2003). The distribution of food is expensive -  RslOO of food can cost Rs 100-200 to 
distribute -  and much of the food is sold off before it reaches its destination (ibid). 
Because the purchase of the food from the central government body is the responsibility 
of the state governments, the poorer states, with the majority of the poor populations,
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sometimes purchase less than 50 percent of their entitlements {ibid). Further, requiring 
the purchase of a month’s supply of food at a time renders the full benefits of the scheme 
out of the reach of many of the poor who have limited cash reserves.
The Targeted Public Distribution Scheme (TPDS) which was introduced in India in 1997 
represented an effort to ensure that those living below the poverty line would have access 
to subsidized cereals. However, even after the introduction of the TPDS in Bihar, 85 
percent of the commodities were being diverted to the black market (Kabeer, 2002).
A common criticism of both cash transfers and food subsidies is that the effectiveness 
persists only for as long as the transfer (Coady, 2004). This is perhaps the key reason 
donors shy away from such schemes, but this criticism ignores the effects such transfers 
can have on risk management and, hence, potentially income generation, when credit and 
insurance markets are absent. This thesis is considering more than the traditional safety 
net role that social protection plays, so while cash transfers and food subsidies have 
certain limitations, especially in difficult environments, it is important to note that most 
social protection mechanisms can also play an important livelihood promotional role, the 
effects of which can remain long after the particular scheme ceases to function.
Well-designed cash transfer and food subsidy schemes can be appropriate mechanisms to 
address chronic poverty in remote rural areas. Other strategies such as direct provision of 
basic health and education services could also assist the chronically poor and indeed, 
would be necessary for any comprehensive development strategy in remote rural areas 
but, as argued below, workfare programs are a more suitable mechanism to address some 
of the more immediate constraints faced by the chronically poor in remote rural areas.
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3.2 Workfare Programs
3.2.1 A Good Fit for the Chronically Poor in Remote Rural Areas 
Addressing chronic poverty is a complex problem made even more difficult when it 
occurs in isolated regions. Chronic poverty, by its nature, normally involves unpicking 
layers of constraints and, as described in the previous chapter, mountain specificities add 
another dimension to deprivation compared to well integrated areas. There cannot be one 
simple strategy which will address every aspect of a person’s deprivation but some 
strategies can be more appropriate than others and, when living such a marginal 
existence, could mean the difference between barely surviving and being able to pursue 
opportunities to slowly start to escape from de Haan and Lipton’s (1998) “logjam of 
disadvantage” .
The social protection mechanism that this thesis will examine from this point is the 
workfare program. A well-designed workfare program has the potential to significantly 
impact on the conditions which entrench poverty in remote rural areas. It can act as a 
promotional measure, by increasing incomes and sometimes skills. If access to income 
leads to changed behaviour, it can affect future security such as facilitating risk taking 
behaviour. It could also assist in keeping children in school, especially girls who often 
have reduced access to schooling in remote rural areas of developing countries. A 
workfare program can also be a preventative measure by averting deprivation -  it could 
stop distress land sales for example. Finally, a workfare program can be an ex post 
protective measure because of its ability to guarantee relief from deprivation if other ex 
ante measures have failed. In comparing various social protection mechanisms in India, 
Lanjouw and Ravallion (1998) found that the poorest quintile was best served by public 
works programs, while credit programs were ranked second and the food subsidy 
program did the least well at reaching the poorest.
Workfare programs offer no miracle cures for the chronically poor in remote rural areas; 
they do not address structural constraints such as entrenched discrimination, for example, 
but it will be argued that they represent the best fit with the particular conditions
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experienced by the chronically poor in these marginal environments. Some of the key 
areas of complementarity which will be examined below are: 1) use of labour; 2) 
targeting; 3) higher wages; 4) need for assets; and, 5) need for insurance.
Use of labour
All social protection mechanisms have costs. The administrative costs of targeting in 
developing countries with weak institutions is one of the main drawbacks of closely 
targeted social protection schemes. Workfare schemes are typically self-targeting so the 
administrative cost is small but they do have an opportunity cost. A key criticism of 
workfare schemes is that they divert labour which, while it may not have many high 
earning opportunities, is very rarely idle (except in areas where no employment 
opportunities exist). Very poor people cannot afford to be unemployed and so they will 
normally be engaged in some type of productive pursuit. This is generally true, especially 
in well integrated areas where income earning opportunities are available. In McCord’s 
(2005) review of public works as a social protection measure she highlights the fact that 
that poor households with limited labour resources may divert labour away from their 
own production to secure immediate cash income which may have negative medium to 
long term consequences for livelihoods. McCord (ibid; 7) also highlights the idea that 
because poor people can rarely afford to be completely idle, once income forgone is 
taken into account, “the net value of a transfer through public works may be significantly 
reduced compared to its gross value and the net transfer may not necessarily have the 
anticipated welfare impact of the gross transfer” . The opportunity cost may be so high 
that labour-constrained households may not be able to participate at all unless public 
works employment is provided long-term.
Subbarao (2003; 4) describes the transfer benefit to a worker as “the amount he/she gains 
from the scheme, minus any costs of participation (such as the cost of transport) and any 
earnings lost from alternative employment”. If alternative employment is non-existent, 
the transfer benefit is higher. As mentioned above, poor people are normally engaged in 
some kind of earning activity, but, in remote rural areas, where opportunities for off-farm 
employment are not as great as in well integrated areas, idle labour can exist, especially
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during certain parts of the year. The transfer benefit of workfare programs in remote 
rural areas thus has the potential to exceed the transfer benefit for comparable schemes in 
well-integrated areas.
Targeting
The benefits of self-targeting social protection mechanisms such as workfare schemes are 
well known. There is a saving in administrative costs that may otherwise have to be used 
to determine who should receive access to the transfer and what the size of the transfer 
should be. There is also a saving in having to maintain the data over the life of the 
targeted scheme and in responding to complaints and queries. Because of the 
pervasiveness of poverty in remote rural areas, inclusion errors will be minimal. This last 
point is important because it has implications for the wage rate that can be paid. Errors of 
exclusion, which Devereux (2002) describes as being much more of a concern than 
inclusion errors, are also minimised because whoever wants wage employment has access 
to the scheme.
It could be argued that this self-targeting aspect of workfare programs is not necessarily 
an advantage in remote rural areas where most households are very poor. To a certain 
extent this is correct; the self-targeting feature of these programs is probably most useful 
when there is a reasonable degree of income inequality in an area and it is an 
administrative burden to determine who should have access to benefits. However, even in 
remote rural areas, the self-targeting nature of the programs is beneficial as it allows 
households to make their own decisions about participation based on their own 
assessment of what would maximise their welfare rather than relying on the assessment 
of an external administrator.
Not everyone is as convinced of the self targeting capacity of workfare programs, 
particularly in relation to extremely poor households. Barrett and Clay (2003) assert that 
self-targeting will only work well when the labour market also works well. They contend 
that the marginal value of labour varies between households and less poor households 
with excess labour may choose to supplement their income, even if a below average wage
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is paid. This is in contrast to very poor households which may not have the necessary 
excess labour to take advantage of the program.
Higher wages
In describing the necessary components of a well functioning workfare scheme, the 
majority of the literature on workfare highlights the wage rate as being significant.
Wages need to be low to ensure that the self-targeting feature of the scheme remains 
intact. If the wage rate is the same as, or higher than, the prevailing minimum wage then 
people other than the poor will want access to the work and the scheme will lose its 
ability to screen out the non-poor. Subbarao (2003; 10) suggests that the wage rate needs 
to be low but not so low as to stigmatise the work so that “poor but proud” people self- 
exclude themselves from the transfers.
An oft-cited criticism of workfare programs is that the extent to which they can address 
poverty is constrained by the low wage rate. The argument is that a well functioning 
workfare scheme necessitates a low wage in order to reach its intended beneficiaries and, 
therefore, its ability to provide any real impact on poverty through an appropriate level of 
transfers is constrained. This requirement for low wages for a well functioning workfare 
program has led to the conclusion that such programs are more suited to dealing with 
crisis situations rather than structural poverty (Coady, 2004). Their ability to act as a 
consumption smoothing mechanism can reduce the need for irreversible coping strategies 
such as distress sales (ibid). This consumption smoothing would have some impact on 
poverty and possibly prevent people from falling into chronic poverty, but the ability of 
such schemes to deal with the chronically poor’s problem of a lack of assets, for example, 
is doubted due to the requirement for a low wage rate.
The view that there is a trade-off between the wage rate and the ability of workfare 
schemes to effectively address poverty is well highlighted in the literature (Sen 1996). 
However, in a study of a workfare scheme in Ethiopia, Barrett and Clay (2003) provide 
support for the potential to pay higher wages within workfare schemes. They argue that 
targeting problems will not necessarily be overcome by setting a low wage rate in 
environments of imperfect factor markets. Thus, if the wage is not serving the self-
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targeting function effectively, and the poverty reduction effectiveness of the scheme is 
compromised by the low wage rate, it could make sense to use complementary targeting 
which will then allow the market wage, or even a higher than market wage, to be paid to 
the most needy {ibid).
The extent to which remote rural areas with high concentrations of chronically poor 
people require any substantial additional targeting to ensure the programs reach the 
intended beneficiaries is an under-researched area. Areas with pervasive poverty, which 
also have geographical constraints to others accessing workfare programs drawn by 
incentive effects, may have different targeting needs. In remote rural mountainous areas, 
the trade-off between a well functioning workfare scheme and effective poverty 
alleviation may not exist to the same extent as in other areas due to the concentration of 
chronically poor in these areas, which could allow a higher than normal wage to be paid 
without the accompanying inclusion errors.
While not assessed as part of the case study analysis, one possible solution to the 
conundrum of the need for higher wages to address chronic poverty but the need for 
lower wages to deter inclusion errors, is the payment of a rising wage. A low wage could 
be paid in the first year to exclude the non-poor, but in subsequent years the wage could 
rise. In very remote areas, where employment options are limited, the first year’s low 
wage may not act as a deterrent so such a solution may only be appropriate in more 
integrated areas.
One of the benefits sometimes associated with workfare programs is the improvement in 
bargaining power of those not in the scheme to receive higher wages or better conditions. 
Because alternative employment options are rare in remote rural areas, the poor lack a 
strong collective voice to bargain for better wages and conditions. Having a workfare 
program operating in an area offering alternative employment could serve to strengthen 
the bargaining position of those disadvantaged by the isolation of the region.
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Need for assets
A lack of assets is a defining feature of the chronically poor. While workfare programs 
would generally not address the issue of a lack of personal assets, community assets can 
be provided. Workfare programs have traditionally underemphasised the potential value 
to the poor of assets (Ravallion, 2003). Most attention has been paid to the employment 
benefits the schemes offer. Sen (1996), for example, says that redistribution of income 
and creation of assets is important, but the safety net function of workfare schemes is 
more important. Recently there has been greater attention paid to the potential of the 
schemes to create valuable developmental assets such as rural roads or irrigation 
infrastructure (Devereux, 2002). Poor communities can utilise workfare schemes to 
undertake useful work which otherwise would not be done (Ravallion, 2003). The assets 
have the potential to be even more effective if poor communities themselves are involved 
in the selection of activities (Coady, 2004) but this must be balanced with the need to 
ensure that there is some coordination between villages so that economic and other 
linkages (such as health and education) are enhanced.
The perceived necessary trade-off between wages and effectiveness has been discussed 
earlier, but there is also another potential trade-off, that between equity and efficiency, 
which is often mentioned in the literature on workfare schemes in relation to assets. The 
argument is that because of the requirement for labour intensive activities which offer 
high employment opportunities, the quality of the assets may suffer if their creation 
would have benefited from a more capital intensive construction approach (Coady, 2004). 
Sen (1996) believes that lower quality assets are a price worth paying for access to 
employment, but it would severely diminish the merits of the scheme if the assets were of 
such poor quality as to be unusable. However, if the quality was less than ideal but the 
assets were still strong and functional, the trade-off is less important to consider when 
assessing the suitability of workfare programs. The “price” referred to by Sen may not be 
that high.
Gaiha (2003) provides another perspective on the asset trade-off by suggesting that there 
may be too great an emphasis on the labour intensiveness of workfare programs. If the
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assets are chosen well, and if the benefits of the assets accrue to the poor, then tight 
restrictions on the labour/capital ratio may not be warranted.
As well as being a defining condition of the chronically poor, a lack of assets in the form 
of community assets such as basic infrastructure is one of the characteristics of the 
remote rural areas of the Hindu-Kush Himalaya which compounds the isolation of 
communities. As described in the previous chapter, the inaccessibility of remote rural 
mountainous areas reduces access to markets, off-farm employment, schooling and other 
basic social services. The extent to which workfare programs can address the condition of 
isolation requires farther investigation, but there would appear to be a natural synergy 
between a scheme that can provide assets and communities that need them.
The argument that workfare schemes use up scarce resources (ILO, 2004) will be 
considered in the analysis of the provision of assets. Resources can be scarce in 
developing countries and must be allocated carefully. While it will be outside the scope 
of this thesis to analyse the appropriate use of government development budgets and 
donor funds, an argument will be made that if the assets are necessary, and would be 
provided as standard in more integrated areas, then workfare programs represent a good 
use of development funds. There is not only a moral, ethical and social responsibility to 
provide these assets but also a strong economic rationale.
Insurance effects
Workfare programs delivered in remote rural areas can perform an important insurance 
function. Even if higher wages cannot be paid, the poverty alleviation effects of workfare 
programs may be underestimated due to the behavioural changes that such a social 
protection mechanism can bring. Workfare programs can act as a form of insurance in the 
absence of insurance markets available to the chronically poor in remote rural areas. The 
stablilisation benefits of workfare programs are well recognised; that is, during slack 
seasons, when the market demand for labour is low, workfare programs can provide 
employment (Subbarao, 2003). Although this consumption smoothing argument implies
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that it would be the transitorily poor who would most benefit from the insurance function 
of workfare programs, the chronically poor can also benefit.
The two key areas that this thesis will investigate in relation to the insurance function of 
workfare programs for the chronically poor in remote rural areas are:
1) The extent to which access to employment during difficult times, either poor seasons 
or the pre-harvest period, prevents irreversible strategies being undertaken such as the 
selling of productive assets like livestock or land. This is an important area of 
analysis because it is not a coping strategy but a survival strategy and it can entrench 
poverty.
2) The extent to which knowledge of the existence of access to employment, whether 
undertaken or not, fosters productive risk taking behaviour. For example, potentially 
profitable crop diversification may not occur because of the devastating consequences 
if the crop fails, even if the chance of crop failure is low.
The insurance function offered by workfare schemes in some ways is no different to the 
insurance offered by other social protection programs but the analysis for this thesis will 
focus on the particular benefits or disadvantage of access to work rather than simply 
access to funds.
In addition to the above, which represent the more obvious areas where workfare 
complements the particular constraints faced by the chronically poor in remote rural 
areas, there are some other areas where potential complementarity exists. These are: the 
income it can provide; the method and type of payments that can be made; accompanying 
strategies which can be built into a workfare program; the empowerment that workfare 
and the accompanying strategies can bring; and the contribution to the stability of the 
region. These areas will also be examined in the context of the case study analysis.
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3.2.2 What type o f workfare programs?
As argued above, workfare programs have the potential to fit well with the conditions 
experienced by the chronically poor in remote rural areas. However, in the literature on 
workfare programs, it is rare to find mention of their ability to address long-term poverty. 
The consumption smoothing function of workfare schemes which is often emphasised in 
the literature (Subbarao, 2003) could lead to an assumption that workfare programs are 
better suited to addressing transitory poverty than chronic poverty. Coady, (2004; 26) 
states that “the comparative advantage o f [workfare] programs lies in dealing with 
vulnerability and crisis situations rather than as approaches to dealing with structural 
poverty”. This consumption smoothing feature is identified perhaps due to the fact that 
workfare schemes are often used as short-term interventions to address temporary shocks 
and are, therefore, designed with minimal community consultation. However, workfare 
schemes have the potential to be used in different ways. They do not need to be used only 
as short-term, safety net measures. They have the well-recognised ability to function as 
counter-cyclical measures which impact on the transitorily poor, but they also can 
effectively address longer-term poverty if they have some specific features.
In analysing the effectiveness of workfare schemes in South Africa, McCord (2005; 15) 
concludes that “sustained rather than short term, employment opportunities are required if 
public works are to address poverty” . An example of such a program is the Zibambele 
road maintenance program in KwaZulu Natal, South Africa, which is offered year round 
and, to further improve its effectiveness, pays above the prevailing wage and uses 
targeting to determine participation {ibid). To address chronic poverty McCord (2005; 
16) highlights the need for the following:
• “Sustained public works employment;
• Integration of public works programme with other developmental initiatives;
• Linkages with micro-finance, and micro enterprise activities;
• Creation of assets which directly impact on reducing vulnerability and promoting 
livelihoods;
• Flexible or piece based employment, enabling participants to combine public works 
employment with other responsibilities and income earning opportunities;
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Higher wages; and,
Poverty targeting measures”.
The extent to which all of the above are also relevant in the context of a remote rural 
environment (access to micro finance and the need for poverty targeting measures, for 
example) will be a focus of this thesis’s later analysis.
3.2.3 Conditionality
As detailed above, a well designed workfare program has the potential to effectively 
address chronic poverty. While workfare schemes alone have the ability to improve the 
conditions of the chronically poor, because of the multidimensional nature of poverty for 
the chronically poor, especially in remote rural areas, workfare programs may be made 
more effective in addressing the development needs of a target community by having 
some kind of conditionality which addresses improvements in human capital.
Human capital subsidies in the form of transfers to households, conditional on those 
households investing in human capital, are enjoying increasing recognition for their 
ability to address what Coady (2004) describes as the “structurally poor” whose poverty 
persists overtime. By investing in nutritional, health and education status of children, the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty can be broken (ibid). Coady is referring to cash 
transfers, but this thesis will examine the extent to which access to workfare schemes can 
be made conditional on these same types of human capital investments. Making access to 
work conditional on sending children to school or having them attend nutrition and 
hygiene sessions could serve to provide a clear link to chronic poverty alleviation 
regardless of how the wage earned is expended.
Conditionality has had mixed reviews in the development literature. It is usually 
discussed in terms of more macro issues like structural adjustment. At the level of the 
household, in relation to human capital subsidies, Coady (ibid) argues that making 
transfers conditional on households investing in their own future renders the transfers a 
hand up rather than handout. It is an approach which “combines the recognition of the
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rights of the poor with them having responsibilities for achieving these rights” (ibid; 31). 
The importance to the functioning of workfare programs of having the right to work was 
highlighted in Chapter 2, but this issue of accompanying responsibilities and, more 
importantly, the ability of workfare programs to influence the actioning of these 
responsibilities, will require further analysis.
3.2.4 Who Misses Out?
While it has been argued that workfare schemes are a natural fit to address chronic 
poverty in remote rural areas, they are not the only required strategy in addressing the 
particular needs of these populations. The schemes have some flexibility to address 
certain issues of non-participation such as providing creches to allow the participation of 
women with children, and providing piece rates and task based payments for those who 
cannot commit to full-time work. But where there are other prohibitions to participation, 
such are disability or old age, accompanying social protection strategies are required.
The working poor focus of workfare schemes is a clear weakness of this social protection 
mechanism but, given the suitability of workfare in other respects, it is surmised that 
these excluded populations will be small enough, and the benefits from the scheme for 
included populations large enough, to warrant workfare schemes taking centre stage as 
the key social protection mechanism in these areas. This will have to be tested in remote 
rural areas, especially where there are residual populations with larger than average 
concentrations of disabled and the elderly due to out-migration of able bodied workers to 
more integrated areas.
3.2.5 Cash vs Food
In the early public works programs in India and Bangladesh, it was common for transfers 
to be in-kind (Subbarao, 2003). In-kind transfers continue to be paid within workfare 
programs but increasingly cash transfers are used. Cash transfers have the obvious benefit 
of allowing the worker to maximise the welfare gain of the transfer by spending their 
earnings on goods or services other than food if appropriate without a complicated barter 
arrangement. Cash transfers do not have the problems associated with in-kind transfers in
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the form of transport and handling costs, and the considerable supervision requirements 
of distribution (ibid). There is also evidence that private markets can be more efficient at 
transporting food to areas of need (Coady, 2004). Indeed, if commodity markets function 
well, cash transfers can create what Devereux (2002) refers to as a “virtuous circle” in 
which food production and trade are stimulated rather than undermined.
In their study of workfare programs in Ethiopia, Clay and Barrett (2003) found that 
workfare programs could employ one quarter more people if they paid in cash instead of 
grain. They do recognise that if food is the only form in which resources are available to 
provide transfers then “in-kind transfers may be a second best solution” (ibid; 178), but 
they argue that cash transfers would generally result in assistance reaching more people. 
They hypothesise that there could be a circumstance where payments in food could be 
justified if private traders could not be induced to deliver food to local markets at prices 
that workfare workers could pay based on their cash transfers. This could be the case in 
remote rural areas.
In the absence of increased food availability, cash injections into communities could risk 
driving up prices and benefiting private suppliers at the expense of the transfer recipients 
(Coady, 2004). However, this is only likely to occur if a large proportion of the country is 
famine stricken.
While cash payments are often preferred, there are some situations where in-kind 
transfers are preferable, especially for women. For example, in Lesotho and Zambia, 
payment of half of the wage in food attracted more women than men to the workfare 
programs (Subbarao, 2003). In a study of public works programs in Malawi, the 
preferred method of payment depended on the season, gender and proximity to roads and 
towns (Devereux, 2002). Women were more likely to request food than men and the 
further they were from roads or towns increased the preference for food. In the hungry 
season food was preferred, but around planting time agricultural inputs were favoured 
and at harvest time cash was the preferred mode of payment (ibid). If food attracts more 
women, this raises the question of whether this is due to any true preference or whether it
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highlights the women’s lack of alternatives. It could also reflect men being attracted by 
cash to spend it on non-core items. If being near a road can affect payment preference, 
then for remote rural areas, this is very significant. This thesis will examine all of the 
above issues further as part of the case study.
3.2.6 The Maharashtra Employment Generation Scheme
While the case study area for this thesis is in Nepal, it is worth briefly considering the 
case of an Indian workfare program, the Maharashtra Employment Generation Scheme 
(MEGS), which is one of the most famous workfare schemes in the developing world. 
This scheme has been running since 1965 and has well documented impacts, which can 
assist in providing some background on functioning workfare programs for the Nepal 
case study analysis. MEGS has received renewed attention of late given the Government 
of India’s decision to introduce a national workfare program, modelled on MEGS, as a 
core mechanism to address rural poverty. The national scheme will initially cover the 150 
poorest districts in the country giving one household member the right to 100 days per 
year of employment at the minimum wage of the state (Mehrotra, 2005).
MEGS guarantees employment to any adult who needs it within 15 days of applying for 
work. The applicant must be willing to undertake low skilled manual labour in rural areas 
and be paid on a piece rate basis (Gaiha, 2003). The wage rate is usually below the 
agricultural wage, although there was a wage rise in 1988, and the two key criteria that 
the scheme must satisfy are labour intensiveness and the creation of productive assets, 
especially those that minimize the impact of droughts (Imai, 2003). The work is 
supposed to be organised so as not to interfere with agricultural production.
Due to the longevity of MEGS, and the attention it has received as being a potentially 
effective tool for addressing poverty in rural areas, there have been many studies of the 
scheme (Engvist, 1995; Dev, 1995; Imai, 2003; Gaiha, 2003; Gaiha and Imai, 2005). 
Some of the key finding of interest to this thesis relate to wages, assets and the general 
effectiveness of the scheme:
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Wages
As a result of the increase in the wage rate of the scheme in 1988, employment 
needed to be rationed and there was a marked reduction in days of employment 
offered. Despite this rise, MEGS wages remained low and in Gaiha’s (2003) study 
of two villages in Maharashtra he found that in a small tribal village, even though 
the MEGS wage rate was low, the travel and job search costs in neighbouring 
villages where wages were higher were such that employment under MEGS was a 
more attractive option than looking for employment elsewhere. These costs hide 
the true opportunity cost of participating in MEGS; that is, the true wage rate is not 
just the MEGS rate less the value of the wage that could have been earned. It needs 
to take into account possible high search and travel costs (Gaiha and Imai, 2005). 
This is important in the context of remote rural areas, where working elsewhere 
would normally entail search and travel costs, as it highlights the fact that low 
wages provided locally can provide greater spending power than higher wages 
elsewhere.
In terms of wage preference, part payment in food grains reduced the attractiveness 
of the employment, and there have been mixed findings in terms of piece rates 
against time rates (Gaiha, 2003). The very poor, for whom a lack of physical 
strength prohibits the fast paced work normally offered under time rates, prefer 
piece rates as do the very skilled who can complete a large number of tasks in a 
short amount of time. Time based rates have fewer delays and do not carry the same 
risks of underpayment (ibid).
The effect of the MEGS wage on agricultural wages and the bargaining position of 
workers is difficult to quantify, but there is some evidence that there is a link. 
MEGS wage rises do lead to agricultural wage rises. The collective identity 
fostered through the MEGS scheme provides the workers with a strengthened 
position from which to bargain with landholders (Gaiha and Imai, 2005). The 
assets created through MEGS increase agricultural productivity and increase the
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demand for agricultural labour. Further, the existence of MEGS as an alternative 
employment source further bolsters the wage (ibid).
Assets
One of the key criticisms of MEGS with regards to assets created through the 
Scheme relates to the benefits of the assets accruing to the wealthy (Gaiha and Imai, 
2005). Indeed, the focus of the Scheme on the promotion of unskilled labour is 
based on the view that given the disproportionate gain of the benefits of the assets 
by the wealthy, the poor need to also gain, so the focus is on ensuring that at least 
the wages flow through to the intended beneficiary of the Scheme. However,
Gaiha (2003 ;19) argues that if the benefits of the outputs were to accrue more to the 
poor then “the tight restrictions on labour intensive employment may not be 
required”.
Scheme effectiveness
Perhaps the main criticism of MEGS relates to its ability to include all of those who 
want to participate. The Scheme was designed to provide work to anyone who 
required it, but in practice, due to financing constraints, it has excluded some of its 
intended beneficiaries. Exclusion errors are much higher than inclusion errors 
(Gaiha and Imai, 2005) and, as mentioned in the previous chapter, errors of 
exclusion are of much greater concern for social protection schemes.
In general, the reviews of MEGS’ effectiveness have been reasonably positive. The 
Scheme has served an important insurance function, without which some 
participants would have experienced severe economic hardship and been forced to 
sell off valuable productive assets (Gaiha and Imai, 2005). Where employment is 
offered, there are few barriers to participation, especially because employment is 
viewed as a right in Maharashtra, and MEGS has proved to be a better alternative to 
many than finding work elsewhere. There is only a mild disincentive effect - that is, 
the existence of MEGS stopping workers entering into other productive pursuits - 
related to job search in neighbouring villages especially among women (Gaiha,
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2003). The travel and the potentially shorter duration of the employment would be 
relevant factors here.
While there have been criticisms of a disproportionate benefit to the wealthy, there 
also have been substantial gains by the poor. In Gaiha’s (2003) study of two 
villages that participate in MEGS he found that irrigation works conducted under 
MEGS allowed an additional summer crop to be grown and there was also some 
resulting off-farm employment opportunities generated, such as brick making and 
construction. This expanded production led to a weakening in the demand for 
MEGS.
Even though MEGS has some problems with the benefits of the assets accruing to the 
weal thy rather than the poor and it does exclude some of its intended beneficiaries, this 
appears to be due to deficiencies in implementation rather than any inherent flaw in the 
Scheme. In analysing MEGS role in preventing households from entering poverty or 
helping them escape, Imai (2003) determined that factors other than MEGS were 
important such as land holdings and dependency burden but as these are structural 
factors, and difficult to change in the short term, the role of MEGS was seen to be 
extremely important. Imai and Gaiha’s (2005) analysis of MEGS concluded that the 
“poverty alleviation potential of MEGS is high”.
Gaiha (2003) found that MEGS played both protective and promotional roles. In terms 
of the protective side, it can provide a consumption smoothing function and can prevent 
“adverse nutritional effects’’ (ibid; 16). It has the ability to also play the promotional role 
by allowing the poor to lift their incomes above the poverty line. Although finding both 
effects Gaiha did note that the protective function of MEGS was likely to be stronger 
than the promotional role.
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3.3 Testing the Hypothesis
3.3.1 Workfare in Remote Rural Nepal
The focus area for the case study in the analysis of workfare programs and chronic 
poverty will be the Kamali Zone of remote mountainous Mid Western Nepal. Participant 
interviews will be carried out in Mugu District of the Kamali Zone. The specific 
workfare program which will be the focus of this thesis’s analysis is the Rural 
Community Infrastructure Works Programme (RCIW). RCIW has been operating in 
Nepal since 1996 and in Mugu District since 2000. The objective of the Programme is to 
improve the livelihoods of the 50,000 households across the country who are most 
vulnerable to food insecurity. It aims to enable poor people to obtain and maintain assets 
that contribute to improving access to food and income at both the community and 
household level.
Workfare programs have been functioning in remote areas of Nepal with high levels of 
poverty despite the violent conflict between the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 
hereafter referred to as Maoists, and the government. That the Maoists have allowed 
these programs to continue in remote rural Nepal is, in part, a reflection of workfare’s 
ability to address some of the difficult conditions faced by inhabitants of these areas.
The case study will assess the extent to which workfare programs are an appropriate 
strategy for addressing chronic poverty in the Kamali Zone. Based on the existing 
analysis of chronic poverty, remote rural areas and workfare programs, it is hypothesised 
that in the Kamali Zone there will be a spatial concentration of chronically poor and their 
isolation will form a key component of their poverty status. It is further hypothesised that 
social protection, through the workfare program, can offer the chronically poor benefits 
that address their isolation and some of the other constraints that they face. The analysis 
will be broken down into three separate areas: firstly, an examination of the geographic 
dimension of the chronically poor’s poverty; secondly, an analysis of what the workfare 
program can do for the chronically poor; and, thirdly, how, given the difficult 
environment and the depth of the poverty, workfare can achieve these results. A key part
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of the analysis will be to determine whether workfare goes beyond being a strategy which 
could be used to address chronic poverty in remote rural areas to being a strategy which 
should be used. The specific areas of analysis will be:
1) Poverty status -  The extent to which the target population is living in chronic 
poverty will be assessed. Long term panel data with income or consumption 
information is not available for the target population in Mugu District. Because of 
this, a proxy for chronic poverty which provides some indication of the duration 
of the poverty will be used. The proxy will be the experience of “hungry seasons”. 
This will be supplemented by qualitative data which can provide an insight into 
the dynamics of poverty and local perceptions of poverty. A key issue in the 
poverty assessment will be an appraisal of the uniformity of poverty across the 
broader region as this will have particular relevance for the analysis of coping 
strategies and wages.
2) Income -  Although normally associated with methods for addressing transitory 
poverty, income is also important to the chronically poor. Whether workfare is 
able to provide appropriate income allowing households to satisfy their basic 
needs, such as food security, as well as other needs related to livelihood 
enhancement will be assessed.
3) Assets -  The asset related trade-off that appears in the literature - that is, the 
trade-off between equity and efficiency - will be examined. The extent to which 
the quality of the assets suffers due to the requirement for the scheme to utilise 
labour intensive methods will be assessed. Particular focus will be on the issue of 
whether the assets are of adequate quality. This will not be a technical analysis 
but rather an assessment by the RCIW Programme participants in Mugu District 
which will include an appraisal of the benefits that the assets bring (or may bring 
in the future) and the importance of the scheme to the chronically poor in terms of 
the provision of assets as opposed to just the wages. The analysis will include an 
assessment of the level of participation in the choice of assets and the resulting
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implications for the chronically poor. The issue of the use of scarce resources will 
also be discussed in the context of asset provision, as will the extent to which the 
benefits of the assets accrue to the target population or the more wealthy 
households.
4) Insurance -  The extent to which the mere existence of a workfare program in 
Mugu District could be significant for the target population in terms of providing 
insurance whether they access the program or not will be reviewed. Areas of 
analysis around this issue will cover how to prevent a situation in which the 
chronically poor are forced to adopt irreversible survival strategies and what 
changes in livelihood strategies result from the knowledge of a safety net. 
Whether the main benefit to the chronically poor is experienced during Mugu 
District’s hungry seasons in April/May and July/August or whether the existence 
of the program has a year round benefit, will be questioned.
5) Use of available labour -  For the transfer benefit of workfare programs to be 
maximised, the opportunity cost of labour must be low. Because of the isolation 
of the Kamali Zone caused by geography in this mountainous terrain and the 
accompanying lack of off-farm employment opportunities, even with temporary 
migration, it is assumed that there would be a reasonably high level of labour 
which could participate in a workfare program and, in doing so, would not be 
displaced from particularly productive pursuits. The importance of flexible access 
to the program so as to reduce the opportunity cost, and increase the transfer 
benefit, will also be assessed. Another important area of enquiry will be the 
significance of the work as distinct from the payment; that is, would the transfer 
alone serve to provide sufficient opportunities to absorb the available labour or is 
the work aspect a significant productive opportunity?
6) Targeting -  As a key feature of workfare programs, the ability of these programs 
to effectively include the poor and exclude the non-poor will be examined. One 
of the key issues here is that the isolation of the Kamali Zone could serve as a
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targeting function in itself by effectively trapping a group of chronically poor 
people in one area; that is, geographical constraints could perform the targeting 
function. Even if this is the case, then the self-targeting nature of workfare 
programs functioning in Mugu District is still of interest because households may 
be able to utilise the scheme to suit their particular circumstances (for example, 
having multiple household members participate) in order to maximise their 
welfare, rather than having bureaucrats or donors make that determination for 
them.
7) Wage Levels and Method of Payment -  How the RCIW Programme has set wage 
levels will be examined as well as whether a trade-off exists between a well 
functioning scheme (which most of the literature says must have low wages) and 
effective poverty alleviation. The impact the Programme’s existing wages are 
having on chronic poverty will be assessed as well as the scope for increasing 
these wages. Forthose working outside the scheme, there will be an examination 
of whether the existence of the scheme has had any impact on the bargaining 
power for better wages and conditions. The suitability of the method of payment 
will be questioned.
8) Type of Payment - The form of these wages, cash or in-kind, will be discussed to 
determine what best serves the chronically poor. Whether the type of in-kind 
payment impacts at all on participation will also be assessed.
9) Accompanying Strategies -  While workfare programs can provide direct benefits 
to the chronically poor, effectiveness has the potential to be increased by 
including additional components to the programs. The extent to which conditions 
are used and are effective in addressing the particular constraints of the 
chronically poor will be examined, as well as the implications of the right to work 
having accompanying responsibilities. Appropriate accompanying strategies will 
also be assessed by seeking comment on what currently exists and what the 
chronically poor would desire.
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10) Conflict - While the link between workfare and its ability to address a root cause 
of Maoist insurgency is important, it will not form a major part of the analysis. 
The conflict cannot be ignored, however, and the extra complexity of workfare 
programs operating in a conflict environment, where there is the potential for 
benefits to be forcibly taken by those other than the target population, will be 
considered. Because one of the root causes of the conflict in Nepal is related to 
long-term poverty and a lack of basic services, any program which is able to 
address the grievances which fueled the conflict also has the potential to play a 
positive role in consolidating peace. The role of the program on the conflict and 
the role of the conflict on the program are both important areas of analysis for this 
thesis insofar as they impact on the chronically poor in Mugu District.
11) Limitations -  A cross cutting issue through the above outlined analysis will be a 
focus on the limitations of workfare programs in addressing chronic poverty in 
remote rural areas. Very real issues such as: ongoing asset maintenance; the 
number of non-working poor (which could be higher in remote rural areas due to 
residual populations); transport o f materials without roads; and, the lack of 
political will and resources for social protection schemes in a fragile state such as 
Nepal, will be examined in order to ensure a balanced view of workfare 
programs’ ability to address chronic poverty is presented. Distinctions will be 
drawn between the limitations of the RCIW Programme and workfare more 
broadly to ensure clarification between what is Programme specific (and thus can 
be addressed) and what is a function of workfare as a social protection 
mechanism.
The analysis will continue to bring the focus back to how effectively workfare addresses 
the issue of chronic poverty within remote rural mountainous areas; how it is able to 
reduce the layers of constraints that the chronically poor face and that keep them poor. 
This thesis is not intended to be a project evaluation but rather a conceptual analysis of 
the ability of a particular social protection mechanism to address a particular type of
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poverty in a particular environment. Some of the results of the analysis will be Nepal 
specific, and maybe even Mugu District or Kamali Zone specific, but an attempt will be 
made to highlight relevant findings that could have broader applications.
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C H A P T E R  4
The Karnali Zone of Nepal: Case Study Background
The Kamali Zone, situated in Northwest Nepal forms the region of focus of the case 
study. This chapter begins with a discussion of Nepal - specifically poverty in Nepal - 
with a focus on the geographic nature of that poverty. The tremendous development 
challenges across the country impact on the government’s ability to address specific areas 
of need like the Kamali Zone. The dynamics of the recent conflict in Nepal are briefly 
examined as are existing social protection mechanisms within the country. This provides 
the national context for the next section in this chapter which details the key relevant 
characteristics of the Kamali Zone. Then, as some final background before the following 
chapter which presents the case study, a description is given of the Rural Community 
Infrastructure Works (RCIW) Programme which is the social protection mechanism 
chosen for analysis. The description of RCIW within this chapter is intended to highlight 
how the Programme is meant to function. The following chapter will delve into how it 
does function and assess its relevance for addressing chronic poverty in the remote rural 
area of the Kamali Zone.
4.1 Nepal
4.1.1 Overview
Surrounded by China and India, Nepal is a small, landlocked country which straddles the 
area where the Eurasian and Indian plates collide to form the Himalayan mountain range. 
It has a population of approximately 24.8 million people (Central Bureau of Statistics, 
2004). It is a predominantly rural population, although the urban population has been 
increasing over the last thirty years; from four percent in 1971 to 14 percent in 2001 
(ORC Macro, 2002). Eighty one percent of the population works in agriculture, which is
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one of the highest rates in the world (SAAPE, 2003). Annual per capita income is 
US$240 (UNDP, 2005) and Nepal is classified as Least Developed Country. In UNDP’s 
Human Development Index, Nepal is ranked 137th out of 177 countries, scoring 
particularly low in areas of literacy and maternal and child health (UNDP, 2005).
Map 1 -  Nepal
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Development
As Map 1 shows, Nepal is divided into three ecological zones (Mountains, Hills and the 
Terai), five development zones (East, Central, West, Mid West and Far West) and 75 
districts. The districts are then further divided into municipalities and Village 
Development Committees (VDCs), and each VDC comprises approximately nine wards 
(ICIMOD, 2003).The population is concentrated in the fertile plains of the Terai and the 
valleys of the Hills although there is a significant population in the remote mountainous 
areas which have harsher conditions both in terms of land quality and climate than the
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other ecological zones. Although the mountainous areas comprise one third of the land 
area, only two percent of this is available for cultivation (Rajan, 2003).
Nepal has experienced moderate economic growth, even through the ten years of internal 
conflict (from 1996 to 2006). From 1990 to 2003 GDP per capita grew by an average of
2.2 percent (UNDP, 2005). This growth figure could be viewed positively except that 
growth was very unequal and had little impact on the rural poor (SAAPE, 2003). The 
UNDP’s recent Nepal Human Development Report (2004b), states that Nepal’s growth is 
not broad-based. The agricultural sector has not diversified its production structure and, 
in other sectors, growth has been urban biased, and so growth has not been pro-poor. 
UNDP {ibid; 2) describes growth as being pro-poor “when it uses the assets that the poor 
own, favours the sectors in which the poor work and takes place in the areas in which the 
poor live”. This has not occurred in Nepal.
4.1.2 Poverty in Nepal
Estimates differ on poverty in Nepal depending on the calculation. Recent data suggests 
that income poverty has fallen from 42 percent in 1996 to 31 percent in 2004 (CBS, 
2004). However, in 25 remote districts, the rate ranges from 45 to 60 percent. With the 
population increasing at such a speed, even though there has been a fall in the proportion 
of people living in poverty, the actual number of people has increased dramatically 
doubling in the last 20 years (SAAPE,2003). Over the same period the share of total 
income of the poorest 40 percent of the population has decreased and the share of the 
total income of the top 10 percent has increased significantly {ibid).
As mentioned earlier, chronic poverty is not only an income phenomenon but a 
multidimensional condition comprising a variety of constraints and some of the key 
constraints in Nepal will be detailed below. These constraints indicate that poverty is of a 
chronic nature, but due to data limitations, specifically a lack o f time series data, it is 
difficult to calculate chronic poverty using the spells or components approach. Proxies 
must be used for determining chronic poverty in Nepal. Those proxies, which suggest 
long-term deprivation such as child stunting and continual food insecurity, all indicate
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that poverty is persistent. There is a general consensus that poverty is persistent and, 
hence, chronic poverty exists (Sadeque, 2003; UNDP, 2004a)
Some of the main constraints which keep people in Nepal in a state of persistent poverty 
include: a lack of access to basic services; exclusion from effective participation in 
society; a lack of return to assets and labour; and, geographical constraints. These 
constraints will be briefly described below:
a) Access to Basic Services
Health -  There have been some improvements in the health situation in Nepal but 
it remains serious. The number of health facilities has increased but so has the 
population. In 2001, the average number of people per government health 
institution was 5,663. This varied substantially by district from 685 (Manang) to 
17,177 (Kanchanpur) (ICIMOD, 2003). Under-nutrition is significant in Nepal. 
Fifty percent of children are stunted (short for their age), 10 percent are wasted 
(thin for thin for their age) and 48 percent are underweight (ORC Macro, 2002). 
There has been little improvement in nutritional status of children in the last 
decade (ibid). Food insecurity is a serious problem in Nepal. Food production in 
certain parts of the country is significantly short of requirements. Seventy five 
percent of rural households have no sanitation {ibid). Nepal also has one of the 
worst maternal mortality rates in the world at 539 deaths per 100,000 women.
One out of every 185 pregnant women dies because of complications with the 
birth or pregnancy (UNDP, 2004b). This high death rate is attributable to lack of 
access to appropriate pre and post-natal care.
Education - Access to education is improving but is still poor. The primary 
school enrolment rate has increased from 57 percent in 1995/96 to 72.4 percent in 
2003/04. Literacy, while still low, has climbed to 54 percent; up from around two 
percent in 1951 (UNDP, 2004b). Education statistics vary enormously depending 
on a number of factors including age, sex, geographic, and caste differences. For 
example, 26.8 percent of average six to nine year old girls have never attended
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school compared to an average of 97.5 percent of women aged 60 and above 
(CBS, 2004). The main reason for not sending boys to school is related to the 
expense (ibid). For girls, the main reason is that the parents do not want them to 
go followed by the need to help in the home; the expense is ranked third for girls 
(ibid). The government has made some meaningful reforms to the education 
sector, but until primary education is made compulsory, their goal of 
universalisation will remain elusive (UNDP, 2004b).
Infrastructure -  Out of the 75 district headquarters, 15 do not have road linkages 
(SAAPE, 2003). Commercial agriculture has been developing rapidly in regions 
that do have good road networks, indicating a strong link between the two 
(UNDP, 2004b). Without roads, transport of essential commodities to remote 
rural areas has become prohibitively expensive (ibid). Communication 
infrastructure is similarly underdeveloped. Only 2.5 percent of households have 
access to a phone (ORC Macro, 2002) and over half of the Village Development 
Committees have no phone access (UNDP, 2004b). Fifty percent of the rural 
population has access to a radio and only one percent has a television (UNDP, 
2004b). Thirty one percent of households have access to electricity, and the cost 
per unit of electricity in Nepal is the highest in South Asia (ibid).
b) Social Exclusion
Caste/Ethnic Minorities -  Discrimination on the basis of caste and ethnicity is an 
entrenched practice in Nepal. A key result o f the recent peace agreement is that 
the Constitution of Nepal will be rewritten but, until recently, although it stated 
that people should not be discriminated against on the grounds of sex, religion or 
caste, in practice it supported discriminatory practices by upholding “traditional 
religious practices”. Low caste groups such as the Dalits who comprise 12.9 
percent of the population, are often denied access to education and other basic 
services (UNDP, 2004b). The unsanitary living conditions into which Dalits are 
often relegated reinforces the stigma of untouchability. Caste and ethnicity are 
significantly correlated to poverty. For example, 25 percent of people of Newar
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ethnicity are below the poverty line compared to 71 percent people of Limbu 
ethnicity (SAAPE, 2003). Discriminatory practices prevent low caste or ethnic 
groups accessing opportunities to improve their lives. Only in 2006 did Nepal 
move from being a Hindu Kingdom to a secular state, which removed the formal 
dominance of one language and one culture.
Women - In addition to facing discrimination based on caste or ethnic group 
women also face systematic discrimination based solely on their gender. UNDP’s 
Gender-related Development Index exposes rural areas as having a greater degree 
of gender inequality than urban areas (UNDP, 2004b). Violence against women is 
severe in rural areas. In a recent country-wide demographic and health survey, 
men were questioned about reasons for hitting or beating their wives, and 73.1 
percent of men living in the western mountainous region agreed with at least one 
reason (ORC Macro, 2002). This compared to 25.5 percent of urban men. The 
survey also found that women often have very little say in how their earnings are 
spent and one in two married women responded that their husband has the final 
say in their health care (ibid). Women also work longer than men, 641 minutes 
versus 547 minutes per day for men (UNDP, 2005). Some estimate the women’s 
daily work burden to be as high as 16 hours per day (UNDP, 2004b). Participation 
of women in productive, non-household related activities, is one of the highest in 
the world ((UNDP, 2004b). Female literacy at 33.8 percent lags well behind male 
literacy at 64.5 percent. The government has attempted some measures to address 
discrimination against women but it is yet to adopt any policies aimed at 
mainstreaming gender as a key strategy in promoting equity and equality (UNDP, 
2004b).
c) Returns to Assets and Labour
Over 70 percent of Nepal’s population still works in agriculture (CBS, 2004), one of the 
highest rates in the world (SAAPE, 2003). Although this has declined from over 80 
percent eight years earlier, its share of GDP has declined even more, which indicates that 
agricultural productivity has declined (UNDP, 2004b). Nepal’s high rate of population
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growth means that an extra 300,000 people join the labour force each year (SAAPE,
2003). Growth in employment opportunities has not kept pace with population growth 
resulting in people seeking work outside Nepal. Over 31 percent of households receive 
remittance income (CBS, 2004). Even if the economy grew at a rate of four percent as it 
did during the Ninth Plan (1997 - 2002), this equates to only 100,000 jobs annually 
(UNDP, 2004b). The employment opportunities in Nepal are mostly in the informal 
sector, are low paid and require low skills. There is little access to training opportunities 
in this sector. Underemployment is also an issue in Nepal with some estimates as high as 
43 percent (UNDP, 2004a).
There is a strong correlation between poverty and access to assets. The non-poor have 
more land, greater access to irrigation and higher levels of education than the poor 
(UNDP, 2004). Landholdings are very unequal; the bottom 40 percent of households 
owns only nine percent of the land, and the top six percent owns 33 percent. The small 
size of landholding constrains productivity (SAAPE, 2003). Most landholdings, 69 
percent, are less than one hectare and 88 percent are less than two hectares {ibid). One 
fifth of rural households own no land. Due to the fragmentation of landholdings, 
subsistence agriculture is increasingly unable to meet the needs of the household, so a 
combination of agriculture and day labour work is becoming the norm (ADB, 2004).
Compounding the ownership difficulties is the issue of quality. While size of land 
holding is important, it is the return from the land that is most relevant. In a country like 
Nepal, with such varied ecological terrain, productivity can differ substantially even in a 
small area. Across the Terai, Hill and Mountain region a common finding is that the non­
poor have significantly more productive land. The average productivity of land of non­
poor households, with only small holdings of land, is Rs 26,058 (approx. US $371) per 
hectare. This compares to only Rsl 1,199 (approx. US $159) per hectare for the same 
sized holdings for poor households (UNDP, 2004a).
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d) Geographic Dimensions to Poverty
Poverty in Nepal is widespread, and pockets o f poverty exist across all development 
regions and ecological zones; however, when looking at the concentration of the poor 
across the country there is a distinct geographical dimension to poverty in Nepal. Rural 
areas are significantly poorer than urban areas and the mountains generally have 
development indicators well behind the other regions. The Mid and Far Western 
development regions of Nepal are particularly excluded from the broader development 
processes in the rest of the country, irrespective of other factors which govern exclusion 
in other parts of the country such as caste, ethnicity and gender. It is therefore important 
in any development strategy to not only focus on disadvantaged groups, but also on 
disadvantaged regions.
UNDP has created a human empowerment index to capture the multidimensional nature 
of deprivation that characterises poverty (UNDP, 2004b). It brings together the political, 
economic and socio-cultural dimensions of empowerment. Across each of these areas the 
mountainous regions score lower than the other ecological regions. When broken down 
even further the mountains in the west of the country is the most disadvantaged region. 
The low political, economic and socio-cultural empowerment in the mountainous regions 
of Nepal, and particularly the western mountains, manifests itself in some very visible 
constraints in the areas of health, education, infrastructure and assets as described below.
4.1.3 Poverty in the Mountainous Regions o f  Nepal
As mentioned earlier, poverty in Nepal has declined recently, but the poverty rates in the 
remote rural areas remain high. The mountainous regions are the most deprived, 
particularly in the areas of health, education, infrastructure and assets.
Health - Access to health care facilities has improved across Nepal, but access remains 
difficult in mountainous areas, with over 35 percent reporting that it takes over an hour to 
reach the nearest facility (CBS, 2004). Life expectancy at birth in Nepal is 61 but only 52 
in the mountains (UNDP, 2004b).
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Nepal used to be a food surplus country until the 1970s, but the mountains and hill 
regions have always been vulnerable to food shortages (UNDP, 2004a). It is estimated 
that food production in certain parts of the country has remained short in all analysed 
years by 37 to 45 percent (UNDP, 2004a). In the period 1994-1998, 70 percent of 
mountainous districts had a food deficit of more than 40 percent, (ibid). UNDP (2004a; 
32) considers this food security data to be evidence of “chronic, long term poverty in 
remote areas [of Nepal]’’. Surveys of mountain and hill regions have shown that local 
production can meet food needs for only 5-6 months on average each year, which means 
that people have to adopt other coping strategies to survive for the rest of the year (WFP, 
2001) .
The problem of accessing sufficient, nutritious food is experienced across Nepal, but it is 
fell in some areas more than others. For example, in rural areas children are more likely 
to be stunted (52 percent) than children from urban areas (37 percent). Predictably, in 
mountainous areas, children are even more likely to be stunted (61 percent) (ORC Macro, 
2002). Fifty percent of children under five are chronically malnourished across Nepal, but 
that figure rises to 75 percent in the Mid Western mountains (UNDP, 2004b).
Education - The literacy rate for the mountains is 36.1 percent compared to 52.3 percent 
in the hills and 48.6 percent across Nepal (UNDP, 2004b). In the mountains of Nepal, 81 
percent of women have had no education in the form of formal schooling (ORC Macro, 
2002). In the Western mountains this figure jumps to 92.7 percent. Some of the least 
developed districts have extremely low numbers of girls enrolled as a percentage of total 
enrolment. In Kathmandu, 47 percent of enrolments are girls, whereas in the Western 
district of Kalikot only 32 percent are girls (ICIMOD, 2003). In the Mid Western 
mountain district of Humla, only 4.8 percent of adult females are literate (UNDP, 2004b).
Infrastructure - Over 80 percent of urban households have electricity, whereas only 21 
percent of rural households have access (UNDP, 2004b). The figures are even worse for 
the more remote regions with only 6.1 percent of the population living in the Far Western 
mountainous region having access to electricity (UNDP, 2004b). Access to roads is
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similarly absent in many districts, particularly those in the Mid Western mountain region 
where there are no roads (ICIMOD, 2003).
Assets - In the mountainous region, the correlation of being landless, or only having a 
small land holding, to poverty is higher than in other regions. In the Terai region 60 
percent of the landless were non-poor whereas in the mountain region 77 percent of the 
landless were poor (UNDP, 2004a).
The ability to protect assets during difficult periods relies on access to credit. In the Terai, 
25 percent of households have access to institutional credit (UNDP, 2004b). This 
compares to 14 percent for households in the mountains (ibid).
4.1.4 The Maoisi Insurgency
Nepal’s development problems have been compounded by the Maoist insurgency, which 
began in 1996. A peace agreement was signed in 2006, but thousands ofNepalis, 
including innocent civilians, died in the fighting over the previous ten years. The country 
was caught up in a vicious cycle of political instability, poverty and economic stagnation. 
Remote mountainous areas, with their fragile livelihoods, in what is often very marginal 
land, have been particularly affected by the conflict. Coping mechanisms have been 
constrained due to restrictions on movement, and development activities in 
underdeveloped regions have been delayed. Schools were routinely overtaken by the 
Maoists, and thousands of teachers fled rural schools, resulting in serious disruptions to 
children’s education. The Nepal economy suffered badly with tourist numbers 
plummeting and infrastructure being destroyed (SAAPE, 2003). In a country with very 
limited resources, it could ill afford the seven fold increase in government security 
expenditure from 1990/01 to 2002/03 (ibid).
One of the root causes of the conflict was the inability of democracy, which came to 
Nepal in 1990, to deliver substantial gains to the poor. The development budget is low, 
with the international community funding approximately 60 percent of it (ADB, 2004). 
Visible signs of government service delivery were rare, particularly in the more remote
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areas. This culminated in discontent among the people in two deprived districts and this 
discontent was mobilised by a communist political party. The movement spread across 
the whole of rural Nepal.
The Comprehensive Peace Accord signed by the Maoists and the government in 
November 2006 is holding, and observers are optimistic that there will not be a return to 
violent conflict. However, government institutions remain weak and may not be able to 
deliver on promises made to the people, especially in the areas of generating employment 
opportunities and delivering basic services to deprived areas. There remains much 
healing to be done as human rights abuses on both sides were atrocious and trust in the 
authorities will take time to rebuild.
4.1.5 Social Protection Mechanisms in Nepal
In 2004, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) commissioned a study on social protection 
in Nepal. The study examined existing social protection mechanisms and also made 
recommendations about some future appropriate uses of social protection in Nepal.
Social protection programs in Nepal are described in the study as “broadly based but 
shallow” (ADB, 2004;iv). The framework exists but it does not assist many people. Nepal 
has passed labour market legislation protecting formal sector workers but, given that 80 
percent of the population does not work in the formal sector, the legislation does not 
provide any support to the majority of the population. The only government financed 
income transfer is the Senior Citizen ’s Allowance. The government does provide some 
funding to the Rural Community Infrastructure Works Programme, but funds are limited 
to an equivalent of NRs50 per capita (approx US$0.75).
Micro finance initiatives have been present in Nepal since 1956, but coverage is far from 
universal. Between one quarter to one third of rural communities have access to 
microfinance arrangements (including micro insurance).
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In the absence of other social protection options, children are used as an economic 
resource; a coping mechanism for households. It is estimated that 40 percent of children 
work and many are victims of human trafficking (ibid). Many are trafficked to India for 
commercial sex work and others are trafficked both inside and outside Nepal to work in 
areas such as domestic service and the carpet industry (UNDP, 2004b). Protecting 
children depends on the ability of poor households to develop the capacity to meet the 
needs of the children both in terms of education and health. Increasing household income 
is not the only answer, but it is a key part of solving the problem.
The ADB study estimates that just under 14 percent of Nepal’s budget outlays are for 
social protection strategies (including health). Given the needs, this is a veiy modest 
outlay. In attempting to address some of the usual criticism of social protection - that is, 
that it is a luxury that a small, poverty stricken country like Nepal can not afford - the 
ADB study suggests that there are considerable revenue gains to be made through efforts 
to improve tax compliance. Further, they cite the recent high military expenditure (15 
percent of total government outlays) as evidence that expenditure priorities can shift if 
the political will exists. Finally, and as detailed in Chapter 2, social and economic 
spending decisions can be reinforcing. The choice is not between one or the other; social 
spending can support economic goals. Social protection programs, as compared with 
economic development programs, have the benefit of providing immediate impacts, 
including economic benefits, which can help address some of the root causes of the 
conflict in Nepal.
Because of the unorganised nature of the informal sector, the best way to target 
appropriate interventions is not obvious. One option that is suggested by the ADB study 
is to use geography. As Nepal has some spatially concentrated poverty, geography could 
serve well as an entry point. It could guide policy makers to populations that, while not 
homogenous in their poverty, are experiencing significant deprivation.
The two approaches recommended by the ADB study are the establishment of:
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1) a National Employment Program. Wage based employment would be guaranteed on a 
household basis. This would be followed up with increased access to microcredit to 
promote longer term income generating activities.
2) District Welfare Funds. These hinds would exist in each of the 75 districts and 
provide financial support to the destitute, the aged, widows and people with ongoing 
disabilities. It is estimated that there would be approximately 650,000 people eligible 
for payments.
The increase in transfers to rural areas for both programs would have benefits for rural 
markets.
The first recommended approach is of particular relevance to this thesis as it supports the 
approach taken by the Rural Community Infrastructure Works Programme (RCIW), 
which will be discussed in more depth later in this chapter. RCIW is not a national 
program as is recommended by the ADB study but it has used geography as a way to 
target appropriate households which is in line with other recommendations made by the 
ADB study.
4.2 The Karnali Zone
4.2.1 Location and Climate
The Karnali Zone is located in the North West of Nepal as shown in Map 2. It is 
officially referred to as the Mid Western mountain region and comprises the five districts 
of Humla, Mugu, Dolpa, Kalikot and Jumla. It is an extremely remote region, and none 
of the districts yet have motorable roads, compounding the remoteness. The difficult 
terrain can make walking, the main transport method in the region, an arduous 
undertaking.
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Map 2 -  Nepal -  Administrative Zones - The Karnali Zone
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Much of the region is situated in a rain shadow which disrupts the monsoon, resulting in 
the rainfall pattern being markedly different to that of the central and Eastern mountain 
areas of Nepal. The Karnali Zone is much drier and warmer than these areas. Warmer is 
a relative term of course, with much of the Karnali Zone experiencing only 120-180 days 
free from frost which severely limits the growing season (Bishop, 1990). Strong valley 
winds contribute to the dryness of the region and hinder air travel to the few existing air 
fields. Snow fall is much heavier during the winter than it is in the East due to the 
particular topographic conditions, and because of the area’s more northerly latitude it is 
also slower to melt in the spring {ibid).
4.2.2 Characteristics
The Karnali Zone fits within Jodha’s (1990, 1992) conceptualisation of mountain 
environments as described in Chapter 2 in terms of inaccessibility, fragility, marginality, 
diversity and niche. With no roads, the region is inaccessable as dramatically highlighted 
during the recent drought of 2006 when the only way to get emergency food relief to 
suffering communities was through costly air lifts. The malnutrition situation worsened 
and people were so desperate for food that there were reports of people eating uncooked
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rice from the food drops (eKantipur, 2006). In a more integrated area with a less 
vulnerable population, the consequences of the drought would have been less serious.
The mountains of Kamali are very fragile and have suffered degradation as a result of 
livelihood strategies. They represent extremely marginal environments within which to 
obtain a sufficient standard of wellbeing. The Kamali Zone also represents a marginal 
environment in terms of the political voice of the population. The region has long been 
ignored by the central authorities in Kathmandu. On the positive side the Kamali Zone 
does enjoy significant diversity compared to the plains with different ecosystems existing 
at different elevations and different topographical conditions. As a result of these unique 
conditions, the Kamali Zone does have a certain niche in the production of herbs, 
medicinal plants and other wild vegetation (Bishop, 1990). There is a market for these 
medicinal plants elsewhere in Nepal. They are also demanded by pharmaceutical firms in 
India and elsewhere {ibid). The killing and selling of protected fauna also has become a 
source of income in difficult periods.
Perhaps the overriding characteristic of the Kamali Zone at this time in Nepal’s 
development is its depth of poverty. It is overwhelmingly acknowledged to be the poorest 
region in Nepal and suffers from yearly food shortages. On average, a normal year’s 
food production only lasts six months, and most of the population survives on less than 
US$1 a day (IRIN, 2006). The situation has not always been so dire in the region but 
population pressures have pushed down living standards over the last few decades 
(Bishop, 1990). Due to the proximity to Tibet, most households in the Kamali Zone 
engaged in cross border trade with Tibetans, but this trade was officially suspended a 
generation ago (National Programme Support Unit, 2002a). The conflict over the last ten 
years has also damaged livelihoods.
Primarily due to the lack of roads, markets do not function well. In the severe drought of 
2006, relatives in India were sending funds back to their villages in the Kamali Zone, but 
there was no food to buy (Newar, 2006). Even in normal times when goods are being 
brought into Kamali, the cost can be prohibitive. A bag of cement, for example, which
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costs NRs 300 in the market centre ofNepalgunj to the south of the Kamali Zone, can 
cost NRs 3,000 in Kamali (Khadka, 2000).
Table 1 well illustrates the depth of deprivation within the Kamali Zone. As the field 
work, which will be detailed in the next chapter, focuses on Mugu District within Kamali 
Zone it has been highlighted separately.
Table 1 -  Nepal - Geographic Differences
N ep a l U rb an R u ra l K a rn a li
Z o n e
M u g u
D istr ic t
Life expectancy at birth 
(years)
60.98 64.53 60.61 52.94 44.07
Adult literacy (%) 48.6 68.3 45.0 25.3 24.1
Mean years of schooling 2.75 5.06 2.35 1.48 1.40
Chronic malnourishment 
among children under 5
(%)
50.5 36.6 51.5 75.0 68.8
Infant mortality (number of 
deaths of infants under one 
year per thousand live 
births)
68.51 51.71 70.32 116.53 173.83
Population with life 
expectancy less than 40 
years (%)
17.74 13.39 18.20 29.02 40.30
Population without access 
to safe water (%)
20.48 11.46 22.19 38.84 44.83
GDP per capita (PPP$US) 1310 2224 1162 940 1105
Labour force employed in 
non agricultural jobs (%)
31.33 71.74 25.75 15.26 10.83
Electrified households (%) 31.8 82.53 21.34 11.69 5.68
Households with access to 
institutional credit (%)
19.85 N/A 23.52 0.96 0.00
Source: UNDP (2004b)
The Kamali Zone falls under the national averages for most social indicators of 
wellbeing. Of particular concern are the statistics on child welfare. Three quarters of the
93
children in the Kamali Zone are chronically malnourished. In the absence of good district 
level time series data, this indicator forms a good proxy for the proportion of people in 
the Kamali living in chronic poverty. The infant mortality rate in Mugu District is higher 
than the rate in any country in the world (UNDP, 2005a). The life expectancy for Mugu is 
the lowest of all districts in Nepal.
On the economic side, significantly more people in the Kamali Zone are employed in the 
agricultural sector and, due to the harsh conditions of the region, earn less from their 
efforts than people in other parts of the country working in agriculture. For the purposes 
of this thesis the term agriculture includes animal husbandly, which is prominent in the 
Kamali Zone, as is the practice of transhumance (the seasonal movement of people and 
animals in search of pasture) which reduces the pressure on people’s own limited land 
holdings. Of particular importance within the economic statistics above is the low rate of 
access to institutional credit, an important social protection mechanism. Less than one 
percent of the population within the Kamali Zone has access compared to almost a 
quarter of the rural population across Nepal.
While the above figures for the Kamali Zone are grim for both the social and economic 
indicators, they become worse when gender differences are examined. As discussed in 
earlier chapters, poverty is a multidimensional concept and people face various 
constraints, gender discrimination being one of them. Education is one of the main areas 
in which females face discrimination. The adult literacy level for Kamali is extremely 
low at 25.3 percent, but it hides the enormous difference in the adult male and female’s 
previous access to education. The adult male literacy rate is 41.2 percent compared to the 
adult female rate of 7.9 percent. The female rate is even lower in Mugu District at 5.2 
percent. The average years of schooling for males in the Kamali Zone is 2.41 compared 
to 0.55 for females (UNDP, 2004b). Across the whole country, the percentage of ten to 
14 year olds who are usually economically active is almost 20 percent. In the district of 
Mugu, the male child economic activity rate is slightly higher than this average at 27.8 
percent, but the rate for female children is staggeringly higher, the highest in the country, 
at 70.1 percent (ICIMOD, 2003b).
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As well as gender differences it is also likely that the statistics hide caste and ethnicity 
differences. While statistics are not readily available for district level caste 
discrimination, it is surmised that this is one area in which the Kamali Zone does not fare 
particularly badly in comparison the rest of Nepal. This is not to say that there is a lack of 
discrimination, rather that the discrimination is being practiced across the country. For 
example, across the country 12.9 percent of enrolled primary students are from 
disadvantaged castes. Mugu District records 15.9 percent of disadvantaged caste 
enrolments (ICIMOD, 2003b). That the Kamali Zone practices discrimination based on 
caste more of less to the same extent as the rest of Nepal does not diminish its 
seriousness. In such a marginal environment it represents yet another constraint people 
need to overcome to achieve a satisfactory livelihood. The Kamali Zone has scarce 
arable land and only a small proportion of that is considered to be the superior khet, 
access to which is determined by caste status (Bishop, 1990). In Mugu District, for 
example, only five percent of the khet land is held by the lower castes (ibid).
Government services in the Kamali Zone are notoriously poor, but in the area of 
education the government has started to address this deprivation. Fifty percent of girls 
receive scholarships of Rs 250 yearly up to grade five. The scholarship recipients are 
determined by the school management committee and are meant to be the most needy.
All dalit children, male and female, also receive Rs 250 yearly up to grade five. Through 
the Kamali Scholarship Program students in grades six to ten receive Rs 1,000 yearly. 
These amounts are small but have been contributing to keeping children in school.
The social and economic indicators for the Kamali Zone in some cases have been 
improving, but they are coming from a very low base. The initial conditions were 
extremely poor, but there is evidence that despite these initial conditions substantial 
improvements can be made beyond those which the Kamali Zone has been able to 
achieve to date. For example, the Manang and Mugu Districts, both mountainous regions, 
had total literacy rates of only 4.7 percent and 5.2 percent respectively in 1971. By 2001, 
in Manang, the total literacy rate had jumped to 60.5 percent whereas the rate in Mugu
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had only increased to 28 percent (ICIMOD, 2003b). The other Kamali districts showed 
similar slower improvements (ibid). Thus the initial conditions can be blamed to some 
extent for the Kamali Zone’s current low level of development, but the Manang case 
demonstrates that there is significant room for improvement.
4.3 The Rural Community Infrastructure Works Programme
4.3.1 Overview
The section provides a brief description of the RCIW Programme and how it seeks to 
function. It does not provide any comment on how it actually functions or any assessment 
of its strengths and weaknesses. In the context of the next chapter, which looks closely at 
how the Programme functions in Mugu District of the Kamali Zone, an assessment of 
RCIW’s relevance for dealing with chronic poverty will be made through analysis of 
primary data from the field. In addition to the field data, various reviews of the scheme 
conducted by others in different districts will be discussed in an attempt to assess the 
Programme’s appropriateness.
4.3.2 Background and Objectives
The RCIW Programme began in 1996 as a Nepal Government initiative supported by 
World Food Programme (WFP) and the German Government through German Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ). The existence of the RCIW Programme indicates at least some level 
of political will on behalf of the Nepal Government to support social protection measures. 
The intention of RCIW is to target 50,000 households in 25 of the most food insecure 
districts and provide approximately 70 days of work per household, equivalent to 280kg 
rice per household during a work season which corresponds to the agricultural slack 
season (WFP, 2005a). Due to the food shortages suffered by most targeted households, 
this slack season is the time households would be resorting to various coping strategies 
such as gathering herbs and plants in remote areas or migrating to more integrated areas 
to work as day labourers.
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The long-term objective of the Programme is:
“To create productive infrastructure through the self help approach in order to improve 
the food security status of the poor rural households through the institutional framework 
of local agencies by remaining within the policy provisions related to poverty alleviation 
of His Majesty’s Government.’’ (Ministry of Local Development, 2002; 1)
The short- term objectives are:
“a) To provide assistance in the creation of productive infrastructures that provide long­
term security to the rural households.
b) To enhance the self-reliant capacity of rural communities, particularly women and the 
deprived, in order to assist in properly engaged livelihoods by bringing about 
improvements in the immediate food necessities of the poor rural households.
c) To minimise damage from natural calamities in vulnerable regions.” (Ministry of 
Local Development, 2002; 2)
The focus of the Programme is on the most food deficit districts and most food insecure 
households within those districts (WFP, 2006) and it is based on the concept of helping 
people to solve their own problems rather than imposmg external solutions to 
development problems. The technical quality of the constructed assets and the social 
dimensions of the Programme are given equal importance (WFP, 2006). Social 
mobilisation forms a key part of RCIW and through this the Programme aims to 
transform target populations from “being recipients of benefits to being active 
participants in the development process” (National Programme Support Unit, 2002b; 1).
The Programme intends to achieve its outcomes as illustrated in Diagram 3.
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Diagram 3 -  RCIW Inputs to Outcomes
Inputs / Resources
- Rice
- Cash
- Construction materials and agricultural inputs
- Human resources
_________________________________
Activities
- Road construction and other infrastructure
- Social mobilisation 
-Training and capacity building
- Income generating activities
_________________ V __________________
Outputs
- Employment generation
- Roads, irrigation systems
- Orchards, agroforestry plantations, nurseries
- Income
- Reclaimed land
- Self help groups 
-Trained beneficiaries
Outcomes
- Food security through increased production/productivity and income
- Reduction of transport costs and process for food items
- Access to markets and service providers
- Services from self help group, cooperatives and local resource persons
- Better nutrition and health
- Empowered communities
Source: Adapted from National Programme Support Unit (2005), Annual Report for Rural Community 
Infrastructure Works Programme- Fourth Year o f Phase II (Mid-July 2004 to mid-July 2005), December
2005
4.3.3 Components
There are three key components of the RCIW Programme; core projects, micro projects 
and complementary activities. Each are meant to reinforce the other components. The
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core projects refer primarily to the construction of roads. An assessment has been made 
by the Programme management team, in consultation with the local population, that the 
lack of roads is one of the key constraints to development in the most food deficit areas. 
The aim is to link these roads into the national road network. The roads are built in 
sections that eventually join in order that people can be working on the one road in 
different locations. The roads are typically built so that they pass near population centres 
which facilitates easy access to the work and the transport link when the roads are 
completed. Approximately 80 percent of resources have been dedicated to the core 
projects. Until recently, if micro projects or complementary activities were not of 
sufficient size as to absorb the remaining 20 percent of resources, these resources could 
also be used for the core projects (Ministry of Local Development, 2002). As mentioned 
previously, 50,000 households are expected to directly benefit from the Programme, but 
the infrastructure constructed is expected to benefit over 500,000 people (National 
Programme Support Unit, 2005).
The roads are constructed using a “green engineering” or “green roads” approach. It is a 
low technology approach which emphasises protection of natural resources so as not to 
damage the often fragile local environments on which local livelihoods depend (WFP, 
2006). The construction method is labour intensive and has the potential to employ a 
large number of local people. The roads are built over a number of phases by which time 
the road bed is naturally stabilised (National Programme Support Unit, 2005). In the first 
phase a track is opened and in subsequent seasons the track is widened until it is of 
motorable width. The track is thus not immediately motorable, but just having a track can 
assist in the transport of goods using other means, such as animals.
Approximately 20 percent of the Programme’s resources have been allocated to 
productive micro projects (15 percent) and complementary activities (five percent) (WFP, 
2005b). The community identifies relevant micro projects. Participants in micro projects 
all work on the core projects and through the groups formed on the core project, develop 
other activities which they believe would improve their livelihood or welfare. Examples 
of micro projects include small-scale irrigation, fish ponds and orchards. The
99
complementary activities refer to such things as literacy training, savings and credit 
groups, cooperative formation and construction of household and community facilities 
such as sanitation facilities within schools. A key complementary activity is called 
Participatory Learning Actions (PLA) and is a form of adult learning which emphasises 
issue based discussions for literacy and numeracy. The aim of both the micro projects and 
the complementary activities is to improve people’s livelihoods so that when the road is 
completed, and there is easier access to the rest of the country, the population will be 
better positioned to take advantage of the more integrated environment (WFP -  
interview, 2006). They will have enhanced capabilities and confidence to exploit the new 
opportunities.
4.3.4 Participants
RCIW is designed to be a self-targeting mechanism; people who want to work on the 
Programme identify themselves. If people want to work they are deemed to be eligible 
participants. Due to the depth of poverty and level of food insecurity in most of the 
geographically targeted areas, and given there is a limit on the food resources provided 
by WFP, there is a problem in some areas of having too many people wanting to 
participate and hence the self-targeting feature of this Programme is compromised. 
Efforts to deal with this problem will be discussed in the following chapter.
Women, lower caste and ethnic groups are encouraged to participate in the Programme. 
Given the low levels of literacy and other skills among groups who typically suffer 
discrimination, the complementary activities are particularly important for these groups.
4.3.5 Structure /Implementation o f the RCIW Programme
At the central level there is a Programme Coordination Committee (PCC) which 
comprises the Ministry of Local Development; WFP, GTZ and other donors that are 
involved in the Programme. The PCC is concerned with the more macro issues of 
Progamme strategy, guidelines and effectiveness. The overall responsibility o f the 
Programme lies within the National Programme Support Unit -  a body which exists 
within Nepal’s Ministry of Local Development. WFP’s main responsibility is to provide
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rice, with which to pay the participants, and GTZ is the main technical assistance 
provider. It performs this role through other groups such as Netherlands Development 
Organisation (SNV) in the Kamali Zone.
At the district level, the District Programme Support Unit, under the District 
Development Committee (DDC), takes care of the local logistical issues such as 
disbursement and transportation of rice. The DDC ensures, among other things, that the 
activities of RCIW fit within the District Development Plan (Ministry of Local 
Development, 2002). The core activities, road construction, are selected with reference to 
the District Development Plan and the desire for as many populated areas with food 
insecure households to participate as possible.
At the local level, the Village Development Committee’s (VDC) main function is to 
facilitate micro project identification. They also play a key role in maintenance and 
collect funds to this purpose. They assist User Groups and User Committees that form the 
grassroots groups responsible for the Programme and that are also the Programme’s main 
beneficiaries. The User Groups identify micro projects and submit project proposals to 
the VDC. The User Committees are comprised of representatives from the User Groups 
and are responsible for such things as the payment of wages, preparation of progress 
reports and logistical issues such as maintaining the security of equipment. These 
formalised groups at the local level allow the Programme to target specific groups, for 
example, the User Committee must comprise 50 percent women (ibid).
In the construction of the roads, User Groups are paid as a group based on the length of 
the completed section of road. This allows significant flexibility of employment as 
people with other responsibilities (such as women with small children) can participate 
within a user group for reduced hours and the Group can adjust the payment accordingly.
The payment method is predominantly rice. In some more integrated areas there is a 
mixture of payment in food and cash, but in the more remote areas rice continues to be 
the sole mode of payment.
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4.4 Summary
The remote rural area of the Kamali Zone in Nepal provides a sound geographical setting 
to undertake the analysis of a workfare program for the purposes of this thesis. Nepal has 
very serious developmental challenges, but the challenges in the Kamali Zone are 
amplified by the geographical constraints. Poverty in the Kamali Zone is not uniform but 
there is a greater homogeneity to the poverty, as indicated by the number of malnourished 
children, then elsewhere in the country. The RCIW Programme is targeted to the most 
food insecure households that, in this environment, are very likely to be chronically poor. 
The extent to which the RCIW Programme is able to address the pressing needs of the 
local population, and hence how social protection is able to address chronic poverty in 
remote rural areas, is the subject of the next chapter.
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C H A P T E R  5
Results of Case Study Analysis
The case study work was predominantly carried out in the remote Mugu District of the 
Kamali Zone. The RCIW Programme operates in all five Kamali districts directly and 
includes approximately 20 percent of the households in these districts (WFP, 2006c). The 
Programme began in 1996 but only started in the Kamali region in 2001 after WFP 
Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping was undertaken and the food insecurity of this 
region was determined to be severe enough to warrant RCIW Programme intervention 
(WFP, 2005b). The Mugu District was chosen for this thesis’s analysis because it is 
extremely food insecure, remote and mountainous, and the Programme includes a 
relatively high proportion of the District’s population at 43 percent, compared to other 
Kamali districts such as Jumla at 13 percent (WFP, 2006c).
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with participating households and 
Programme managers (in October and November 2006), details of which will be 
described below, to assess their perception of the scheme. The three key goals of the 
interviews were: 1) to assess the proportion of the participating households that were in 
chronic poverty; 2) to determine what workfare programs can realistically be expected to 
do for the chronically poor; and 3) to determine how workfare is able to address chronic 
poverty in such remote environments.
As mentioned previously, this analysis was not meant to be a review of the RCIW 
Programme. It is not a Programme evaluation. Most development activities have some 
sort of design and implementation problems, and detailing these in great length would not 
add to the analysis for the purposes of this thesis. The main aim was to gather the 
experiences of the beneficiaries and the views of the Programme managers in order to
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assess the capacity of the Programme to address chronic poverty effectively, even if the 
capacity is currently unrealised.
5.1 RCIW in Mugu District and the Impacted Population
5.1.1 The Programme in Mugu District
In Mugu District, the Programme directly includes members from 3,533 households out 
of a district total of 8,261 households. Seven of the 24 VDCs in Mugu are involved in the 
Programme (WFP, 2006c). The aim of the Programme, as in other districts, is to provide 
70 days of work to each participant, who earns a base rate of four kilograms of rice per 
day.
As can be seen in Map 3, the road under construction in Mugu District goes from 
Sukhadhik VDC to Gamgadhi, the district headquarters. The road will be 45 kilometres 
long when completed. At the moment it is only up to two metres wide but, as per the 
“green roads” concept, it can be made a fully motorable road. From Sukhdhik VDC there 
is not yet a link to another major road nearby. The Sukhadhik road leads to a suspension 
bridge which crosses the Kamali river and then proceeds to a major trail which connects 
to roads in Accham District and Dailekh Districts in the South.
To fit within the major harvest and plantation periods, the work is offered in Mugu 
District between the November/December and March/April period. Despite the aim of the 
Programme to offer 70 days work, participants in the District have access to only one to 
two months work on the Programme. All participants are paid in rice.
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Map 3 -  The RCIW Programme in Mugu District
NEPAL
CHINA
I M 3  IHsti ict ill H izhlizht
K ALIKOT DISTRCT JUMLA DISTRCTLEGEND
\K>C Boundary
A/
District Boundary 
International Boundary
-------  Sukhadhtk-Gamgodhi Road
K ilom eters
Source: Adapted from Topographic Map; 1992/96, Department o f  Survey, GoNepal
Table 2 lists the locations in which interviews were conducted with both RCIW 
participants and people who would have liked to participate but were excluded from the 
Programme. The map references correspond to Map 3.
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Table 2 -  Respondent Locations
M a p  R eferen ce V illa g e V D C
1 D ad up ata Seri
2 S atb ada Seri
3 T o li S r ik o t
4 R oll S r ik ot
5 K harka S rik o t
6 K aw a K h a m a le
7 R ik h iy a n K h a m a le
8 R atanani K otd ad a
9 L uien K otd ad a
10 G am tha G am tha
11 Jum pa Seri
12 Jam oo S eri
13 L uien K otd ad a
14 L ahm er K h a m a le
Given the depth of poverty and food insecurity in Mugu District, and the route of the road 
only allowing less than half of the households in the District to participate in the RCIW 
Programme, WFP introduced a scheme called Protecting Livelihoods in Crisis (PLIC) as 
a sub-component to the Programme in 2005. Eight non-RCIW districts in Mugu have 
access to PLIC, which focuses on the construction of small-scale infrastructure (such as 
irrigation), community assets or income generating activities for payment in rice. PLIC 
was initially conceptualised as a response to enhanced suffering as a result of the conflict. 
Even in the absence of conflict, it is intended that PLIC will continue for at least the next 
year given that chronic hunger in the target VDCs still exists. After this time it is likely 
that PLIC will be transferred to the NGOs currently responsible for its implementation.
5.1.2 Data Collection
The participant household data was gathered from 14 villages within five VDCs (of the 
seven participating VDCs) in Mugu District and from key donor and government 
stakeholders in Kathmandu such as German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), World Food 
Programme (WFP), Department for International Development (DflD), the Nepal 
Ministry for Local Development and the District Roads Support Programme (a program 
linked to RCIW funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation). There
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was also extensive consultation with Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV), the 
technical assistance provider for Mugu District, based in Nepalgunj.
A research assistant gathered the data in Mugu District using a questionnaire designed by 
the author. The individual responses for the interviewed participants and non­
participants were tabulated for each question in a format created by the author to allow 
for ease of data analysis and comparison of individual respondent answers across 
different questions. All Programme manager interviews were undertaken by the author, 
primarily in Kathmandu.
In Mugu District, 55 project participants were interviewed in the villages that are 
clustered along the RCIW Gamgadhi -  Sukhadhik road construction project. People were 
interviewed during their work breaks. As illustrated in Map 3, the road runs through the 
southern part of the district, which is mountainous but is generally at a lower elevation 
than the northern part of the District and is more densely populated. The 14 villages in 
which interviews were conducted are extremely remote. They are two days’ walk from 
the nearest airstrip and at least four days walk from the nearest motorable road.
A cross-section of people were interviewed from different castes, age and gender groups. 
The initial plan was to interview people from non-participant households who lived in the 
Programme area but who chose not to, or were unable to, participate in the Programme. 
Non-participants were located and 20 interviewed but all had someone in their household 
participating in the Programme. The participant and non-participant interviews thus 
captured information on 75 participating households.
Where possible, the questions posed to all respondents were designed to compare the 
situation before RCIW began in the District to the situation after Programme 
implementation in order to assess the effect RCIW has had, particularly on the 
chronically poor households. Before seeking answers on the respondents’ experiences of 
the RCIW Programme, questions to determine relevant personal details were posed
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concerning such things as: age; caste; household composition; schooling; children’s 
schooling; access to basic services; and assets (especially land ownership).
In seeking data on the poverty status of the respondents, questions were asked related to 
the number of months the households were food secure and whether they experienced 
what are know locally as “hungry seasons” every year or just in some years. Those who 
experienced “hungry seasons” every year were deemed to be chronically poor.
In addition to assessing the chronic poverty status of the participants, the other key goals 
of the fieldwork were to determine: 1) w hat workfare programs can do for the chronically 
poor in remote rural areas and 2) how workfare can address chronic poverty in these 
environments; that is, how suitable workfare is for this task. The answers to these 
questions were sought with reference to the conclusions drawn at the end of Chapter 3 
which hypothesised why workfare programs had the potential to be an appropriate social 
protection mechanism to address chronic poverty in remote rural areas. In line with these 
conclusions, in answering the “What", questions were posed in relation to the 
Programme’s ability to provide income, assets and insurance. For the “How”, the focus 
was on questions related to the Programme’s use of labour, the self-targeting nature of 
the Programme, the potential for higher wages, the appropriate method and type of 
payment, accompanying strategies and empowerment.
The full questionnaire for both the participants and non-participants of RCIW is at 
Appendix 1.
5.1.3 Participant Characteristics
Of the interviewed Programme participants, 31 percent were female, 29 percent classed 
themselves as lower caste and the rest classed themselves as higher caste. They ranged in 
age from 18 to 60 with an average age of 38. The average household size was over seven 
with just under four people per household economically active. No household members 
aged over 60 in the sampled households were found to be economically active.
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All o f the interviews in Mugu District were with people from two castes; either the high 
caste Chetri or the low caste Bishwokarma. The key assets of all households, regardless 
of caste, are land and livestock. Livestock are integral for ploughing and for manure. In 
many cases they are also utilised to transport goods. Due to a lack of other employment 
options, the depth of poverty very much depends on the amount of land the households 
hold and the productivity of that land. The respondents identified this as being the key 
determinant of wealth in the region.
The health and sanitation facilities to which the local population has access are poor. 
There is one sub health post in Seri VDC that serves the people in this VDC and one 
health post in Kotdada VDC for the other surveyed VDCs. These facilities are not well 
staffed and the respondents complained that the health personnel are often absent. Their 
main health problems were illnesses such as dysentery, cholera, diarrhoea and 
pneumonia. Communal drinking water facilities exist in each of the surveyed villages and 
are shared between seven to ten houses. The sanitation conditions are extremely poor. No 
household or communal toilets exist in any of the surveyed villages.
Education among girls is accorded less importance than boys’ education. Due to early 
marriage which results in the girl moving to her husband’s household, parents sometimes 
decide that educating their daughters will be a waste of time as the benefits will not 
accrue to their household, unlike male children, who are expected to assist their parents 
over their lifetimes. Girls over ten are often used to take care of their younger siblings 
and assist with household duties.
While the dropout rate for girls is higher than that for boys, in light of the data in the 
previous chapter on the low schooling years for adults, especially for females, it was 
expected that many of the school-aged children of the participating households would not 
be in school. However, the collected data did not reflect this to the extent expected. 
Thirteen percent of Chetri children and 15 percent of Bishwokarma children of school 
age were out of school. Almost all of the school-aged children not attending school were 
female.
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The education statistics were better than expected for children but for the adult 
respondents they were in line with the District average. The average years of schooling 
for the interviewed adults was 1.7 years.
5.2 Chronic Poverty Among Participant Households
5.2.1 The Hungry Seasons
Given the absence of appropriate time series panel data, a proxy for chronic poverty must 
be used. The definition of chronic poverty for the purposes of this thesis is those 
households that are food insecure and experience “hungry seasons” every year. This 
proxy was chosen because it gives an insight into the duration of poverty. Hungry 
seasons refer to periods where households do not have access to enough food to meet 
their needs resulting in them having to resort to coping strategies. The assumption was 
not that hunger causes chronic poverty. It may be a contributing cause but it is also a 
consequence of chronic poverty. Given the data limitations in the region, it is the most 
appropriate available proxy for chronic poverty.
Both RCIW participants and non-participants were asked if they experience hungry 
seasons, and, if so, whether they experience hungry seasons every year or just in some 
years. Over 85 percent of the respondents replied that they experience hungry seasons 
every year and so, for this analysis, can be classified as chronically poor. Ten percent 
experience hungry seasons some years and only five percent of the respondents do not 
experience them at all. All of the chronically poor may also be severely poor; that is, 
living on less than US $2 a day, but this was not a focus of the analysis.
The plantation and harvest periods are detailed in Tables 2 and 3 for each of the seven 
VDCs in which RCIW operates in Mugu. It must be noted that the hungry seasons do not 
correspond to the times people are not working. People are busy harvesting and planting 
during the normal hungry seasons. Thus RCIW does not need to match the hungry
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seasons but the times between the harvesting and plantation when people have the 
capacity to undertake work.
Table 3 -  Plantation Times
Time of Plantation of Food Crops
Food
Crops Seri VDC Srikot VDC
Khamale
VDC
Gamtha
VDC
Kotdanda
VDC
Sukhadhik
VDC
Hyanglu
VDC
Paddy June June June June/July June/July June/July July/August
Wheat
Oct/Nov
(Low
altitude) Sep
(high
altitude)
Oct/Nov
(Low
altitude) Sep
(high
altitude)
Oct/Nov
(Low
altitude) Sep
(high
altitude)
Oct/Nov
(Low
altitude) Sep
(high
altitude)
Oct/Nov
(Low
altitude) Sep
(high
altitude)
Oct/Nov
(Low
altitude) Sep
(high
altitude)
Oct/Nov
(Low
altitude) Sep
(high
altitude)
Maize April April April May May May May
Millet March March March March March March March
Potato March March March March March March March
Table 4 -  Hamest Times
Time of Harvest of Food Crops
Food
Crops Seri VDC Srikot VDC
Khamale
VDC
Gamtha
VDC
Kotdanda
VDC
Sukhadhik
VDC
Hyanglu
VDC
Paddy October October October October October Oct/Nov Oct/Nov
Wheat May/June May/June May/June May/June May/June May/June May/June
Maize September September September September September September September
Millet October October October October October October October
Potato September September September September September September September
Table 5 -  Hungry Seasons
Hungry Seasons for All Seven VDCs
1st Hungry season April and May
2nd Hungry Season July and Aug
Source: Participant and Programme manager interviews
1 1 1
Every interviewed RCIW participant said that the Programme was operating when they 
needed it; that is, when they were not otherwise engaged with planting or harvesting 
duties. They also all indicated that it operated as both a safety net and ladder in terms of 
protecting their existing livelihoods and providing improvements. However, because 
people would like 100 days work but they are only getting access to 10 to 45 days work 
through the Programme, the protection function was emphasised more than the livelihood 
promotion capability of the Programme. This does not diminish the promotion capability 
of RCIW, or workfare programmes in general; it just highlights the limitations of the 
current Programme. If the required number of days work was met, it is likely that the 
Programme would be viewed by the participants as a significant livelihood enhancement 
measure. For example, in Rolpa District where the Programme is able to provide 100 
days labour, people are able to cease migrating for work, cover their consumptive needs 
and invest in assets (Dietz, 2006).
The link between food security and land holding has been mentioned, and Table 6 
provides a breakdown of the respondents’ holdings, but it is worth highlighting the small 
differences in land size that can determine whether a household experiences hungry 
seasons or not. Those households that are not chronically poor and do not experience 
food insecurity in any year have access to an average of 1 hectare of land. Those who 
experience hungry seasons occasionally have an average of 0.85 hectares of land and the 
chronically poor, who experience hungry seasons every year, have an average of 0.46 
hectares.
Table 6 -  Land Holdings o f  All Respondents
L a n d  H o ld in g s N u m b er  o f  R e sp o n d e n ts
Less than or equal to 0.1 hectares 6
Less than or equal to 0.4 hectares 24
Less than or equal to 0.6 hectares 23
Less than or equal to 0.8 hectares 13
Less than or equal to 1 hectare 6
Greater than 1 hectare 3
Source: Participant interviews
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5.2.2 Characteristics o f the Chronically Poor Respondents
The general characteristics of the chronically poor as described in Chapter 2 are exhibited 
among the chronically poor respondents in Mugu District. Household size is generally 
high (7.6 persons), education is low (1.7 years), and there is little access to off-farm 
employment opportunities.
There is some mobility among the chronically poor population, but the moves are not 
permanent and exhibit characteristics of what Rogaly (2003) termed the “struggle to stay 
put”. It was the stated aim of most households not to have to work in other districts or in 
India. Indeed, one of the key stated positives of the RCIW scheme was that it had reduced 
the need to travel to work elsewhere. Working elsewhere was not the most common 
coping strategy among the respondents in difficult periods, which supports Kothari’s 
(2002) argument that it is often only the relatively well off who have the necessary 
capitals (including social, economic and human capitals) to take advantage of migration 
of a coping strategy. This strategy is not always open to the chronically poor.
Perhaps the key characteristic determining chronic poverty mentioned in Chapter 2 of 
relevance to the population in focus in Mugu District is that of geographic location. It is a 
remote, inaccessible location that precludes the chronically poor respondents from 
pursuing a variety o f livelihood strategies. Great faith was placed in the road by the 
respondents as being able to address their isolation and provide access to economic 
opportunities and basic services that would improve their well being. Data limitations 
precluded an in depth analysis of the correlates of exit from poverty, as was undertaken in 
the Baulch and McCulloch (2002) study in Pakistan but, from the qualitative data 
gathered, isolation through geographical constraints was articulated as being the most 
important factor keeping people in poverty and preventing exit.
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Table 7 -  Schooling o f Chronically Poor Respondents
A v e r a g e Y e a r s
Chetri 2.12
Bishwokarma 0.55
Male Chetri 3.11
Male Bishwokarma 0.75
Female Chetri 0.00
Female Bishwokarma 0.00
Source: Participant interviews
Compounding the above chronic poverty characteristics are layers of constraints such as 
gender and caste based discrimination which make exiting chronic poverty more difficult. 
Only one Bishwokarma respondent did not experience chronic poverty. As shown in 
Table 7, the interviewed Bishworkarma caste members have an average of 0.55 years of 
education compared to 2.12 years among the Chetri caste. Only 10 percent of the 
Bishwokarma respondents had any education at all compared to 30 percent of Chetris. 
They have less land, 0.35 hectares compared to the Chetn’s 0.57 hectares. The 
correlation between land holding and food security of the Bishwokarmas was 
considerably higher, at 0.93, than the Chetris, at 0.79, perhaps reflecting the lack of 
access to other livelihood strategies for the lower castes.
Gender discrimination in Mugu District manifests itself in a number of ways, including 
having to bear a disproportionate burden of unpaid labour to maintain the household. This 
is on top o f the paid work also undertaken by women; at 85 percent, Mugu District has 
the highest rate of economic activity by women of any district in Nepal (ICIMOD, 
2003b). A striking example of the extra constraints on the interviewed women is the data 
on their access to education. Of the women interviewed, both the participants of the 
RCIW Programme and the non-participants, not one woman of either caste had 
undertaken any schooling.
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5.3 What can Workfare do for the Chronically Poor?
5.3.1 Provision o f Income
Perhaps the most obvious benefit o f workfare schemes for the chronically poor is the 
provision of income. While it has been recognised that poverty is a multidimensional 
concept, and the reason for people remaining in a situation of chronic poverty could be 
due to many factors besides income, that does not discount the importance of income.
The condition of chronic poverty is not only a function of a lack of income, but it is an 
important factor that is keeping people poor. As well as dealing with their other 
constraints such as geographical location, caste, ethnicity and gender, the chronically 
poor need to be able to provide for their basic needs such as food and shelter, and for that 
they need income. The participants were asked about how they expend their project 
earnings.
The chronically poor respondents gain the bulk of their income from agriculture and from 
their coping strategies in the hungry seasons which typically take the form of gathering 
wild produce to sell to people in the towns and cities or temporarily migrating for day 
labour work.
The income the RCIW participants receive from the Programme is in the form of rice. All 
of the chronically poor households use the rice for food. The less poor households all sell 
some of the rice to pay for schooling and other expenses. While the chronically poor 
participants do not sell the rice, 23 percent of the chronically poor respondents reported 
that the rice income does allow them to sell some of their other crops, such as maize and 
millet, for cash which is then used for schooling and other livelihood activities. Rice is 
viewed as a prestige product and all households would prefer to consume the RCIW rice 
payment if they do not have enough of their own produced rice to last the whole year.
Due to the difficulties caused by the conflict and the Programme’s resource constraints, 
the Programme has not been functioning to its full capacity, and the income households 
are receiving is less than it would otherwise be. The food provision, at about 100-150
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kilograms per household annually, representing up to two months of food per household 
of six members, has made some of the households that had food deficits for only one to 
two months completely food secure. Due to the depth of the food insecurity suffered by 
most chronically poor households, only one such interviewed household has been made 
food secure as a result of the Programme but, with additional days of employment or 
higher wages, the rest of the chronically poor could also be lifted to a situation of food 
security.
As stated above, for a quarter of the households the food income received through the 
Programme is contributing to enhancing their welfare and their livelihoods by allowing 
them to obtain some cash income through selling their other crops. This is an important 
achievement of RCIW. The contribution of the income to addressing chronic poverty 
should not be downplayed for the other chronically poor households who mostly 
consume the food, as food security is an important end in itself which allows households 
to pursue other strategies to improve their well-being. As described in Chapter 2, the 
nutrition improvements for individuals, allowing them to work to their capacity, can do 
more for economic growth than is normally given credit.
5.3.2 Provision o f Assets
The accumulation of assets, both private and community assets, is recognised as one of 
the most important ways to address chronic poverty. The main assets of the interviewed 
chronically poor households are land and livestock. The amount of land and its 
productivity is a key determinant of poverty status in the RCIW Programme operating 
area. The participants were questioned about the (potential) usefulness of the assets and 
whether they agree with the choice of assets being constructed.
The key asset being created by the RCIW Programme in Mugu District VDCs where the 
interviews were undertaken is the Sukhadhik-Gamgadhi road. Other community assets 
such as apple orchards and drinking water facilities within schools have also been 
created. The usefulness of these types of assets is typically discounted in assessments of 
this type of social protection mechanism as workfare programs are normally seen as ways
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to ensure food security rather than an effective way to provide assets which could 
contribute to future food security and poverty reduction. All o f the projects are in their 
infancy, but the respondents are all extremely supportive of the chosen assets and are 
firmly convinced that the benefits of the Programme extend well beyond the immediate 
benefit o f the rice payment.
The Programme participants select the micro projects but the selection of the road is 
much less consultative. The route and location is selected by the government with 
reference to the centres of population and the Programme participants do not have any 
input into the selection of the core projects. Because of this, it could be assumed that 
some participants would like other assets if they had greater decision making power. 
However, when questioned about this, every participant agreed with the choice of the 
road as the core project. They see it as the necessary first step to bring about development 
in their region. If the road is built they see the possibility of other infrastructure following 
such as improved water supply, sanitation and better schooling facilities. They are also 
looking forward to cheaper goods due to the significant reduction in transportation costs 
that the road would facilitate. The chronically poor have identified the road as being the 
key asset required to address the geographical constraint which they see as being the most 
instrumental in keeping them poor.
Even though the road is not yet completed and not yet motorable, it has already begun to 
significantly assist the local population. The communities’ isolation has already been 
reduced to a certain extent. Twenty-eight kilometres of the road is at a width of two 
metres and it facilitates walking to other villages, to the district headquarters and to other 
districts.
The labour intensive nature of the creation of the assets within workfare programs has 
been the subject of some criticism, especially regarding the equity-efficiency trade off; 
that is, the need for labour intensive methods at the price of substandard assets. In a 
region such as the seven RCIW Programme participating VDCs, this criticism is 
theoretically sound as there have been some quality concerns with the road, but given the
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isolation of this region and the sheer impossibility of transporting heavy machinery to the 
region, the criticism loses its validity. While the respondents had some concerns with the 
quality of the road, mainly in the area of maintenance, they were generally satisfied that it 
would be able to serve the desired purpose. In light of the significant development needs 
across Nepal and the constraints on its development budget, in these environments, the 
realistic choice is between assets that are not perfectly constructed and no assets at all. It 
is also worth noting that the cost of roads created under the RCIW Programme have been 
estimated to be similar to commercial construction methods (Dietz, 2006) which would 
not come with the income transfer benefit to the local population.
The argument referred to in Chapter 3 against the creation of assets through workfare 
programs because they use up scarce development funds is similarly invalid in Mugu 
District and the Kamali region more broadly. This argument focuses on the income 
provided rather than the assets created. Basic infrastructure is necessary for economies to 
function and is a necessary public good provided as standard in areas with less difficult 
terrain. Addressing the geographical constraint of isolation through the construction of a 
road has the potential to provide the resident households with a significantly better 
quality of life and thus represents a good use of development funds. It is the 
overwhelming stated priority need of the surveyed participants.
Finally, unlike MEGS in India, the assets being created by the RCIW Programme, at least 
in the remote rural areas like Mugu District, are not primarily benefiting the wealthy.
This is mainly due to the spatial concentration of chronic poverty in Mugu. Even though 
the road is a public good, there are so few wealthy people in the region that all of the 
assets, by default, have to benefit the target population, the majority of whom are 
chronically poor.
5.3.3 Provision o f Insurance
Workfare programs have the potential to provide significant benefits to the target 
population through the insurance function they offer. Providing the certainty of income 
during difficult periods can change the nature of coping strategies and have an impact on
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livelihoods outside of the difficult periods simply because of the knowledge of the 
existence of the guaranteed income during hard times. The participants were asked about 
the effectiveness of the Programme in providing an insurance function, in terms of 
stopping conditions deteriorating, during difficult periods. They were also asked about 
what they did during difficult periods before and after the implementation of the 
Programme. Finally, they were questioned about the extent to which the Programme 
impacted on their life at other times of the year (to when it was operating).
The insurance aspect of the Programme was viewed positively by the survey respondents; 
it had reduced their vulnerability to a certain extent, but its effectiveness was limited by 
the days of work offered, which were well below the majority of the respondents’ 
requirements.
The main coping strategies of the interviewed RCIW participants involved seasonal 
migration, gathering wild mushrooms, herbs, fruit, medicinal plants and sometimes wild 
honey. Because of the limited work available through the RCIW Programme, which does 
not cover the annual food deficit for all households, difficult periods remain. It was 
reported that the gathering of wild products remains a key coping strategy in these 
difficult periods, but the need for seasonal migration had been somewhat controlled since 
the RCIW Programme began. Respondents stated that there were two normal periods of 
temporary migration each year and RCIW had controlled one. Also, the normal period 
of migration was shortened.
During especially difficult periods, such as the 2006 drought in Western Nepal, the 
coping strategies do not differ greatly to those in the normal annual difficult periods. The 
respondents are typically unwilling to sell their livestock even during the most serious of 
times as there are no wealthy people in the district; the extent of chronic poverty in the 
region effectively limits their coping strategies. To sell the livestock they would have to 
walk four to five days and, knowing of the desperation of the seller, the prices received 
are low. A more common coping strategy involving livestock that was mentioned by five 
Chetri households of Satbada village in Seri VDC was the grouping together of
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households in difficult periods and using their livestock as food on a rotation basis. This 
was seen to be a much better use of the resource than selling it given the effort to get it to 
the market and low price received once there. This is a good example of the use of social 
capital, but it remains a poor-to-poor transfer so is not necessarily robust in the face of 
large shocks.
Because of the physical location of the target population, the irreversible coping 
strategies, such as selling important assets like livestock, are not occurring. However, 
there has been a depletion in some of the wild products, and with increasing population 
pressures this can not remain a viable coping strategy for all. With access to more work, 
as the Programme increases the days’ work available to households, the need for this 
non-sustainable coping strategy will decline (and it may become sustainable for a reduced 
number of households). The argument discussed in Chapter 2, that social protection 
mechanisms have the potential to crowd out traditional coping mechanisms that were 
working effectively, is thus not applicable in Mugu District. Indeed, in Mugu District, the 
traditional coping strategy of trading with Tibet was dismantled long before the RCIW 
Programme commenced and the other key coping strategies are mostly unsustainable 
(gathering wild products) or unpopular (seasonal migration).
In terms of the RCIW Programme’s ability to impact on livelihoods just because of its 
existence as an insurance mechanism, there was no evidence found that people were 
pursuing more risky, and potentially more profitable, livelihood strategies because of the 
knowledge of this safety net. However, because of its existence, and the guaranteed 
income it provides, it has allowed for more of the economically active members of the 
household to remain at home for longer periods of time which has had implications on 
such things as children’s school attendance. There are no conditions imposed on 
participants that their children must go to school, however, teachers have reported that 
the regularity of children attending school has improved since the commencement of 
RCIW. Drop-out rates have also fallen. Teachers have asserted that this is due the fact 
that parents are more likely to be at home providing a consistency of care for a greater 
period of time rather than away pursuing various coping strategies. The insurance
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function that RCIW offers, the guarantee of work for households, is thus having positive 
impact on one of the constraints that keep people poor and, therefore, reducing the 
potential for the intergenerational transmission of poverty.
5.4 How can Workfare address Chronic Poverty?
5.4.1 Use o f Available Labour
The analysis of labour in terms of how the RCIW Programme is able to address chronic 
poverty in Mugu District focused on what else the participants would have been doing 
with their time and how significant the work element was as opposed to just the transfer. 
If the participants were being diverted from reasonably productive pursuits then the 
opportunity cost would be high and the transfer benefit low. In an isolated region such as 
that through which the Sukhadhik-Gamgadhi road passes, outside of agriculture there are 
few income earning opportunities. The population’s normal coping strategies have their 
own costs, such as being away from home, travel costs and living expenses while away.
The participants were asked about their coping strategies in the absence of RCIW; that is, 
what they did before the Programme began. They were questioned about their earnings 
and whether they were comparable to the income they receive through the Programme. 
Given they are expressing a preference for the Programme by no longer pursuing their 
previous coping strategies during the Programme operation period, the participants were 
asked about the reasons for this preference.
Work under the RCIW Programme is only offered during harvest and plantation times so 
there is no opportunity cost related to the normal production activities undertaken by the 
households. Agricultural production is not negatively impacted at all by RCIW. The 
focus is thus on the coping strategies and how the income received from these strategies 
compares to that offered by RCIW.
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If RCIW did not exist, most of the respondents reported that they would have just 
increased the coping strategies that they use now during difficult periods. All participants 
who used to gather wild produce reported that they earned less than they do under RCIW. 
The travel and search costs associated with gathering this produce eroded their income 
from this source. For these participants it is assessed that, while the labour is not idle, the 
opportunity cost of their RCIW participation is relatively low.
The 12 percent of chronically poor participants who used to migrate to India for work 
during the time that they now work on RCIW all earned more by migrating than by 
working on RCIW. The overwhelming reason for the RCIW participants preferring to 
work on the Programme rather than pursuing the higher income associated with of 
temporary migration was given as being able to stay with their families. For these 
participants the opportunity cost would appear to be high and the transfer benefit low 
given that RCIW is effectively displacing more productive pursuits, but this must be 
viewed with regard to the other potential benefits of staying with family. There is 
evidence that education o f children improves with parental presence and there is also the 
potential for health and other social benefits to the children from this presence. Because it 
is often the male who migrates, there is an increased work burden on women and 
potential reduced attention to existing production. The emotional health of the participant 
must also be taken into consideration in terms of them being able to pursue a livelihood 
strategy that maximises their well being even if, economically, it would appear to damage 
their well-being. The preference for working on the Programme over migration well 
illustrates that people are willing to pay a certain price in their struggle to stay put and it 
highlights the true costs of some coping strategies.
In terms of the issue raised in Chapter 3 related to the significance of the work that the 
labour force is involved in as distinct from the payment, it is true that the transfer benefit 
alone of the RCIW Programme would have the potential to improve the food security 
situation of the household, whether in the form of direct handouts or subsidised food. It 
would allow the participants to pursue other strategies in the time they would have been 
working on RCIW that would further improve their income. A guaranteed nutrition
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program, for example, could also ensure that the transfers were not just used to access 
better tasting food rather than more nutritious food. However, what would be missing is 
the construction of the assets which have been assessed by the participants as being key 
to their future welfare and their current absence as being a key constraint preventing them 
from exiting chronic poverty. Just providing the transfer benefit in this isolated 
environment is unlikely to improve productive opportunities in the region. The work 
aspect of the Programme, the use of labour, is thus a significant part in the success of this 
social protection mechanism.
5.4.2 Targeting
The self-targeting feature of workfare programs was, as expected, difficult to assess in 
Mugu District. It is a feature of self-targeting mechanisms that they are able to include 
the poor and exclude the non-poor without resorting to costly administrative procedures. 
However, in Mugu District which is assessed to be the poorest district in Nepal (UNDP, 
2004b) nearly all residents are poor; only the degree and type o f poverty differs. The 
participants were asked to give their assessment of the targeting of the scheme in terms of 
whether everyone could work who wanted to and whether anyone was accessing the 
Programme who, in their view, should not have access.
For the purposes of this thesis the focus is the chronically poor participants of RCIW, but 
most of the other participants also occasionally experience hungry seasons, and even the 
few who do not are willing to undertake the low paid, physically demanding labour 
offered by the RCIW Programme indicating that they are not wealthy. The average land 
holding (the key determinant of wealth in the region) of the participants who do not 
experience hungry seasons is only one hectare; less than 0.2 hectares more than those 
who occasionally experience hungry seasons. However, given that they are food secure, 
the participation of these households could be described as an inclusion error and will be 
discussed further below in the section on the method of payment.
While not uniform, the pervasiveness of poverty among the respondents, and indeed the 
impossibility of finding a household in the villages visited which did not have a
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household member participating in the Programme, rendered it difficult to make any 
detailed assessment on inclusion or exclusion errors. The data shows that some less poor 
households were participating in the scheme, but the other participants were questioned 
about this and none viewed the less poor households as less deserving of participating, 
perhaps indicating that these households are still viewed as poor. The errors of exclusion 
which Devereux (2002b) sees as much more important than the inclusion errors have 
been effectively dealt with by the Programme at the household level, but due to the 
limited resources of the Programme in most cases participation has been capped at one 
person per household. This effectively excludes many people who would like to work and 
erodes the self-targeting benefit of the Programme. Of the 20 non-participants 
interviewed, the key reason for them not participating in the Programme was that they 
were not given the opportunity. If they were allowed to participate in the Programme 
every one of them would.
There is a small degree of flexibility in the Programme which decreases the exclusion 
errors: a policy which allows two people from the poorest households to participate in the 
Programme. The User Committees identify these households that are most in need. Those 
households interviewed that have two participants were found to be the most food 
insecure, with only one month’s food security coverage on average and ownership of 0.1 
hectares of land per household. Among other poor households who are not assessed to be 
the poorest, there appears to be little disgruntlement about this concession.
The issue of including too many people when the Programme resources have stayed the 
same has been assessed to be a problem in a recent WFP review (WFP, 2005b). It has 
resulted in less food per household, but in the Mugu field work the inclusion of more 
people in the Programme was not found to have had the same effect. Occasionally, due to 
construction delays that require, for example, 40 days o f work to be completed in 20 
days, households are allowed to bring in an additional member. This means that rice per 
person declines, but rice per household remains the same. The increased participation in 
Mugu District therefore has not necessarily had as detrimental an effect on household 
food security as it has in other areas.
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5.4.3 Wage Levels and Method o f Payment
The issues of how people are paid and how much they are paid can have significant 
impacts on how workfare programs are able to address chronic poverty. The RCIW 
Programme has been paying based on the amount of work completed, and payments in 
Mugu District have only been made in rice based on a level set below the market rate, a 
standard practice of workfare programs. The appropriateness of this payment system to 
address the chronic conditions faced by the Programme participants formed a key part of 
the analysis in the participating areas. Participants were asked about how they would like 
to be paid and whether the existence of the Programme had influenced wages outside the 
Programme.
People are not paid based on the time they put in but rather on the work completed. All of 
the participants confirmed this as the preferred method of payment. It provides the 
desired flexibility and there is no wish to move to a daily rate for individuals. The 
payment is made to the work group based on distance completed but also factors in the 
nature of the soil or rock. The responsibility for allocating work rests with the group 
leader, who is in charge of 25-30 people focusing on one allocated piece of work. The 
leader can permit one family member to work in the morning and one to work in the 
afternoon. The working arrangement can be so flexible that, if absent, the next day the 
worker can bring along a family member to adjust for the missed day’s work. This 
flexibility facilitates women’s participation.
The aim of the Programme is to provide a base rate of four kilograms of rice per day. The 
participants view approximately 80 kilograms of rice as being sufficient for a family of 
six for one month, but in other areas it has been reported that one month of RCIW work 
will provide food security for an average family for two months. The interviewed 
participating households reported receiving 100-150 kilograms of rice per year.
The four kilograms of rice per day represents about 80 percent of the market wage for 
comparable work undertaken in more integrated areas, but because the rice is, in most
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cases, delivered close to the villages and is seen as being a prestige product, its real value 
is higher than the cash equivalent of the rice at the purchase point. Thus, the geographical 
constraints that the target population face in effect increase the value of the transfer. 
Further, because of the way payments are calculated and due to the amount of work the 
participants put in, the average RCIW recipient receives about six kilograms of rice per 
day. There are even reports of people earning up to 10 kilograms per day. These higher 
wage levels are positive with respect to the Programme’s ability to address chronic 
poverty, but the reduced number of days’ work to which the Programme participants in 
Mugu District have access offsets the benefit.
Programme participants reported that wages outside the Programme were not influenced 
in any way by RCIW. They believe that this is due to the fact that the Programme only 
operates in agricultural slack periods when there is no competition for labour.
In discussions with Programme managers about the ability to pay more to enhance food 
security and have a greater impact on poverty, there was some support for a revision in 
the wage rate, especially if the increase took the form of a less prestigious product like 
maize. This leads to the next section dealing with the appropriate type of payment.
5.4.4 Type o f  Payment
In Mugu District the Programme pays participants in rice. There is much debate in the 
literature about whether cash payments or food payments are more effective for this type 
of social protection mechanism. While this remains an important question that will be 
dealt with later in this section, the analysis of the Programme in Mugu District 
highlighted the fact that the issue is not as simple as food versus cash. The type of food in 
which payment is made can also be very important to the effectiveness of the workfare 
program. Participants were asked about the type of payment they prefer.
Rice is a highly desired commodity. As an indication of the preference for rice in Mugu 
District, four of the participant households interviewed were food secure for 12 months of 
the year yet still wished to participate in the Programme in order to access rice. Their
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food security was gained through rice, millet, maize, wheat and potato, but they would 
prefer rice all year round if possible and hence were willing to undertake the hard 
physical labour required by the Programme in order to access the rice. All households 
would like to be able to consume rice but this preference, to some extent, distorts the 
Programme as food secure households still wish to access the Programme because of the 
type of food provided. There are so few food secure households in Mugu District that this 
has not been a great problem for the Programme to date, but if the Programme reaches its 
target coverage of 70 days per year, the participation of the food secure households will 
provide a greater drain on scarce resources.
A potential solution to the attractiveness of rice, which is drawing food secure households 
to the Programme, is to pay participants in maize. Maize is a poor person’s food and 
paying people in maize instead of rice would enhance the targeting of the Programme. In 
Bangladesh, when a food for work program switched from rice to maize, participation in 
the program decreased significantly (Dietz, 2006). Payment in maize would also 
potentially allow the payment of higher wages. Food secure households would be less 
inclined to participate and the trade-off between wages and effectiveness detailed in 
Chapter 3 may be reduced. The cost of maize is 40-60 percent lower than rice (ibid,
2006) which could free resources facilitating the inclusion of more people in the 
Programme. Cost-benefit analysis would have to weigh these potential benefits of maize 
against the increased cost of transport and storage associated with maize. Also, maize 
does not last as long as rice and more maize is required to match the calorific value of 
rice.
In some of the more integrated areas in which the RCIW Programme operates, the 
Programme managers are starting to trial cash payments or a mixture of cash and food. In 
remote areas such as Mugu, however, payment continues in food and it is unlikely that 
cash payments will be made, at least in the near future. The interviewed Programme 
participants all preferred payment in food as opposed to cash because, due to the 
inefficiency of the market, food would otherwise be difficult to obtain.
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The preference of the participants for food supports some analysis conducted by WFP 
(Dietz, 2006) on food versus cash payments for the RCIW Programme. The conclusion of 
the analysis was that where work offered in mountainous areas was less than 50 days, the 
provision of food is preferable. For work more than 50 days, a mixture of cash and food 
was recommended and it was highlighted that for the Kamali region in particular this 
could result in large savings given the administrative costs of procurement and transport 
of the food. A key finding was that when longer term employment is offered (50 days or 
more) the provision of cash, or a mixture of food and cash, will allow people to invest in 
productive assets as their other expenses will be covered (ibid). Given the depth of food 
insecurity in Mugu District it is unlikely that this would be the case for some of the 
chronically poor households who are food insecure for a significant part of the year, 
unless higher wages could be paid.
Perhaps the key disadvantage with regard to the provision of cash in the mountainous 
areas such as Mugu District is the cost related to the time and effort for households to buy 
the required food. Each household would have to send people for what are often very 
long and arduous journeys to the nearest road to buy the food, depriving the household of 
an economically active member for that period (ibid). Even within the RCIW 
Programme, this physical transport issue causes problems for some households. The rice 
is not always delivered to people’s doorsteps. Under the Programme, “Rice for 
Porterage” arrangements have been made for some of the remote districts like Jumla but 
the porters are very poorly paid (WFP, 2005b). The work is sometimes undertaken 
because it is thought to be the only way to get the rice to their homes.
There have been reports in other food for work programs that food is often more 
preferred by women as it is more likely to benefit the family than cash which can be used 
in ways which are not necessarily beneficial for the household (WFP, 2003). Perhaps 
because of the depth of the food insecurity and the small amount of work offered at this 
time, there was little evidence to suggest that the female participants were more biased 
towards using the income as food. The data did show, however, that of the 18 percent of 
participants who reported using some of their income gained under the Programme for
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things other than food, school or livelihood enhancement, all were men. Every female 
participant used the income as food.
In summary, the respondents were not against receiving cash instead of food if the food 
was available to purchase. If the Programme continues after the completion of the road 
and goods are getting through to the district, this could be an option.
5.4.5 Accompanying Strategies
The productive micro projects and the complementary activities are playing an 
increasingly larger role in the RCIW programme. These accompanying strategies are 
extremely important for the chronically poor because, as highlighted by Dietz (2006; 28), 
“highly food insecure families who rely mainly on their labour as entitlement may benefit 
very little in terms of increased food security from new roads”. Road access can break 
down the constraint of isolation which has been confining economic development but, 
unless the population has the ability to make use of the road and the opportunities it 
brings, it may take a long time before the reduced isolation has any real impact on the 
population’s well being. The accompanying strategies could be conceptualised as 
improving the initial conditions of the chronically poor referred to in Chapter 2. The 
participants were questioned about their participation in micro projects and their 
assessment of the potential benefits of the projects. They were also asked about other 
types of activities in which they would like to participate.
At the time of data collection, the Programme was increasing the requirement for 
resources being utilised for accompanying strategies from 20 percent of the total 
Programme to 30 percent. Until this point, resources that were not utilised on the 
accompanying strategies could be used on the core project. This has now also changed 
and it is a requirement for the full 30 percent to be utilised on the accompanying 
strategies.
The main productive micro projects created so far in the surveyed area are apple 
orchards. The aim is to have productive orchards by the time the road is completed. All of
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the interviewed RCIW participants also participated in the orchards’ development. They 
are all hopeful that when the road is completed the apples can be transported to other 
regions providing them with some increased income.
A complementary activity that was undertaken in Gamtha village by the interviewed 
participants in that village was the construction of drinking water facilities at a local 
secondary school. This has obvious potential health benefits for the students. Because of 
the conflict, other complementary activities, such as the Participatory Learning Actions 
which focuses on literacy and numeracy have not yet commenced in Mugu District but 
will be commencing soon.
When questioned about what sort of productive micro projects or complementary 
activities the participants would like to have access to, the overwhelming answer from all 
respondents was that they would like to participate in any project that could enhance their 
future earning potential. Due to the isolation of the region, they have not had access to the 
many development activities that exist in other areas of the country. The recent Maoist 
conflict has compounded this problem, and RCIW is the only program that operates in 
the region. The types of livelihood activities they mentioned included things such as bee 
keeping, knitting and sewing, but they were completely open to any suggestions of how 
best they could improve their earnings potential.
There are currently no conditions on participation in the Programme that could help 
support the dismantling of other constraints that are keeping people in chronic poverty. 
Examples given in Chapter 3 referred to conditionality of participation on things such as 
sending children to school or attending classes on literacy or health and nutrition. The 
issue was discussed with Programme managers and it was seen as something that could 
be investigated in the next phase of the Programme. With the current state of the 
Programme in Mugu District - that is, the limited working days offered each year - the 
Programme does not have a great deal of bargaining power to enforce the conditions but, 
if it increases the work days available, there may be greater ability to introduce 
conditions.
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There is no evidence yet that working on the Programme is seen by the participants as a 
right. But neither is there any evidence that not seeing it as a right is impacting on 
participation as it did in the MEGS scheme where people of higher castes were less likely 
to participate until access to work was accepted as a right. Every household is 
participating so there is no evidence of any stigma attached to working on the 
Programme. However, one of the key benefits of viewing work as a right comes with the 
acceptance of responsibilities associated with that right. It is likely that any potential 
conditionalities will be more successfully adhered to if working on the Programme is 
viewed as a basic right.
5.4.6 Empowerment
The issue of empowerment is an extremely important part of how the RCIW Programme 
is able to address chronic poverty in Mugu District. The definition of empowerment in 
this thesis is in line with the UNDP’s definition; that is, “conditions necessary to enable 
the poor to take advantage of poverty-reduction opportunities by strengthening their 
socio-cultural, economic and political capabilities” (UNDP, 2004b; 2). The target 
population of the Programme has experienced extreme deprivation for as long as many of 
them can remember. This, combined with isolation, has removed the population from the 
development processes occurring in the rest of Nepal. In Chapter 2, resignation to 
poverty was discussed as being an important correlate to chronic poverty, manifesting 
itself in discouragement and risk aversion due to the belief that the poverty will endure no 
matter what action is taken (Aliber, 2001). Breaking the belief that poverty will endure, 
providing some hope that chronic conditions can be overcome and demonstrably 
providing the skills and assets for this to occur is key to combating chronic poverty.
The mere existence of the Programme in Mugu District in some ways has contributed to 
the empowerment of the local population. Just having access to a development program 
provides hope that conditions could improve. This, coupled with direct measures to 
increase the income and skills of the local population, is providing tremendous benefits in 
empowering the local population. The Programme has assisted with people being better
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able to work as a group, to coordinate their work and develop a feeling of unity. 
Individuals have been taught to manage groups and to develop leadership skills. The 
Programme has actively developed the concept of unity, coordination, and cooperation. 
Along the Sukhadhik-Gamgadhi road, 162 participants have been trained to lead 
construction. This group of leaders includes 16 females and 26 of lower castes. For each 
micro project, there is a committee of seven to nine members who make the decisions; 
half of these are female.
The Programme’s Participatory Learning and Action activities have not yet begun in 
Mugu District, but in other areas these activities have made significant gains in the area 
o f empowerment. People are brought together for issues-based discussions on matters 
such as child health and nutrition or savings and credit. The basic literacy and numeracy 
training provided can facilitate access to a multitude of livelihood enhancing 
opportunities. This training gives the participants the confidence to undertake activities 
outside the bounds of the Programme. The savings and credit groups created are linked to 
cooperatives that then play the support role in their future development.
In other RCIW Programme districts it has been found that through participation in groups 
started by the Programme, the participants “are becoming more vocal and confident.
They can better articulate their needs and priorities and demand information, extension 
services and resources from government and non-government service providers and local 
bodies. They are enabled to define their future development interventions themselves 
through solidarity, networking and linkage development (National Programme Support 
Unit, 2005; 15)” .
5.4.7 Stability
The conflict in Nepal impacted on the functioning of the Programme to a certain extent 
but it was supported by the Maoists as they recognised that it was providing important 
benefits to the targeted population who had been ignored by the state for so long. Given 
that this was one of the root causes of the conflict - a conflict which in many cases 
formed another layer of constraint on the chronically poor through interrupting livelihood
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strategies and schooling - RCIW’s efforts to address this root cause must be seen as an 
extremely important part of demonstrably providing benefits to the most vulnerable 
households, and therefore supporting stability.
5.5 Key Limitations
5.5.1 Limitations -  Programme Specific or a Function o f Workfare?
The RCIW Programme has much to offer the chronically poor participants in Mugu 
District and elsewhere, but it has some definite limitations, some of which have been 
discussed briefly in the previous sections. It is useful to consider these limitations in 
order to assess what are Programme specific and what reflect the limitations of workfare 
more generally. The criterion used for assessing what is specific to the Programme is 
whether the Programme could be modified to address the limitation. Those limitations 
that are a function of workfare programs cannot be addressed by the Programme; their 
impact can be reduced through modifications to the Programme but the limitation will 
remain in some form.
5.5.2 Programme Specific Limitations
This is not an evaluation, so every shortcoming of the Programme was not considered. 
The limitations listed below came directly from interviews with the participants, the 
Programme managers and from recent Programme reviews. The key limitations which 
are assessed as being specific to the RCIW Programme rather than being limitations of 
workfare schemes are:
1) Low wages - Wages are set at a base rate of four kilograms of rice per household per 
day’s work. The requirement to have low wages to allow the self-targeting aspect of 
workfare programs to function has been discussed earlier. There is a perceived trade­
off in the literature between a well-functioning scheme that has low wages and 
effective poverty alleviation. It has been assessed that because of the piece-rate way 
in which the wages are being paid it is currently possible to earn at least the average
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wage and more in some cases, but some still receive the below average wage. The use 
of maize could further increase wages paid.
2) Micro projects not linked well to core projects -  The rationale for linking the micro 
projects to the core road projects is to provide the target community with the skills 
and livelihoods to effectively make use of the road on completion. The extent to 
which this is able to occur depends on things such as the assessments of the markets 
in which the goods will be sold and the potential income opportunities to be derived 
from the projects. One of the Programme managers interviewed expressed doubts 
about the ability of some of the micro projects to provide the promised benefits. The 
orchards, for example, could be profitable for a household but, shared by the 
community, may only provide minimal income in some cases.
3) Road selection sometimes politically driven -  WFP’s Vulnerability Analysis and 
Mapping, their key analytical tool to determine food insecurity, is not being utilised 
in the planning process of road selection. A WFP review of RCIW found that some 
roads are being selected randomly in areas where the district administration was not 
providing cash-based support and hence are politically motivated decisions (WFP, 
2005b).
4) Self-targeting hindered by quota system, payment in rice and lack of alternatives for 
less poor households -  The self-targeting feature of the RCIW Programme has been 
severely hindered by the limitation of work to, in most cases, one person per 
household. People are not able to maximise their welfare and improve their food 
security by making their own judgements about what would constitute the best use of 
their household labour resources to work on the Programme. The self-targeting 
function of the scheme is further eroded by the payment in rice combined with the 
lack of employment alternatives for less poor households. This has resulted in these 
less poor households participating in the Programme in order to obtain the desirable 
commodity of rice. Evidence from other workfare programs suggests that payment in 
a less desirable commodity will reduce the beneficiaries (WFP, 2003), and hence, 
improve the targeting of the Programme.
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5) Rice distribution delayed -  All of the interviewed participants stated that the work 
was available at the right time of the year, but some reported that the rice was not 
delivered when it should have been. WFP has done much to address the problems of 
the quality of rice and the timeliness of delivery but more needs to be done on the 
latter given the extreme nature of the food security situation in many of the areas in 
which the Programme operates.
6)  Not enough resources to cover all of the participants who want work -  Development 
programs are typically of a finite size; donors have annual budgets which cannot be 
exceeded. The demand for work in the target areas suggests that the RCIW 
Programme is underfunded. Responding to a call for workers in Mugu District, 7,000 
people once turned up for work designated to be completed by 2,000 people, resulting 
in the extra 5,000 people having to be turned away. The reduced number of days’ 
work offered has resulted in the participants emphasising the livelihood protection 
function of the Programme more than its livelihood promotion capability. The 
Programme can still operate underfunded to a certain extent, but the availability of 
resources constrains it from operating in a way that will best achieve the stated 
objectives of the Programme.
7) No analysis of needs of different areas/households -  While WFP Vulnerability 
Analysis and Mapping has been used to select new RCIW Programme districts, there 
is little differentiation across the Programme in relation to the varying needs of 
different areas and the households within those areas. Programme targets are set in 
the same way, that is four kilograms per participant per day and 70 days of work. If 
the days of work target could be met or if the Programme was truly self-targeting this 
would not be such a limitation. The problem arises because of the resource constraint 
which has not only limited the number of people who are able to participate but also 
means that the Programme is not offering the planned 70 days of work. Different 
numbers of days work are offered in different areas, but this is generally not based on 
the assessed needs of the population. Having the same Programme targets in different
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areas, regardless of the various levels of food insecurity, ignores the very real 
differences in the people’s welfare.
8) Increased participation at cost of quality -  A common response to delays in the 
Programme is to increase participation. If there are 40 days left o f work to do but only 
10 days left to do it in, extra labour is recruited. As mentioned earlier, this practice 
does not necessarily reduce the household’s access to food in Mugu District, but there 
have been problems with regards to the assets being constructed. It has been reported 
that when too many people participate, supervisory structures are not adequate and 
asset quality can suffer.
9) Poor maintenance of roads -  Programme managers acknowledge the difficulties with 
road maintenance and have found that adequate maintenance has only really occurred 
when the road is well used. In these cases transport operators and the local 
community have worked together to maintain the roads. Maintenance is the 
responsibility of the village and District authorities, but this role has generally not 
been fulfilled due to budget constraints. In Mugu District, participants reported 
uncleared landslides and collapsed walls. The issue of maintenance is becoming one 
of high importance to the Programme managers and greater pressure is being put on 
the government to fulfil its obligations.
101 Culture of dependency - One of the Programme managers mentioned a concern 
about a culture of dependency developing in some RCIW areas. People are becoming 
used to work which, in the absence of the Programme, would not be provided and the 
Programme manager viewed RCIW as keeping people in areas artificially. This may 
be the case in some RCIW operating districts but in the Kamali Zone, until the 
population has access to basic infrastructure and services - and thus has the ability to 
express its capabilities - no judgement can be made about whether the Programme is 
creating a culture of dependency. It is mentioned here because it could become a 
limitation of the Programme in the future.
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While the above are limitations of the RCIW Programme, not of workfare programs in 
remote rural environments more generally, it is important that these limitations not be 
discounted as they do represent real shortcomings of the Programme as it is currently 
functioning. They have negatively impacted on the Programme’s ability to have the 
greatest impact on its target population. The important point about these limitations is 
that they can be addressed through modifications to the Programme. Development 
programs are not static; they often have deficiencies that can be corrected, and it is hoped 
that in the next phase of RCIW, from 2008, many of the above issues will be addressed. It 
is recognised, however, that in a large, multi-stakeholder Programme such as RCIW 
some of these limitations will be extremely difficult to address.
5.5.2 Limitations o f Workfare
The limitations of the Programme listed below have been assessed to reflect more the 
limitation of the social protection mechanism of workfare than any fault with the 
Programme. The key limitations of workfare in addressing chronic poverty in remote 
rural areas are assessed as:
1) Non-working poor are physically unable to participate -  Working on the RCIW 
Programme involves strenuous physical activity. The elderly, the disabled, the sick 
and pregnant women are unable to participate in the core projects or the physically 
demanding micro projects. In discussions with the Programme managers, there was 
some disagreement about the extent to which the non-working poor were able to 
participate. The donors said that they were encouraged to participate in the 
complementary activities but the government representative said that this was a 
program for the working poor. Because PLA activities had not started in Mugu at the 
time of data gathering, this could not be assessed.
2) Access to Programme reduced if not near major asset like road corridor-  The Mugu 
District has a reasonably concentrated population around the road corridor which has 
facilitated the participation of 43 percent of households. While this is relatively high 
compared to the other districts in the Kamali Zone, it is still less than half of the
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households. The introduction of PLIC has in some way addressed the issue of 
households not being near the road, but there are still many households in the district 
that are unable to access work.
3) Programme constructed assets of substandard quality -  This was discussed above in 
the context of the equity-efficiency trade-off; that is, the requirement for labour 
intensive methods at the cost of quality assets. There is evidence that the assets are 
sometimes not of a high standard. For example, in Mugu District cement is not used; 
walls are made of mud and stone and so can be vulnerable to collapse. While more of 
a Programme-specific issue than a workfare issue more generally, also hindering asset 
quality was the report in Mugu District that construction materials were often 
delayed. The Programme can address quality issues to a certain extent but it is likely 
that they will remain in some form. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the limitation 
of less than perfect assets must be viewed in light of the fact that an imperfectly 
constructed asset that is useful to the local population is better than the alternative of 
no assets at all.
4)  Less access for women who, even in slack seasons, still need to undertake household 
duties -  Because women shoulder a disproportionate part of the burden of domestic 
duties, they are less able to participate in programs which involve their time.
The above listed limitations will remain in some form despite modifications to the
Programme. However, the Programme can take some action to reduce the impact of these
limitations. The Programme-specific aspects which could be altered to somewhat offset
the inherent problems of workfare in remote rural areas include:
a) increasing access of the non-working poor to complementary activities;
b) ensuring that technical and supervisory skills are of high quality and have experience 
in labour-intensive construction methods;
c) extending the coverage of asset creation programs such as PLIC to households not in 
easy proximity to the core infrastructure project; and,
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d) improving women’s access to the Programme by providing childcare services (as is 
done as part of MEGS in India) and compensating women adequately for their time, 
such as providing payment for attending training courses. It is key that quality care is 
provided which goes beyond mere child minding.
Few development programs have all of the solutions for all parts of the population. The 
four key limitations of the workfare program operating in remote rural environments like 
Mugu can be ameliorated to a certain extent but will remain and will have to be dealt 
with by other interventions. These interventions will also have to address the other key 
constraints for the chronically poor in areas such as health, education and discrimination. 
Overwhelmingly though, the key limitations o f the Programme in Mugu are Programme 
specific and can be addressed. Even those which, in most of the literature on workfare 
schemes, are seen as limitations of workfare as a social protection mechanism for the 
very poor, such as the payment of higher wages, can potentially be addressed by the 
Programme. A recent WFP review of the RCIW Programme agrees with the finding that 
it is mostly the Programme which requires changes not the chosen delivery mechanism 
(WFP, 2005b). It states that despite the criticisms of RCIW “the need for RCIW to 
continue is greater than ever before” (ibid; 5). The review stresses that it is the 
Programme’s design compounded with implementation problems which is the issue, not 
the concept of workfare in these environments.
5.6 Summary of Main Findings
5.6.1 Chronic Poverty in Mugu District
The fieldwork in Mugu District confirmed that there are spatial concentrations of 
chronically poor people. There is a distinct geographical aspect to the chronic poverty 
experienced by the respondents, and reducing their isolation is the population’s main 
priority in their own efforts to improve their well-being. Other dimensions to their 
poverty such as discrimination, lack of education and lack of access to health facilities 
were seen as important issues to be overcome, but all were secondary to the geographical 
constraint.
139
While geography was the key articulated constraint for the chronically poor, there was no 
stated desire to move to more integrated areas where economic opportunities could be 
greater. Indeed, the desire of the respondents to stay with their families in their villages in 
Mugu District was so great that working on the RCIW Programme was viewed as 
preferable to migration even if it meant earning less income.
The Programme is viewed as a safety net for the chronically poor, but it is also 
recognised as having the potential to promote livelihoods. The longer-term development 
benefit was valued by the chronically poor, providing some hope that, even when the 
short-term benefits end, the Programme will still have a positive impact on their well­
being and potentially provide an escape route from poverty.
5.6.2 What can Workfare do for the Chronically Poor?
The chronically poor receive three key benefits from participating in the RCIW 
Programme; income, assets and insurance.
The income provided by the RCIW Programme is mainly used to cover the interviewed 
chronically poor’s immediate need for food. The food provides valuable calories, 
improving household members’ ability to work and leam. Some households reported also 
utilising the extra income for schooling and livelihood activities which provides a direct 
way to address some of the other constraints which are keeping them poor.
The key asset, the Sukhadhik-Gamgadhi road, provided through the Programme will 
reduce isolation and open the district to benefits available in more integrated areas. The 
constraint of isolation will be dismantled to a certain extent. Already the population is 
starting to experience some benefits even though the road is not yet motorable and, due to 
the spatial concentration of the chronically poor in the region, they are the main 
beneficiaries of the asset creation. The roads may not be of the standard of comparable 
roads close to Kathmandu where heavy machinery can be used but they function well
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enough to justify their construction, especially given that it would be unlikely that they 
would be constructed at all in the Programme’s absence.
Providing the chronically poor participating households with a level of insurance in the 
form of guaranteed annual work allows decisions regarding household welfare to be 
planned in advance. Having a level of insurance can reduce the need for the chronically 
poor to engage in unsustainable or unwanted coping strategies.
The impact of the income, assets and insurance offered through the Programme to the 
chronically poor in Mugu District could all be improved through modifications to the 
Programme. For the purposes of this analysis, that the Programme is not currently 
achieving all of its stated objectives is not important. The examination of the Programme 
flaws and how they can be rectified emphasises the potential capability of the 
Programme, and this highlights the important point for this analysis, which is that this 
capability exists.
5.6.3 How can Workfare Address Chronic Poverty?
The RCIW Programme in Mugu District was able to provide income, assets and 
insurance through: its use of labour; targeting food insecure households; the wage rate 
that is paid; the method and type of payment; the accompanying strategies; the 
empowerment of the participants; and, the contribution to stability. Not all these 
components of how the Programme is able to address chronic poverty are currently 
functioning to their full capacity but, again, it is their potential that is the main concern of 
this analysis.
The opportunity cost associated with the Programme’s use of labour was found to be 
generally low. That is, it was not displacing any particularly productive pursuits and it 
reduced the search and transport costs associated with finding off-season employment. 
This means that the transfer benefit, the income the participants receive, is not unduly 
reduced by productive work forgone. There was an interesting exception to this involving 
people who used to migrate to India during difficult times, and who earned more than
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they do now working on RCIW, but who prefer to work on RCIW as it allows them to be 
with their families. This has benefits for other members of the household and it indicates 
that the costs of some coping strategies may sometimes be hidden. The use of labour was 
also shown to be key as, without it, assets could not be created and it is these assets which 
are facilitating the breakdown of the chronically poor’s isolation constraint. It is also 
important for the reasons of empowerment and skills transfer.
Correct targeting ensures that the income and insurance benefits of the Programme 
accrue to the most food insecure households. At the household level, the Programme is 
self-targeting; that is, households identify themselves as requiring work. At the individual 
level, the Programme no longer becomes self-targeting. Due to resource constraints the 
Programme cannot accommodate everyone who would like to work. The most 
chronically poor do receive some concessions to improve their access to work (in the 
form of two household members being allowed to participate in the Programme) but, if 
there were no constraints to participation, chronically poor households would be able to 
make their own decisions about how to best maximise their welfare.
The higher the wage rate, the larger the transfer of resources to the chronically poor, 
which impacts on their asset accumulation and their income. The wage rate is set low for 
the Programme, as it is for most workfare programs, but the method of the wage 
calculation, combined with the increased value of the wage due to geographical factors 
(limited market access pushing up the price of goods in remote areas) meant that the 
actual wage received for RCIW Programme participants was generally higher than the 
average wage. This has positive implications for the Programme’s ability to address 
chronic poverty, but this benefit was reduced due to the resource limitations which have 
restricted working days.
The piece rate method of payment utilised by the Programme is popular with the 
chronically poor. It allows flexible use of household resources to maximise income. The 
type of payment offered by the Programme, rice, is also popular with the chronically 
poor as it provides them with access to a commodity that they would otherwise be unable
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to afford but to a certain extent it is draining the Programme of valuable resources. 
Payments in maize may not be as popular with the chronically poor, but maize may have 
the benefit of excluding the less poor households and therefore allowing an increase in 
transfers to chronically poor households.
The benefits the road will bring to the chronically poor in the future are enhanced by the 
Programme’s accompanying strategies. In Mugu District the micro projects are in their 
early stages and most complementary activities are yet to begin, but there is tremendous 
enthusiasm for them amongst the chronically poor. The road alone would assist the 
chronically poor, but preparing the population to make the best use of the road to enhance 
their livelihoods and well-being is a sensible strategy.
Despite their extreme needs, the chronically poor in Mugu District have been effectively 
ignored by development programs in Nepal. This isolation has impacted on the 
population’s empowerment which affects their ability to demand their rights and have 
the confidence to pursue different livelihood strategies. The road building activity 
actively tries to provide leadership skills to community members and promote a feeling 
of unity. Other complementary activities yet to begin in Mugu District will further 
develop this and provide other skills. By becoming more vocal and confident, Programme 
participants have greater options open to them to define their futures.
The contribution to the stability of a country or region that social protection mechanisms 
can offer should not be underestimated. Nepal experienced ten years of often extremely 
violent fighting which initially stemmed from a political party being able to mobilise a 
body of fighters from two districts who felt that their basic needs were not being met and 
that they were being ignored by the state. When parts of any population are ignored there 
is the potential for unrest, and this has been well demonstrated in the case of Nepal. 
Although the Programme cannot take any of the credit for the peace agreement signed in 
2006, its continued operation can only help to consolidate peace in Nepal. This additional 
constraint of conflict on the chronically poor has now been lifted.
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C H A P T E R  6
Conclusion
This thesis has analysed the synergies between chronic poverty, social protection and 
remote rural areas, especially mountainous areas. Given the particular characteristics of 
chronic poverty and remote rural areas, social protection theoretically appeared to be a 
good match in being able to address some of the main constraints of the chronically poor 
living in these areas. This theory was tested in Mugu District of the extremely deprived 
Kamali Zone of Mid Western Nepal, and the findings were largely supportive of the 
hypothesis. Although the social protection mechanism examined, the workfare program, 
was not operating to its full capacity in the case study area, it clearly has the necessary 
capabilities to address some of the main concerns of the chronically poor. In particular, it 
has the potential to address the key articulated constraint experienced by the chronically 
poor, which is isolation from markets and basic services experienced as a result of living 
in a remote rural mountainous region.
The poor in Nepal are not a homogenous group; 31 percent of Nepal’s population are 
assessed to be in poverty, but those in chronic poverty, such as the majority of the 
population in the case study area, require a recognition of the particular nature of their 
vulnerability, and the various constraints prohibiting them from exiting poverty, in order 
that appropriate strategies are used to address these conditions. How best to protect 
existing livelihoods and promote alternatives can only be determined through social 
protection and other development strategies if there is a clear understanding of the needs 
of the population. This thesis has argued that the workfare program has some inherent 
advantages which allow it to address some of the specific needs of the chronically poor in 
remote rural areas and it is able to effectively function as both an ex ante and ex poste 
measure in addressing these needs.
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As per Diagram 4 below, workfare programs are shown to be able to provide three main 
benefits - income, assets and insurance - that the chronically poor need in order to assist 
them to extricate themselves from chronic poverty. It is not a cure-all, and other 
supportive interventions are required (such as interventions which improve health and 
education services and break down entrenched discriminatory practices), but it does lay 
the foundations for the chronically poor to be able to help themselves. How it is able to 
achieve these results all fit well with the specific nature o f chronic poverty and remote 
rural areas and all work to assist the chronically poor to not fall further into poverty and 
to support exit strategies from poverty.
Diagram 4 -  Workfare -  Benefiting the Chronically Poor in Remote Rural Areas
Assets
Income Insurance
- Use of labour
- Wage rate
- Targeting
- Payment method
- Type of payment
- Accompanying strategies
- Empowerment
- Stability
1 I Key benefits of workfare programs for the chronically poor in remote rural areas 
I I How workfare programs achieve these benefits
Source: Author
145
In terms of what workfare is able to do for the chronically poor in remote rural areas, the 
results of the case study were strongest in the areas of assets and income. It is well 
acknowledged in the literature that a lack of assets provide one of the key obstacles to the 
chronically poor being able to escape from poverty. Ownership of assets reduces the 
vulnerability of the population. The RCIW Programme participants showed particular 
enthusiasm for this part of the Programme even though most of the assets being 
constructed were communal. They recognise that isolation is the key constraint which is 
keeping them poor and addressing this constraint, through the construction of the 
communal asset of the road, has the potential to provide them with a number of 
opportunities which they assessed as being able to significantly improve their well-being. 
When the road is completed, there is still scope for the Programme to continue providing 
assets, for example, health and sanitation facilities and assets such as irrigation which 
would improve livelihoods. In remote rural areas, where there are spatial concentrations 
of chronic poverty, the benefit of workfare programs in terms of the provision of assets is 
potentially higher than for more integrated areas as the benefits from nearly all of the 
constructed assets accrue to the target population. In more integrated areas, evidence 
shows that they tend to accrue to others, often the non-poor.
In relation to the provision of income, the case study showed a particular appreciation 
among Programme participants of this short-term benefit. A lack o f income in the short­
term is typically associated with transitional poverty but not having enough food to eat is 
also a very real problem of the chronically poor which can entrench long-term poverty in 
a number of ways such as the health and productivity impacts of low calorie intake and 
being away from the household pursuing coping strategies, which was shown to 
negatively impact on things such as children’s schooling. Income can also more directly 
impact on longer-term welfare when enough work is provided to cover immediate 
consumption needs, leaving funds to be invested for the long-term in such things as 
livelihoods and education which can help to dismantle chronic poverty.
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The benefit of the insurance function of workfare programs was less evident in the case 
study analysis than that of the provision of assets and income, but this was perhaps more 
because of the current functioning of the RCIW Programme than any inherent weakness 
in workfare as a social protection mechanism. There was some insurance benefit realised 
within the case-study analysis, but there was no evidence of people now undertaking 
more productive strategies because the Programme had reduced risks. This can be blamed 
to some extent on the problem of limited work days offered by the Programme, but it 
could also be due to the fact that in remote rural areas, such as the Kamali Zone, 
livelihood options are extremely limited. If RCIW remains after the road is completed 
and operating, and thus the isolation constraint is addressed to a certain extent, it is more 
likely that people will then start to appreciate the insurance benefit that RCIW offers and 
take some risks to improve their livelihoods with the knowledge that the RCIW will be 
there as a safety net to catch them if required. Having this reliable safety net has the 
ability to perform both income protection and promotion functions.
In the context of the insurance benefit, it is important to note that the existence of the 
workfare program in the case study area has not resulted in the crowding out of well­
functioning traditional safety nets, primarily because these safety nets did not exist. The 
spatial concentration of chronically poor people reduced the number of effective coping 
strategies as poor-to-poor transfers offer little assistance in difficult periods. The coping 
strategies being utilised were mostly undesirable or unsustainable; both offering 
inadequate security.
The benefits of income, assets and insurance can assist in providing an exit route from 
chronic poverty, but the issue of “distance” referred to in Chapter 2 remains. Many of the 
poor who are able to extricate themselves from poverty do not rise far above the poverty 
line. The case study data did not allow an analysis of this issue because the majority of 
the chronically poor in the Kamali Zone are yet to exit poverty, but it is an important area 
for future research.
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The ways in which the income, asset and insurance benefits are earned by the chronically 
poor in remote rural areas are as important as the benefits themselves. The eight key 
elements of workfare programs listed below enhance the ability of the programs to 
provide the benefits that address the particular needs of the chronically poor in remote 
rural areas. These components are:
1) Use of labour -  Without the labour intensive approach of workfare programs, only a 
transfer could be made and there would be no asset construction, which is key to 
assisting the chronically poor. Using labour in a remote area does not have the same 
opportunity cost as in more integrated areas with greater access to employment 
opportunities.
2) Targeting -  If a workfare program is truly self-targeting, it allows the chronically 
poor to utilise their household resources to maximise their welfare. Errors of 
exclusion can be eliminated.
3) Wage rate -  There is a greater potential to pay higher wages in remote rural areas 
where there is a spatial concentration of chronically poor, especially if participation is 
restricted to those from the target geographical area. The cost of the inclusion errors 
would be lower than in more integrated areas especially if payment is made in a poor 
person’s commodity.
4) Method of payment -  The flexibility of the piece-rate method suits the chronically 
poor.
5) Type of payment -  Food is preferred in remote rural areas as the chronically poor 
have a need for an immediate calorie boost if food insecure and, in remote rural areas, 
the isolation from markets means that it could take a long time to purchase this food 
with cash. If a poor person’s food is used, such as maize in the case study example, 
this improves targeting to the chronically poor.
6) Accompanying strategies - The chronically poor receive long term benefits from 
activities that boost their ability to make use of the core asset. Communities can be 
assisted to make the most from any niche advantages that the remote rural area 
enjoys.
7) Empowerment -  The chronically poor require empowerment in part because of their 
isolation in remote rural areas. Such empowerment strategies can improve the
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confidence of the chronically poor to undertake strategies that benefit their well-being 
and assist them in escaping chronic poverty.
8) Stability -  The enhancement of stability through access to social protection for poor 
and vulnerable communities can be extremely important in potentially volatile 
environments.
These elements assist in providing the asset, income and insurance benefits to the 
chronically poor in remote rural areas but the complementarity can also be viewed the 
other way; that is, it is the nature of the poverty and the remoteness of the region which 
makes the workfare program more successful than in other areas. For example, higher 
wages do help the chronically poor in more integrated areas too, but it is the geographical 
constraint experienced in remote rural areas, creating a spatial concentration of 
chronically poor, which allows the workfare program to pay higher wages in remote rural 
areas as there is a lower risk of inclusion errors.
What has not been mentioned above, in terms of how workfare programs best provide the 
benefits to those in chronic poverty, is the length of the program. Chronic poverty is 
defined by its duration, and any social protection strategies which attempt to address it 
must be available over the longer term to provide the security of benefits which will 
protect people from falling further into poverty but also facilitate a sustainable exit from 
poverty. It is thus a key assumption that workfare programs will only be successful in 
addressing the constraints of the chronically poor in remote rural areas if they are in place 
for the length of time appropriate to the need, which is unlikely to be short-term.
Given the strong evidence of the ability of social protection strategies to address chronic 
poverty, they can no longer be viewed as simple welfare mechanisms. Transfers through 
social protection mechanisms do not represent charitable handouts, but rather a 
contribution to the basic entitlements of often-vulnerable populations which assist them 
to maintain a minimum standard of well-being and support their livelihoods. In choosing 
appropriate interventions to address the immediate and longer-term needs of the
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chronically poor, the choice is not between welfare mechanisms and growth-oriented 
development interventions. Social protection clearly has the potential to act as both a 
safety net and a ladder even for the chronically poor who suffer under a number of 
constraints. It offers active pathways out of chronic poverty and even in performing its 
safety net function, provides a security of income that has the potential to act as a 
livelihood promotion measure.
Social protection, and workfare in particular, is extremely well suited to operating in the 
remote rural mountainous area of the Kamali Zone in Nepal, which has high 
concentrations of chronically poor. The complementarities are such that, in these 
environments, it goes beyond being a strategy which could be used to address chronic 
poverty to being a strategy which should be used and it has the potential to function 
similarly well in comparable areas elsewhere.
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Appendix 1
Questionnaire -  ROW  Participants and Non-Participants
Before the questions were posed to the participants and non-participants, a wealth 
ranking exercise was undertaken to determine the factors that the residents considered 
important in determining wealth. As part of this exercise, people were also questioned 
about harvest and plantation times and when the majority of the population experienced 
the hungry seasons.
PARTICIPANTS OF RCIW
1) Questions to determine basic details: age; household composition at varying times of 
the year (including how many contribute economically); ethnicity/caste; gender; 
schooling; school attendance of male and female children; assets (especially land 
ownership); access to basic services, e.g. health, education, water, sanitation.
- Chronic poverty:
2) X and X are typically known as the hungry seasons. Do you experience this? i.e. are 
there times o f  the year where you don ’t have enough food?
2a) Every year or just some years?
2b) Do these seasons correspond to when RCIW is available?
2c) Now enough food or not? If not, how many months?
2d) Rice received when needed or afterwards?
To facilitate the answering o f these questions people were to asked to talk about the 
availability o f  food throughout the year with local events/festivals marking different 
points in the year.
3) Has RCIW helped you to improve your life or is its value mainly that it has helped 
things to not get worse?
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Income:
4) What do you use your project earnings for?
Assets:
5) How useful do you expect the road/trail you are building will be to you?
5a) What difference will it make to your life? e.g What do you expect the benefits will be 
on completion?
6) Do you agree with the construction of this road or do you think that there would be 
more benefit to you/ your community if you were able to constmct something else? e.g. 
a) irrigation b) school building c) sanitation facilities d) water supply
Insurance:
7) How effective has the RCIW program been at providing insurance (i.e. stopping things 
getting worse) during difficult periods? e.g. a) enough work when you need it? b) food  
sufficient?
8) Before RCIW what did you do during difficult periods? e.g. migrate, sell assets etc 
8a) What do you do now during difficult periods?
9) Does the existence of the program have any impact on you or your family at other 
times of the year? e.g. a) Has the existence o f the scheme allowed you to pursue any 
production strategies that you may not otherwise have pursued because you know i f  they 
don ’t work out you ’ll have some type o f safety net? b) don’t go seeking work elsewhere 
because you know you ’ll have work near home when needed? c) at the times in the year 
when RCIW is not operating, is your life any different because you know you ’ll be able to 
get work when RCIW starts again?
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Labour:
10) What would you do during the period you work on RCIW if it did not exist? i.e. what 
did you do during the RCIW work period before RCIW came to the district?
11) Would your earnings be comparable (including search and travel costs)?
11 a) Do you earn more with RCIW or more with what you used to do?
12) Why do you prefer RCIW? eg a) less travel search costs, b) stay with family, c) 
better conditions.
Wages:
13) What would you like to be paid in? What is best? eg a) cash, b) rice c) maize d) 
wheat, e) mixture etc
13a) Why is this best?
14) How would you like to be paid? eg a) current method, b) time rate 
14a) Why do you prefer this method?
15) As far as you are aware, has the existence of the program affected wages outside the 
program? e.g. since the program started do you know o f  any changes in wages in the area 
that you think might be caused by RCIW?
Self Targeting:
16) What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the targeting of the scheme? e.g. a) 
can everyone work who wants to (including other people in your household who'd like to 
work)? b) is anyone accessing the scheme who shouldn’t? c) do you think that it is 
focused on the poorest community members?
Accompanying strategies:
17) Do you participate in RCIW’s micro projects?
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17a) If interviewee is a participant, then: What benefit do you get from participating in 
these projects (now and after road completion)?
17b) If interviewee is not a participant, then: Would you like to participate and why?
18) Are there other types of micro programs you would like to have access to? e.g. a) 
livelihood enhancement, b) microfinance, c) literacy, etc.
Empowerment:
19) Has the program affected you in any other way? e.g. a) leadership roles, b) have any 
groups formed etc. The information on empowerment is something that was established 
from general discussions with participants and Programme managers rather than this 
direct question.
- Quality:
20) Do you have any concerns about quality and maintenance of roads or other assets?
General Assessment:
21) What do you like most about RCIW?
21a) What do you most dislike (or would most like to change)?
NON-PARTICIPANTS
1) Questions to determine basic details (same details as for Programme participants).
2) X and X are typically known as the hungry seasons. Do you experience this? Every 
year or just some years?
3) Why don’t you participate in RCIW?
4) Does the existence of the Programme impact your life in any way?
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